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Abstract 
A meaning hypothesis to explain speakers’ choice of the sign look 
by 
Nadav Sabar 
 
Adviser: Professor Ricardo Otheguy 
 
The purpose of the meaning hypotheses advanced in this dissertation is to explain why speakers 
and writers choose the forms that they do in the course of documented acts of speaking or 
writing. The choice of interest is the decision to use look (or /lʊk/), particularly in situations 
where see, seem, and appear would at first glance seem to be just as appropriate. The answer to 
the question of why language users make the choices they do is cast in theoretical terms that rely 
on the construct of the sign (a synchronically stable form-meaning correspondence) rather than 
on the construct of the sentence. The analytical consequences of this decision regarding 
theoretical framework are laid out in detail. The explanation for the use of look is given in terms 
of a meaning hypothesis, a single invariant semantic value that, rather than encoding messages, 
functions as a communicative tool that merely facilitates or contributes to the communication of 
many different types of messages or message partials. The hypothesized meaning for look is 
summarized here in shorthand form as ATTENTION, VISUAL. This hypothesis by itself explains the 
full range of the distribution of look without the need to posit as linguistic units ‘look-noun’ and 
v 
 
‘look-verb’, ‘look-visual’ and ‘look-intellectual’, or constructions such as look-for, have-a-look, 
look-like, etc. Tentative meaning hypotheses are also posited for the forms see, seem and appear 
that explain speakers’ expressive choices between look and each of these other forms. Support 
for the meaning hypotheses comes in the form of (a) qualitative analyses of attested examples 
that demonstrate through the presence of redundant information in the text that the hypothesized 
meaning has motivated the choice of its corresponding signal, and (b) large-scale quantitative 
predictions – tested in the Corpus of Contemporary American English – of the regular co-
occurrence of look with other forms that, by hypothesis, are chosen to produce partially 
overlapping message effects. The meaning hypotheses of look as well as the other forms 
mentioned have led to the discovery of numerous peculiarities in the distribution of look that are 
noted here – and explained – for the first time. 
Keywords: sign, meaning, message partial, communication, lexical analysis, visual attention   
vi 
 
Acknowledgements 
This work is the result of collaborative efforts. First, I have been fortunate to receive the 
opportunity to present my work in progress throughout the past year at the Columbia School 
linguistics seminar. The discussions in these meetings have always been intellectually 
stimulating and nurturing, and most invaluable in the development of the hypotheses presented in 
this dissertation. All seminar attendees have contributed to this work, including in particular 
Nancy Stern, Joseph Davis, Alan Huffman and Radmila Gorup.  
I would like to specially thank Wallis Reid, with whom I have engaged in hundreds of 
email correspondences, ranging from the littlest to the most substantial of questions. Beginning 
from my first introduction to Columbia School linguistics about four years ago, I have insistently 
raised many challenges to this theoretical framework, and Wally has consistently taken the time 
to engage with me, thoroughly educating me in CS linguistics and providing me with the tools to 
do research.  
 Ricardo Otheguy has been the most rigorous reader of my work, always offering much 
needed encouragement along with incisive criticism and excellent advice, both in terms of 
content and organization. Our many hours of endless discussions have taught me a great deal 
about linguistic theory, and have had a lasting influence on me as both a scholar and a person. 
 I would also like to extend my gratitude to Juliette Blevins and Sam Al Khatib. Their 
excellent questions and criticisms have challenged me and pushed me to spell out as clearly and 
as fully as possible the theoretical assumptions and methodological procedures of CS linguistics, 
which many linguists are not familiar with.  
vii 
 
 Throughout the writing process I have been fortunate to receive the often necessary 
emotional support and encouragement from the members of my writing group: Michelle 
McSweeney, Ian Phillips, Emily Long Olsen, Joanna Birnbaum, and Ignacio Montoya. I could 
not have gotten through the task of completing this dissertation without the backing of these 
individuals. In particular points of distress and feeling that this work will never be completed, 
writing group has always been there to remind me of what I can do and to help me find the 
strength to do it.  
 My friends Oriel Sabah and Barry Kogan deserve mention as well. I feel so lucky to have 
such good close friends who are always open to listen to my intellectual endeavors and engage 
with me in fascinating conversations. My personal development as a thinker and scholar owes a 
great deal to our friendship. 
 Finally, my deepest gratitude extends to my wife and best friend, Shifi Rathaus. While I 
was the one doing the actual writing, it is no understatement to say that Shifi and I did this work 
together. Shifi has actively been involved in every bit of this process, beginning from developing 
the very initial ideas all the way to the fine details of particular arguments. Her support, 
encouragement and understanding throughout is beyond words. 
  
viii 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract   ………………………………………………………………………………….. iv  
Acknowledgements   ……………………………………………………………………… vi   
List of tables   …………………………………………………………………………….. xiii  
List of figures   ……………………………………………………………………………. xix  
Chapter I. The problem, methodology and theoretical background   ………………... 
1   Introduction   …………………………………………………………………………... 
2   The problem of the identification of linguistic units …………………………………... 
 2.1   The problem of identifying linguistic units based on syntactic categories   … 
2.2   The problem of identifying linguistic units based on cognitive status   …….. 
  2.2.1   The problem of stored sequences   ………………………………… 
  2.2.2   The problem of polysemy   ………………………………………… 
3   Methodology   …………………………………………………………………………. 
 3.1   Qualitative support based on redundant information in texts ……………… 
 3.2   Quantitative support based on overlapping communicative effects   ………... 
4   Preview of upcoming chapters   ……………………………………………………….. 
1 
1 
9 
10 
17 
18 
23 
25 
25 
28 
31 
Chapter II. ATTENTION, VISUAL as the explanation for speakers’ choice of look   …… 
1   Introduction   …………………………………………………………………………... 
34 
34 
ix 
 
2   The fit with messages involving acts of visual attention   …………………………….. 
3   The fit with messages where a visual stimulus is absent   …………………………….. 
4   The fit with messages involving the communication of one’s thoughts or feelings   …. 
5   The fit with messages involving attention-grabbing visual features   …………………. 
6   The fit with messages involving attribution based on visual attention   ……………….. 
7   The fit with messages involving either visual or intellectual attention   ………………. 
8   The fit with messages of searching   …………………………………………………… 
9   Look in combination with directional terms: up, down, forward, back and after   ……. 
10   Conclusion   …………………………………………………………………………... 
42 
43 
44 
46 
48 
52 
59 
62 
65 
Chapter III. Using big data to test the hypothesized meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL   …    
1   Introduction   …………………………………………………………………………... 
2   Methodology   …………………………………………………………………………. 
 2.1   The methodological problem   ………………………………………………. 
 2.2   Quantitative predictions test the generality of communicative strategies   …. 
 2.3   Justification of the inductive over the deductive approach   ………………… 
3   Supporting ATTENTION in the meaning of look   ………………………………………. 
 3.1   Using carefully to support ATTENTION   ……………………………………… 
 3.2   Using this to support ATTENTION   ……………………………………………. 
 3.3   Using but to support ATTENTION   ……………………………………………. 
 3.4   Using at to support ATTENTION   ……………………………………………... 
 3.5   Using deliberately to support ATTENTION   …………………………………… 
3.6   Using think to support ATTENTION   …………………………………………... 
67 
67 
69 
69 
71 
77 
81 
82 
88 
94 
97 
101 
104 
x 
 
4   Supporting VISUAL in the meaning of look   …………………………………………… 
 4.1   Using eye to support VISUAL   ………………………………………………... 
 4.2   Using painting to support VISUAL   …………………………………………… 
4.3   Using see to support VISUAL   ………………………………………………… 
5   Conclusion   ……………………………………………………………………………. 
107 
108 
109 
113 
114 
Chapter IV. ATTENTION, VISUAL in competition with the meanings of see, seem, and 
appear   ……………………………………………………………………..    
1   Introduction   …………………………………………………………………………... 
2   Look and see – ATTENTION, VISUAL versus EXPERIENCING VISUALLY   ………………… 
 2.1   The hypothesis of see as a monosemic sign   ………………………………… 
 2.2   ATTENTION as the explanation for the choice of look over see   ……………... 
  2.2.1   Using turn to to support ATTENTION   ……………………………… 
  2.2.2   Using notice to support ATTENTION   ………………………………. 
 2.3   EXPERIENCING as the explanation for the choice of see over look   ………….. 
  2.3.1   Using believe to support EXPERIENCING   …………………………... 
  2.3.2   Using understand to support EXPERIENCING   ………………………. 
  2.3.3   Using LESS CONTROL to support EXPERIENCING   …………………… 
3   Look and seem – ATTENTION, VISUAL versus PERSPECTIVE DEPENDENCY   ……………... 
 3.1   The hypothesis of seem as a monosemic sign   ………………………………. 
 3.2   VISUAL as the explanation for the choice of look over seem   ……………….. 
  3.2.1   Using green to support VISUAL   …………………………………… 
3.3   PERSPECTIVE DEPENDENCY as the explanation for the choice of seem over           
         
117 
117 
121 
121 
122 
122 
127 
130 
130 
132 
135 
138 
138 
140 
140 
            
xi 
 
look   …………………………………………………………………………. 
  3.3.1   Using logical to support PERSPECTIVE   ……………………………. 
  3.3.2   Using to me to support PERSPECTIVE   ……………………………… 
  3.3.3   Using at the time to support PERSPECTIVE   ………………………… 
4   Look and appear – ATTENTION, VISUAL versus INITIATION OF PERCEPTION   ……………. 
 4.1   The hypothesis of appear as a monosemic sign   …………………………….. 
 4.2   INITIATION as the explanation for the choice of appear over look   …………. 
  4.2.1   Using introduce to support INITIATION   …………………………… 
  4.2.2   Using first to support INITIATION   ………………………………….. 
  4.2.3   Using comparative adjectives to support INITIATION   ……………… 
  4.2.4   Using but to support INITIATION   …………………………………... 
 4.3   Messages involving visual features: look versus appearance   ……………… 
5   Conclusion   …………………………………………………………………………….. 
144 
144 
148 
150 
152 
153 
153 
153 
156 
159 
162 
164 
168 
Chapter V. Competing analyses of the meaning of look   ……………………………... 
1   Introduction   …………………………………………………………………………... 
2   A componential analysis   ……………………………………………………………… 
3   A construction grammar analysis   …………………………………………………….. 
4   A markedness analysis   ……………………………………………………………….. 
169 
169 
170 
177 
183 
Chapter VI. Theoretical excursus: a critique of William Diver’s approach to the 
grammar-lexicon divide, and a recapitulation of analytical 
assumptions and findings   ……………………………………………….    
1   Introduction   …………………………………………………………………………... 
                         
-  
187 
187 
xii 
 
2   The linguistic status of the categories of grammar and lexicon   ……………………… 
 2.1   The a priori assumption of a grammar-lexicon continuum   ………………… 
 2.2   The a priori assumption of polysemy in the lexicon   ……………………….. 
 2.3   The a priori assumption that only grammatical forms constrain one another  .  
2.4   The a priori assumption that lexical meanings are based on real-world 
categorizations   …………………………………………………………….    
2.5   Conclusion   ………………………………………………………………….. 
3   Recapitulations   ……………………………………………………………………….. 
188 
190 
192 
193 
 
194 
195 
196 
References   ………………………………………………………………………………..  205 
  
xiii 
 
List of Tables 
Chapter I 
  
Table 1 COCA searches for careful and first   ………………………………………. 29 
Table 2 Total COCA occurrences of careful and first in the presence and absence of 
look   ………………………………………………………………………… 
 
30 
Chapter III 
  
Table 1 COCA searches for notice and walk   ……………………………………….. 74 
Table 2 Total COCA occurrences of notice and walk in the presence and absence of 
look   ………………………………………………………………………… 
 
76 
Table 3 COCA searches for carefully and carelessly   ………………………………. 83 
Table 4 Total COCA occurrences of carefully and carelessly in the presence and 
absence of look   …………………………………………………………….. 
 
84 
Table 5 Total COCA occurrences of carefully and carelessly in the presence and 
absence of say   ……………………………………………………………… 
 
85 
Table 6 COCA searches for this and the   ……………………………………………. 09 
Table 7 Total COCA occurrences of this and the in the presence and absence of look 90 
Table 8 COCA searches for this and the (for have a look)   …………………………. 91 
Table 9 Total COCA occurrences of this and the in the presence and absence of have 
a look   ………………………………………………………………………. 
 
92 
Table 10 COCA searches for this and the (for look like)   …………………………….. 92 
Table 11 Total COCA occurrences of this and the in the presence and absence of look  
xiv 
 
like   ………………………………………………………………………….. 92 
Table 12 COCA searches for this and the (for glance)   ………………………………. 93 
Table 13 Total COCA occurrences of this and the in the presence and absence of 
glance   ………………………………………………………………………. 
 
93 
Table 14 COCA searches for this and the (for stare)   ………………………………... 94 
Table 15 Total COCA occurrences of this and the in the presence and absence of 
stare   ………………………………………………………………………... 
 
94 
Table 16 COCA searches for but and and   …………………………………………… 96 
Table 17 Total COCA occurrences of but and and in the presence and absence of look 96 
Table 18 COCA searches for at, on and in   …………………………………………... 90 
Table 19 Total COCA occurrences of at, on and in in the presence and absence of 
look   ………………………………………………………………………… 
 
99 
Table 20 COCA searches for deliberately and accidentally   …………………………. 102 
Table 21 Total COCA occurrences of deliberately and accidentally in the presence 
and absence of look   ………………………………………………………… 
 
102 
Table 22 COCA searches for think and believe   ……………………………………… 105 
Table 23 Total COCA occurrences of think and believe in the presence and absence 
of look   ……………………………………………………………………… 
 
105 
Table 24  Total COCA occurrences of thinking and believing in the presence and 
absence of look   …………………………………………………………….. 
 
107 
Table 25 COCA searches for eye and hand   ………………………………………….. 108 
Table 26 Total COCA occurrences of eye and hand in the presence and absence of 
look   ………………………………………………………………………… 
 
109 
xv 
 
Table 27 COCA searches for painting and music   ……………………………………. 110 
Table 28 Total COCA occurrences of painting and music in the presence and absence 
of look   ……………………………………………………………………… 
 
110 
Table 29 COCA searches for tree and idea   ………………………………………….. 112 
Table 30 Total COCA occurrences of tree and idea in the presence and absence of 
look   ………………………………………………………………………… 
 
112 
Table 31 COCA searches for see and say   ……………………………………………. 113 
Table 32 Total COCA occurrences of see and say in the presence and absence look   .. 114 
Chapter IV 
  
Table 1 COCA searches for turn to   ………………………………………………… 124 
Table 2 Total COCA occurrences of look and see in the presence and absence of 
turn to   ………………………………………………………………………. 
 
124 
Table 3 COCA searches for turn to a   ………………………………………………. 126 
Table 4 Total COCA occurrences of turn to look and turn to see in the presence and 
absence of a   ………………………………………………………………... 
 
126 
Table 5 COCA searches for notice   …………………………………………………. 129 
Table 6 Total COCA occurrences of look and see in the presence and absence of 
notice   ……………………………………………………………………….. 
 
129 
Table 7 COCA searches for believe   ………………………………………………… 131 
Table 8 Total COCA occurrences of look and see in the presence and absence of 
believe   ……………………………………………………………………… 
 
132 
Table 9 COCA searches for understand   ……………………………………………. 134 
xvi 
 
Table 10 Total COCA occurrences of look and see in the presence and absence of 
understand   …………………………………………………………………. 
 
134 
Table 11 COCA searches for proper nouns and pronouns   …………………………... 137 
Table 12 Total COCA occurrences of look and see in the presence and absence of a 
proper noun or pronoun   ……………………………………………………. 
 
137 
Table 13 COCA searches for green   ………………………………………………….. 142 
Table 14 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the presence and absence of 
green   ……………………………………………………………………….. 
 
142 
Table 15 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the presence and absence of 
white   ………………………………………………………………………... 
 
143 
Table 16 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the presence and absence of 
round   ……………………………………………………………………….. 
 
143 
Table 17 COCA searches for logical   ………………………………………………… 145 
Table 18 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the presence and absence of 
logical   ……………………………………………………………………… 
 
146 
Table 19 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the presence and absence of 
inevitable   …………………………………………………………………… 
 
147 
Table 20 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the presence and absence of 
reasonable   ………………………………………………………………….. 
 
147 
Table 21 COCA searches for to me   ………………………………………………….. 140 
Table 22 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the presence and absence of to 
me   …………………………………………………………………………... 
 
149 
Table 23 COCA searches for to me (for look/seem like)   …………………………….. 159 
xvii 
 
Table 24  Total COCA occurrences of look like and seem like in the presence and 
absence of to me   ……………………………………………………………. 
 
150 
Table 25 COCA searches for at the time   …………………………………………….. 152 
Table 26 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the presence and absence of at 
the time   ……………………………………………………………………... 
 
152 
Table 27 COCA searches for introduce   ……………………………………………… 155 
Table 28 Total COCA occurrences of look and appear in the presence and absence of 
introduce   …………………………………………………………………… 
 
155 
Table 29 COCA searches for first   ……………………………………………………. 157 
Table 30 Total COCA occurrences of look and appear in the presence and absence of 
first   …………………………………………………………………………. 
 
158 
Table 31 COCA searches for first-adjective   …………………………………………. 158 
Table 32 Total COCA occurrences of look and appear in the presence and absence of 
first-adjective   ………………………………………………………………. 
 
150 
Table 33 COCA searches for comparative adjectives   ……………………………….. 169 
Table 34 Total COCA occurrences of look and appear in the presence and absence of 
comparative adjectives   ……………………………………………………... 
 
161 
Table 35 COCA searches for but   …………………………………………………….. 163 
Table 36 Total COCA occurrences of look and appear in the presence and absence of 
but   ………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
163 
Chapter V 
  
Table 1 COCA searches for at, on and in (for have a look)   ………………………... 183 
xviii 
 
Table 2 Total COCA occurrences of at, on and in in the presence and absence of 
have a look   …………………………………………………………………. 
 
183 
 
  
xix 
 
List of Figures 
Chapter II   
Figure 1 The hypothesis of look as a monosemic sign   ………………………………. 35 
Chapter IV 
  
Figure 1 The hypothesis of see as a monosemic sign   ……………………………….. 121 
Figure 2 The hypothesis of seem as a monosemic sign   ……………………………... 139 
Figure 3 The hypothesis of appear as a monosemic sign   …………………………… 153 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
The problem, methodology and theoretical background 
1   Introduction  
Why do speakers choose to utter look? Why, for example, do speakers choose look – but not see 
– for the communication of (a) message partials involving visual activity (She looked at me); (b) 
message partials involving attribution or judgment (She looks tired); and (c) message partials 
involving visual features (the new look)? In all these cases, is it the same linguistic unit ‘look’ 
that is being chosen? Further, what motivates speakers to use look both for visual messages (look 
at the picture) and for intellectual messages (look carefully at the problem)? Again, do these two 
cases present the same unit look or different looks? Yet more questions: Why do speakers 
combine look – but, again, not see – with (a) for in communicating a message partial of 
searching (look for); (b) forward in communicating a message partial of anticipation (look 
forward); (c) up to in communicating a message partial of admiration (look up to); and (d) after 
in communicating a message partial of care (look after), among many other combinations? Why, 
further, do speakers sometimes say look me in the eye but not see me in the eye, or look at me but 
not see at me? And why does look co-occur with at (look at) significantly more frequently than it 
co-occurs with on or in (look on, look in), even though all three sequences occur many times? 
(Look at is of course most frequent, yet the question here is why this is so). Furthermore, why do 
speakers use look even when the message involves nothing that is visually perceived (e.g., 
looked into space)? And finally, why do people sometimes talk of a person’s look and sometimes 
of a person’s appearance? Why, for instance, do people rely on looks but keep up appearances?   
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Perhaps any linguist who became curious about look would have come to ask such 
questions – yet I propose that the answers provided here, and the theory of language in which 
they are framed, offer a fresh and novel contribution. In addition to these questions, many 
peculiarities in the distribution of look such as the following – all highly statistically significant 
tendencies found in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies 2008) – have only 
just been discovered – as well as explained – through the meaning hypothesis for look that will 
be proposed in this dissertation: (a) look favors co-occurrence with a preceding but in 
comparison to a preceding and ( but look…;  and look…), despite the fact that both 
sequences occur many times in the corpus
1
; (b) look favors co-occurrence with this in 
comparison to the ( look at this…;  look at the…), again though both sequences are found 
many times in the corpus; (c) look favors co-occurrence with carefully in comparison to 
carelessly ( looked carefully…;  looked carelessly…), again though both combinations are 
found to occur; (notice here that classifying look as an ‘activity verb’, as others have done, 
cannot explain this favoring, both modifications being equally applicable to activities); (d) look – 
in comparison to see – favors co-occurrence with turn to ( turn to look;  turn to see), despite 
both sequences occurring many times in the corpus; (e) look – in comparison to seem – disfavors 
co-occurrence with at the time ( seemed… at the time;  looked… at the time), both sequences 
of course found in the corpus; and finally, (f) look – in comparison to appear – disfavors co-
occurrence with a following but ( appears… but;  looks… but), both sequences occurring in 
the corpus, too. What is the explanation for these and many more, clear and strong, and newly 
discovered tendencies?  
                                                          
1
 None of the sequences mentioned here are regarded as ungrammatical or incoherent in any way. The smiling and 
frowning faces point to no more than facts of statistical tendencies.  
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This dissertation defends the thesis that look represents a monosemous sign whose 
hypothesized meaning provides a unified explanation for why this sign’s hypothesized signal – 
/lʊk/ or look – occurs where it does in texts, as perceived in both qualitative and quantitative 
distributional facts of the sort just described. Anticipating the fuller presentation of the meaning 
hypothesis in the chapters that follow, we can describe the meaning of look here using the 
shorthand formulation ATTENTION, VISUAL.  
Guided by the overarching assumption that the structure of language is best revealed 
when it is taken to be an instrument of communication, the problem of this dissertation is 
construed in terms of human speech/writing behavior; that is, we seek to explain why speakers 
utter look on each particular occasion. The solution is given in terms of the hypothesized 
meaning that is posited as a unitary invariant semantic value of the sign look that consistently 
motivates speakers’ choice to utter this sign’s signal.  
 The meaning hypothesis will be elaborated and made precise in Chapter II. But it is worth 
noting here that the proposed meaning is intentionally sparse in content. Among other things, the 
hypothesized meaning that we have summarized as ATTENTION, VISUAL underdetermines: (a) 
whether the message concerns an act of visually attending or attention-grabbing visual features 
(e.g., He looked vs. his look); (b) whether the Entity in Focus with respect to look (roughly, what 
is traditionally called a subject) is an agent exercising its visual faculty or an object of attribution 
(e.g., He looked outside vs. He looked good); (c) whether or not the message involves a visual 
stimulus being perceived (e.g., He looked at the picture vs. He looked into space); and (d) what 
the purpose of the visual act is, e.g., whether it is to search (He looked for his glasses) or to 
inspect (He looked to see that everything’s in order), or something else. While the hypothesized 
semantic value of look is sparse, it will be shown to provide precisely the right amount of 
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semantic substance that is necessary to explain all these different uses of look and more, as well 
as to explain why look is chosen where see, seem and appear may initially appear to be plausible 
alternatives. Indeed, the sparseness of the hypothesized meaning provides crucial explanatory 
strength that allows for this single meaning to explain by itself all occurrences of look without 
the need to invoke either polysemy or homonymy; that is, without positing multiple senses of 
look or multiple looks.  
Confronted by the widely diverse distribution of this form, it may seem that look must 
have multiple senses (e.g., a visual sense and an intellectual sense), or that there is more than one 
look each with its own meaning (e.g., one ‘look-verb’ and another ‘look-noun’). But positing 
multiple looks seems necessary only if one identifies the meaning of a form directly with a 
component part of the communicated message partial – an assumption that is not made here; 
instead, as we shall see soon below, meanings contribute to, but are not necessarily parts of, 
messages. We first turn to an exposition of the opposing position, followed by our position. 
Identifying the meaning of a form with the message partials it is used to communicate. 
Linguists from virtually all schools of thought are accustomed to identifying the encoded 
meaning of a linguistic form with some aspect – be it propositional or conceptual – of the 
ongoing interpretive experience that accompanies the use of the form in real or imagined speech 
events. In other words, both formal and functional linguists speak of the meaning side of a form 
as if it were known to speakers – including, crucially, known to the analysts themselves – simply 
by virtue of the subjective experience of understanding communicative intents in utterances 
where the form is found. In both traditions, linguistically encoded meaning is thus regarded as 
available to introspection (see Otheguy 2002: Section 4). 
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In the generative tradition, it is common practice to break an utterance into its meaningful 
component parts, each of which is assumed to correspond to a fraction of the interpretation of the 
utterance as a whole. This is generally known as the compositional view of meaning, where the 
meaning of a sentence is seen as a function of the meanings of its component parts and the 
syntactic relations that obtain between them. As a consequence, a single morpheme may be 
assigned an indefinite number of distinct meanings, depending on how speakers interpret it 
within different utterances. For example, look in his new look may be assigned the meaning 
‘visual features’ because, in this utterance, a fraction of the communicated message appears to 
involve visible physical or sartorial characteristics. By contrast, the meaning of look in He looked 
outside may be rendered as ‘visual activity’ because, in this utterance, a fraction of the 
communicated message appears to involve a visual exploratory act (see Landau and Gleitman 
1985:132-3). In the former case, look would be assigned to the class of nouns whereas in the 
latter it would be assigned to the class of verbs; Section 2 below will discuss extensively the 
issue of letting lexical form classes guide the identification of linguistic signs. 
Cognitive linguists, for their part, posit constructions as symbolic linguistic units and can 
assign look quite a number of different meanings, depending on the interpretation of the putative 
construction in utterances where it occurs. For example, the meaning of look for in looking for 
my glasses may be rendered as ‘search’ because it appears that, in this utterance, the use of look 
for involves the communication of a message partial of searching. Or the meaning of look up to 
in looks up to his boss may be rendered as ‘admire’ because the use of look up to in this utterance 
appears to involve the communication of a message partial of admiration. The identification of 
linguistic meaning with the interpretation of utterances is also what underlies the analyses of 
linguistic meaning in terms of polysemy. For example, Sweetser (1990) cites look as a 
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polysemous form that encodes two senses – visual and intellectual. The reason why the sense of 
look in, say, Look at the picture is taken to be different from its sense in Look at the problem is 
because the communication of the former involves a message element of vision while the 
communication of the latter involves a message element of intellection. Thus, in the cognitive 
approaches, frequent sequences (such as look for, look up to) are posited to emerge as 
constructions – linguistically encoded form-meaning correspondences – as these sequences 
become cognitively entrenched in the speakers’ minds; and similarly, polysemy emerges in the 
linguistic system as speakers become unconscious of their using a word in two different ways. 
The issue of letting such cognitive considerations guide the identification of linguistic units will 
be discussed extensively in Section 2 below.  
When the meaning of a form is thus identified with the conceptual fractions of message 
or message partials that the form is involved in, an analysis in terms of polysemy or homonymy 
quickly becomes inevitable, because virtually all words are used in multiple ways; that is, all 
words are used for the communication of multiple message partials. But if it turns out that, in the 
case of many forms, the meaning of the form does not encode a message partial, but is instead 
best analyzed as no more than a guide toward the inference of certain message partials, then an 
analysis in terms of monosemy becomes feasible. To this view we now turn. 
Distinguishing between meaning and message. Following the analytical tradition of the 
Columbia School of linguistics (henceforth, CS), founded by William Diver, it is maintained 
here that there is a sharp distinction between meaning and message; that is, between, on the one 
hand, that which is part of the linguistic code – the invariant meaning that consistently 
accompanies a corresponding linguistic signal – and, on the other, the interpretation of the code – 
the ongoing subjective experience of message partials (Contini-Morava 1995, Diver 1995 
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[2012], Diver 2012, Huffman 2001, Otheguy 2002, Reid 1991). Meanings are here seen as 
merely sparse notional fragments that do not encode messages, and that provide but hints, 
prompts from which message elements are suggested and communicative intents can be inferred. 
Rather than compositional, linguistic meaning is thus characterized as instrumental, that is, the 
meanings of forms guide the hearer, through a process of inference, towards the speaker’s 
intended message (Huffman 1997). Whereas in the compositional view of meaning, sentences 
are fractioned into components, each of which must be accounted for by a particular part of the 
linguistic output, in the instrumental view the meanings of individual signals do not add up to 
sentential meaning or to the communicated message at any level. 
In keeping with the instrumental conception of meaning, it is recognized here that a 
single signal may imply different message partials on different occasions of its use, but – by 
hypothesis – the meaning of that signal consistently motivates the choice of its corresponding 
signal. So long as the chain of inference from the hypothesized meaning to the message elements 
suggested in the course of communication can be made precise by the linguist, then message 
elements that are different from the meaning (e.g., in the case of look, ‘search’ or ‘admire’) are 
allowed, indeed – given the human ingenuity to make new uses of existing tools – even expected 
by the nature of the hypothesis.  
The putative meanings alluded to above – ‘visual features’, ‘visual activity’, ‘search’ and 
‘admire’ – are too closely identified with the message partials that are communicated on 
particular occasions; consequently, any one of these meanings – if treated as a hypothesis – 
would fail to provide a unified explanation for the full range of the distribution of look
2
. As will 
be shown in this dissertation, these message partials are all but interpretations – occasional 
                                                          
2
 This statement applies to the putative constructions as well; for example, look up to does not always contribute to a 
message partial of admiration (e.g., He looked up to the top of the mountain), as will be discussed in Chapter II. 
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inferences that are based on the linguistically encoded meaning of look (as well as of the forms 
surrounding it) but that themselves exist outside of the linguistic system. The task of this 
dissertation is to demonstrate that the hypothesized meaning that we have for now summarized 
as ATTENTION, VISUAL consistently contributes to the interpretation of texts where look occurs, 
whether it is in look up to, the new look, look beautiful, look like, have a look, etc. 
This chapter consists of the following sections. Section 2 addresses the problem of the 
identification of symbolic linguistic units, particularly, the problem of identification of the 
phenomena that fall under the responsibility of this account of look. Three approaches will be 
explored in this regard. The first two approaches identify linguistic units prior to the analysis of a 
particular form; they are what I have termed (a) the syntactic and (b) the cognitivist, where 
linguistic units are identified, respectively, on the basis of syntactic function (Section 2.1) and 
cognitive status (Section 2.2). The discussion in Section 2 will also present the third approach – 
the one adopted here – which admits of the existence of a linguistic unit only following 
successful formulation of a meaning hypothesis. This section will thus make precise the place of 
CS in the field of linguistics, explicating its unique characteristics relative to both generative and 
cognitive grammars, including, in particular, why and how analysis in CS begins without 
assuming any a priori linguistic categories. Section 3 will then lay out the methodology that will 
be used in the qualitative analyses and quantitative predictions in this dissertation. And finally, 
Section 4 is a preview of what is to come in the subsequent chapters. 
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2   The problem of the identification of linguistic units 
Putting it first in the simplest terms, the hypothesis proposed in this dissertation is intended to 
explain why speakers say or write look on each particular occasion that this word is used, 
including why they say look in contexts where see, seem, and appear may initially appear as 
plausible alternatives. Going a little deeper, however, it soon becomes evident that the 
form look might represent, or be a part of, more than one linguistic unit
3
. Is there, for instance, 
one ‘look-verb’ and another ‘look-noun’? Furthermore, are frequent sequences such as look at, 
look for, looks like, looking forward to, etc. independent linguistic units – each constituting a 
separate signal (construction) with its own unique meaning – that exist over and above the single 
signal-meaning pairing look? What we see from these questions is that the identification of the 
signal is just as much of a problem as the identification of its meaning, and consequently, both 
the signal and the meaning – the sign in its totality – constitute hypotheses.  
Other linguists, whose position diverges from the one taken here, have talked about look, 
explicitly or implicitly, as if they knew in advance of analysis that this form represents multiple 
linguistic units, that is, multiple signals with multiple meanings (see e.g., Gruber 1967, Swan 
1980, Landau and Gleitman 1985, Levin 1993, inter alia). There are two reasons why linguists 
might assume prior to analysis that there exist more than one look, the first reason being 
applicable to almost any linguistic school of thought, the second applicable specifically to 
cognitive linguistics. First, most linguists operate within a theory that allows for the a priori 
differentiation of linguistic units on the basis of the traditional grammatical categories (e.g., 
noun, verb, etc.). Second, cognitive linguists identify linguistic units with any seemingly 
                                                          
3
 The term linguistic unit is consistently used in this chapter to refer to symbolic linguistic units, that is, form-
meaning correspondences. Meaningless phonological units and purely formal grammatical structures are not 
intended.  
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cognitively stored linguistic representation that can be superficially seen as a form-meaning 
pairing. The next two subsections examine in detail each of these two reasons for positing more 
than one look; Section 2.1 addresses the syntactic motivation and Section 2.2 the cognitive 
motivation. The discussion of the cognitive motivation will address the possibility of polysemy, 
too; that is, it addresses the possibility that look represents one linguistic unit that nonetheless has 
more than one semantic value encoded in the language; (that look is associated with more than 
one value in the inferred messages is of course clearly recognized here). As we review these 
other approaches, we will present and defend our approach, according to which linguistic units 
are identified in response to successful analyses that hypothesize a stable and consistent 
relationship between a piece of form (a signal) and a piece of content (a meaning). 
2.1   The problem of identifying linguistic units based on syntactic categories  
A cursory examination of any dictionary will quickly reveal that there are at least two separate 
entries for look – look v. and look n. (e.g., OED Online 2015). In linguistic analyses, too, the 
distinction between these two looks is always at least implicit. Gruber (1967:943), for example, 
states that look “is obligatorily Agentive”, and concludes therefore, that “look is in all 
circumstances substitutable by the phrase do something, as are all Agentive verbs” (emphases, 
N.S). In the same vein, Landau and Gleitman (1985:67) talk about “the verb look, which 
describes perceptual exploration”, a notion characterized as one of “engaging in perceptual 
activity” (1985:80). Now, if look is indeed substitutable by do something in all circumstances 
and, if its meaning has to do with engaging in perceptual exploration, this entails that in cases 
such as It’s the new look or You look tired the form look must represent a different signal than 
the one that these analysts have in mind.  
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Indeed, even as a verb, it is quite common to talk as if there were two different looks. 
Swan (1980:367), for example, states that “Look has two meanings. One of them is similar to 
appear or seem […] In this meaning, look is followed by adjectives, not adverbs. […] The other 
meaning of look is related to seeing. […] In this meaning, look is used with adverbs.” And again, 
in the same vein, Levin (1993:187-8) classifies look once as a ‘stimulus-subject-perception-verb’ 
(along with feel, sound, taste, etc.) and then also as a ‘peer-verb’ (along with peer, gape, leer, 
etc.). Finally, ‘peer-verbs’, Levin states, are “not used transitively”4, a statement which entails 
the positing of yet another look, seeing as there are the admittedly somewhat infrequent but 
nevertheless well documented cases where look is used transitively (as it is traditionally known), 
for example in I looked him in the eye.   
What we see is that the identification of the signal is regularly guided by syntactic 
categories that are accepted as established givens (see Diver, Davis and Reid 2012 for a thorough 
discussion). The linguists mentioned above are accustomed to talking about nouns and verbs as if 
these could be directly read off the data, that is, as if they were observational categories, but – as 
will be argued presently – they cannot, and are not.  
The purpose of assigning lexical stems to formal syntactic categories is to account for 
distributional facts (see, e.g., Haegeman 1994:37-38); for example, look occurs with nominal 
morphology (e.g., the) because it belongs to the category N. But in English, the vast majority of 
the lexical stems that occur with nominal morphology also occur with verbal morphology
5
. If 
almost any lexical stem in English can be assigned to the category N by virtue of its co-
occurrence with morphology such as the or a then the category N does not explain the 
                                                          
4
 Gruber (1967:942) similarly states: “look cannot be used transitively”.  
5
 Pierce (1985) reports a study of 30,000 words of running text from which all lexical stems occurring with verbal 
morphology and all lexical stems occurring with nominal morphology were taken and listed; in the end, 90 percent 
of the two lists were identical. Ten more similar studies, all based on actual texts published in magazines in 1959, 
show an average of 80 percent of identical lexical stems among the two lists. This study is cited in Reid (1991:313). 
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distribution of the stem, but simply captures the fact that the lexical stem has sometimes been 
found to co-occur with certain grammatical forms (like the) and is interpreted in a certain 
entity/thing type of way whenever it does. A formal analyst may argue that the presence of 
nominal morphology is how one recognizes the category N. But notice that recognition can only 
take place for entities known to exist prior to their observation. The upshot is that if the analyst 
does not posit nouns prior to engaging in linguistic observation – that is, if N is not an a priori 
category – then nouns are not recognized. Strictly, all that one recognizes is certain entity/thing 
interpretations that are regularly associated with the presence of certain morphology (like the)
6
.  
Meaning rather than form classes as the explanation for distributional facts. The decision 
to posit N and V as purely formal categories amounts to deciding prior to analysis that certain 
distributional facts have no semantic explanation; that is, that speakers say, e.g., both the look 
and looked because look is assigned the categories N and V, these distributions having nothing to 
do with the unique lexical meaning of look. But these distributional facts do not require the 
postulation of syntactic constructs in the linguistic system because the same distributions can 
often be explained in terms of the meanings of the forms involved (see Otheguy, Rodriguez-
Bachiller and Canals 2004). In the case at hand, let’s briefly consider the fact that, while look 
regularly co-occurs with both the/a and -ed/-s, see tends to occur for the most part only with -s 
and in the forms saw and seen. The reason speakers choose look for both entity and event 
interpretations while see is mostly chosen for event interpretations has to do with the specifics of 
                                                          
6
 Entity/thing interpretation is not a theoretical construct; it refers to the interpretation of a lexical stem that has been 
shaped by its co-occurrence with grammatical forms such as a or the, whose meanings imply reference to a thing; 
(for example, the meaning of the – DIFFERENTIATION REQUIRED AND COMPLETE – contributes to a message partial 
involving a discrete – or differentiated – entity). By contrast, the term event (which is used soon below) refers to the 
interpretation of a lexical stem that has been shaped by its co-occurrence with other grammatical forms such as -ed, 
whose meaning implies reference to a time. The meaning of look is open to either thing- or event-like 
interpretations. For example, the co-occurrence of the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL with the meaning 
DIFFERENTIATION REQUIRED AND COMPLETE suggests a message partial involving attention-grabbing visual features 
(e.g., the new look). It is the meaning of the grammatical form the that contributes here to the lexical stem look being 
interpreted as a thing – i.e., as visual features as opposed to a visual event. 
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the hypothesized meanings of both signs, as well as the expressive alternatives that exist for see 
but not for look.  
Specifically, we first recall that the meaning that will be proposed for look – summarized 
in shorthand form here as ATTENTION, VISUAL – is neutral with respect to entity or event 
interpretations, while the meaning that will be proposed for see – summarized here as 
EXPERIENCING VISUALLY – specifically favors an event interpretation. This hypothesis of the 
meaning of see acknowledges that speakers have the option of choosing sight, a form not studied 
in this dissertation but whose meaning (perhaps VISUAL EXPERIENCE) may be similar to that of 
see, only explicitly favoring an entity interpretation. When speakers want to conceptualize visual 
experience as a thing, they are likely then to choose sight (e.g., I couldn’t stand the sight of him) 
because the meaning of sight more closely fits the intended message partial. Look, by contrast, is 
not in competition with a closely related form whose meaning differs only in that it specifically 
favors an entity interpretation, and so, speakers will choose look, by hypothesis, whenever the 
semantic substance of visual attention is at issue, whether the intended conceptualization 
involves a temporal act of visually attending or attention-grabbing visual features
7
.  
Formal lexical classes as a solution of last resort. The CS approach does allow for the 
possibility of formal lexical classes, provided that no purely semantic solution can be found to 
solve the distributional facts at hand. In other words, positing form classes is a solution of last 
resort that would admit that certain distributional facts are synchronically arbitrary as far as the 
meanings of the individual forms involved are concerned. For example, this seems to be the case 
in Latin where lexical stems tend to occur either with verbal or with nominal morphology but not 
                                                          
7
 Another example where two closely related forms seem to constrain the use of one another is appear and 
appearance. While this requires further investigation, it seems that in general when we have a form A (like see) and 
a form B (like sight) that have essentially the same meaning with the exception that form A specifically favors event 
interpretations while form B specifically favors entity interpretations, then the use of form A will be constrained by 
the availability of form B to event-type messages. 
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with both. In this case, positing form classes is a solution to a distributional problem that is 
observable prior to setting up these classes (Reid, CS conference 2015). But for English, no CS 
analysis to date has needed to posit nouns and verbs to solve distributional problems. 
In this study, then, the data will not be seen through the filter of the traditional 
grammatical categories. Recognizing that these categories constitute hypotheses, not 
observations, we do not know in advance of analysis whether these hypotheses help solve the 
problem under study (Diver 1995 [2012], Otheguy 2002), in this case, the problem of why 
speakers utter look where they do. If the explanation for why look occurs where it does can be 
achieved by positing just a single look (which is neither noun nor verb, neither transitive nor 
intransitive) then that is the better hypothesis because it posits less while maintaining 
explanatory power, and further, as in the present dissertation, because it leads both to testable 
predictions and to the discovery of new patterns of co-occurrence in written and (transcriptions 
of) spoken texts.  
The starting point of analysis without the traditional a priori categories. In beginning 
analysis without a priori categories, the first step is, as suggested above, to keep well in mind that 
the observations give us no nouns or verbs, no subjects or predicates, no sentences, indeed no 
linguistic categories of any kind. Rather, as Saussure wrote, “A language thus has this curious 
and striking feature. It has no immediately perceptible entities” (Saussure 1916 [1986]:105). In 
the Saussurean tradition to which CS theory is heir, the linguist thus aims to start from a clean 
slate, assuming in language no discrete units in advance of analysis. This point is stated most 
strongly in the writings of Diver, who proposes that linguists need to think of the observations as 
ultimately being simply the asymmetry of the sound waves that occur when people speak: “In 
15 
 
any instance of what we informally recognize as speech, what determines the form taken by the 
sound waves we observe?” (Diver 1995 [2012]:451)  
Diver recognizes that the sound waves present utter chaos in that no phonetic sequence 
ever occurs more than once, and that human cognition enables us to compensate by perceiving 
what are actually different instances of phonetic material as recurrent phonological units: “In the 
material being confronted, a certain sound wave is present because a certain phoneme is 
intended” (Diver 1995 [2012]:456). Diver then proposes that phonological hypotheses are 
necessary in order to state grammatical hypotheses with respect to (most) signs
8. The ‘clean 
slate’ question for the linguist thus becomes, not one about the sound waves, but rather one about 
why the phonemes occur where they do. This question, Diver explains, has to be answered on 
two levels, only the second of which concerns the analysis here. At the first level – not pursued 
in this dissertation – the question concerns the occurrence and ordering of phonemes within a 
morpheme. At the second level, the question is why the morphemes themselves occur where they 
do in the stream of speech or writing
9
. This dissertation offers a partial answer to the second 
question by proposing a meaning hypothesis that explicates why look occurs where it does, 
including, as mentioned, why look occurs as opposed to see, seem and appear.  
In proposing this austere Diverian approach to the observations, it must be acknowledged 
that the utterances to be considered in this dissertation are filtered through my own and other 
speakers’ interpretation of the sequences of phonemes intended in the course of speech; so, for 
example, if someone happens to pronounce the name Luke as /lʊk/, the hypothesis here does not 
                                                          
8
 Some signals are not phonological as will be explained shortly below. 
9
 It should be noted that, while morphemic analysis is often useful in formulating a sign hypothesis, morphemes 
have no theoretical status within CS linguistics. The crucial difference between a morpheme and a signal is that 
morphemes can be posited prior to the hypothesis of a specific corresponding sememe, whereas a signal cannot be 
posited without positing an invariant meaning for it. Morphemes thus may serve as no more than pre-theoretical, 
provisional signals. 
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see itself responsible for explaining this occurrence because – despite the similarity in the 
observable sound waves and the interpreted sequence of phonemes – this is clearly not an 
instance of the hypothesized signal with the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL. Still, the analysis 
begins from a clean slate as much as possible. In this dissertation, both spoken and written data 
are appealed to, where the spoken data has been transcribed. In effect, then, what this dissertation 
aims to explain is why we see the sequence of letters look in written and transcribed spoken 
texts.  
Finally, a limitation in Diver’s reasoning needs to be noted. Diver speaks as if 
morphemes always decompose into meaningless phonemes, when in fact, there are numerous 
languages that have phonological segments that are meaningful (e.g., plural -s in English) and 
even meaningful features (e.g., palatalization in Japanese Mimetic forms; Blevins 2012:285), and 
moreover, there are also morphemes that carry meaning despite not decomposing into 
phonological segments (e.g., the English positive and negative expressions [   ˈh  ] and [   ˈ   ], 
nasalized vowels and contrasting glottal stop not occurring generally in English; Blevins 
2012:289-90). While these cases must be acknowledged, and while they serve to temper the 
perhaps too-simple formulation in Diver, they do not present an insurmountable problem. CS 
aims to make sense of the phonological observations by explaining speakers’ choice to make use 
of a hypothesized signal in terms of its hypothesized meaning; so long as the signal can be 
recognized, it ultimately does not matter whether or not it consists of a single phonological 
segment or feature, or whether or not it decomposes into meaningless phonemes.  
With this in mind, it is important to note that CS analyses have often involved hypotheses 
about signs whose signal is not a phonological sequence. In addition to signals that are 
phonological sequences, there are (a) zero signals, that is, signals expressed through the absence 
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of sound in a particular position, and (b) positional signals that are recognized by word order. To 
give an example of each, a zero signal has been hypothesized in the English system of Entity 
Number that consists of two signals: -s, whose hypothesized meaning is MORE THAN ONE and, the 
absence of -s – a zero signal – whose meaning is ONE (Reid 1991; 2011). Second, word order has 
been hypothesized as a signal in the English system of Degree of Control – ranking the relative 
degree of control that participants exercise over bringing about an event – where the signals are 
expressed through the ordering of the notions of Participant – Event – Participant (e.g., The dog– 
P bit– E the man– P). In this system, the Participant that precedes the Event has the meaning MORE 
CONTROL (dog, in our example), while the Participant that follows has the meaning LESS 
CONTROL (man in the example) (see Reid 1974, Reid 1991:174-8, Otheguy, Rodriguez-Bachiller 
and Canals 2004, Huffman 2006). Note that there is no phonological sequence involved in 
signaling the meanings of the Degree of Control System and that speakers must infer when a 
word is intended as a participant and as an event. This dissertation will return to the Degree of 
Control System in the explanation of a quite salient distributional difference between look and 
see in Chapter IV, namely, that see regularly co-occurs with the Degree of Control System 
whereas look does not. For present purposes, it is enough to make the point that anything can be 
a signal, so long as it is something that speakers can recognize.  
2.2   The problem of identifying linguistic units based on cognitive status 
In usage based linguistic approaches (e.g., Sweetser 1990, Goldberg 1995, Bybee and Hopper 
2001, Tomasello 2003, Langacker 2004, inter alia) the identity of linguistic units is largely based 
on cognitive status; any seemingly symbolic construct that can be conceived of as stored and 
accessed as a unit, that is, anything for which there is reason to believe that it involves some 
cognitive representation, is considered a piece of linguistic structure. This conception follows 
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from the idea that each linguistic utterance one hears and processes affects one’s stored linguistic 
representations, and that the sum of linguistic experience at any given moment forms the basis 
for one’s linguistic categorizations (Bybee and Hopper 2001). A linguistic category is defined as 
a cloud of remembered tokens, or exemplars, that have been associated with some category label 
on the basis of similarities across any salient dimension (Bybee 2006). The implication is that 
linguistic units are not stable but rather constantly emerging in response to the experiences with 
language one has had up to a particular point in time. Section 2.2.1 explicates how this view can 
lead cognitive linguists to posit constructions of which look is only a part, and Section 2.2.2 
explains how this view has led cognitive linguists to analyze look in terms of polysemy. 
2.2.1   The problem of stored sequences 
Usage based approaches posit, in addition to individual words and morphemes, constructions – 
amalgamations of words and morphemes – that are taken to be independent linguistic units that 
exist in the grammar over and above their component parts. This view is expressed in Goldberg 
(1995:1) as follows: “constructions – form-meaning correspondences [… –] exist independently 
of particular verbs … [C]onstructions themselves carry meaning, independently of the words in 
the sentence.” In the same vein, Langacker (2004:21) writes that “grammatical constructions are 
all inherently meaningful”. Bybee and Hopper (2001:9) give an example, revealing that the 
emergence of constructions is dependent upon the frequency with which their component parts 
are uttered together, and that the identification of a construction is based on its cognitive 
representation as a unit: “Tokens of I in I don’t know, I don’t think, I see, I want, etc. are mapped 
onto the same [cognitive] representations. This does not prevent a strong link between I and 
don’t from also being maintained, as don’t is the second most frequent item to follow I (‘m is the 
most frequent)”; these frequent sequences are then referred to as “emergent structure” (2001:10). 
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As we see, any sequential combination of linguistic units that, due to the effects of frequency, is 
taken to be stored and accessed as also being a unit (e.g., I don’t) is seen as a grammatical 
construction.  
If the effects of frequency were to be studied with respect to sequences involving look, it 
is likely that highly frequent sequences such as look for, looking forward to, looks like, etc. 
would be treated as constructions, each with its own linguistically encoded meaning (e.g., 
‘search’ for look for, ‘anticipate’ for looking forward to, etc.) that would exist over and above the 
meanings of the component parts of the sequence
10,11
. But even if these sequences are 
cognitively stored units (which may well be), there still remains the question whether these can 
be identified as linguistic units.   
In the usage based approach, positing look for as a symbolic linguistic unit is based on 
the analyst’s intuitions of what the meaning of the sequence seems to be, yet, importantly, it is 
not based on having treated the purported linguistic unit as a hypothesis, at least not as one that is 
intended to explain speakers’ expressive choices, and that is open to testing and falsification. If it 
were treated as a hypothesis (e.g., signal – look-for, meaning – SEARCH), it would have to be 
shown that the notion of searching invariably contributes to the interpretation of texts where look 
for occurs, and moreover, that this aspect of the communicated message cannot be attributed to 
the semantic contributions of look and of for when these occur independently of one another. 
This last point is crucial because, if the message partials that appear when look for is used can be 
explained solely in terms of the independent contribution of the meanings of look and of for, then 
                                                          
10
 It is curious that the putative construction look at would likely be seen as having the same exact meaning as look 
(the verb) by itself. 
11
 In Chapter V we will review in detail an analysis of the construction have a look found in Wierzbicka (1988), and 
show that the meaning proposed for this putative construction does not stand to empirical testing. No other 
construction involving look has actually been analyzed in the literature, to my knowledge. Nonetheless, the putative 
construction look for will be discussed here below and again in Chapter II, and look like will be dealt with in various 
places in Chapters III and IV.  
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there is no reason for positing an additional linguistic unit look-for on top of the units look and 
for; that is, the hypothesis of look-for would have no greater explanatory power.  
Distinguishing between a cognitive unit and a linguistic unit. Note that it is perfectly 
compatible with CS theory to recognize the cognitive status of frequent sequences, as well as the 
effects of frequency on processes of grammaticalization and the rise of new units that have been 
studied in the usage based approaches. For instance, the word breakfast was presumably 
sometime in history a sequence of two signs, but it is almost certain that today’s speakers 
recognize it only as a single sign, that is, speakers no longer recognize meaningful internal 
component parts within this sequence
12
. This would be a case where the effects of frequency 
have resulted in the emergence of a new sign. But because, as will be argued in Chapter II, 
occurrences of look for in speech and writing can be explained in terms of the hypothesized 
meanings of look and of for, look for is not hypothesized to be a sign – even if it is quite 
plausible that it is cognitively stored as some kind of a processing or experiential unit. 
The power of the meaning hypothesis to explain regular co-occurrences. While 
constructions of the type proposed in other functional approaches are not admitted here as 
linguistic units themselves, it is worth stressing that the analysis offered in this dissertation goes 
to great lengths to explain why speakers regularly use look in combination with certain other 
forms – both with forms whose regular co-occurrence with look is well known (e.g., look with 
at), as well as forms whose regular co-occurrence with look has been discovered here for the first 
time (e.g., look with this). Indeed, the counts that will be presented in Chapters III and IV all 
compare the relative frequency of look with certain other forms, and the hypotheses proposed 
(for look as well as for see, seem and appear) offer an explanation for these regular co-
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 In other words, the hypothesis of breakfast as a monosemic sign (if we had one) would at some point in time offer 
a better explanation for speakers’ choice of this form than would the independent hypotheses of break and of fast, 
each as a monosemic sign.  
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occurrences in terms of the semantics of the individual forms involved. It is doubtful that many 
of the regular patterns that have been discovered through the hypothesized meaning proposed 
here would have ever been noted, much less explained, by approaches whose interest would 
likely extend only to the high frequency sequences involving look. The power of the proposed 
meaning hypothesis to discover and explain why even relatively low-frequency sequences 
regularly recur is a crucial explanatory difference between CS and the usage based approaches. 
And even for the highly frequent sequences that are likely stored and accessed as units, 
there still remains the question – not addressed by the usage based approaches – of why the 
forms that make up the sequence came to be used together so frequently in the first place. Note 
that in the usage based literature it is explicitly acknowledged that what causes certain sequences 
to recur frequently has to do with the meanings of the individual forms in the sequence: “My 
hypothesis is that semantics, and to some extent, pragmatics and our experience with the world, 
will determine what elements tend to occur together in sequences in an utterance, but repetition 
is the glue that binds constituents together” Bybee (2002:11). Trivially, for a sequence to be 
stored as a unit it must first be the case that speakers have already used it frequently. Speakers do 
not utter something because it is stored as a unit or because it has been frequently repeated, but 
rather, they do so because they want to achieve some communicative effect; the meaning of each 
individual form in a sequence explains why it occurs where it does, including why it regularly 
occurs with certain other forms. For Bybee, the question of what these meanings are and why 
speakers put those meanings together is set aside. But, because a CS analysis is specifically 
concerned with identifying explanatory symbolic units, it is well equipped to answer the 
question, seemingly logically prior to Bybee’s account, of why speakers sequence certain forms 
together in the first place.  
22 
 
Significantly in the acquisition literature as well, Tomasello acknowledges that children 
must somehow learn the meanings of individual words before they can go on to learn the more 
abstract syntactic patterns that he postulates and studies. His research, however, has yet to 
undertake this endeavor, because, as he explains, “at the moment, the issue of how best to 
characterize children’s early word meanings is unresolved” (Tomasello 2003:58). Perhaps the 
work of CS linguistics can aid Tomasello in resolving this issue. 
A stable synchronic grammar. A final difference between CS and the usage based 
approaches needs noting. Unlike many usage-based approaches, CS posits a stable synchronic 
state of the grammar where something either is or is not a sign, and admits of no in-between 
status. This is so because, given the goals of the CS analysis, a hypothesized sign either can or 
cannot explain the occurrences of a signal in terms of its hypothesized meaning. The advantage 
of this position is that it makes the theory highly constrained, and individual hypotheses 
concerning the identity of signs and their meanings clearly falsifiable. In the usage based 
approach of, for example, Bybee, a sign, or a construction, as well as its meaning is not a stable 
unit, but one that is ever changing or emerging in response to usage events; indeed, the symbolic 
value of a sign in these approaches may be no more than the sum of its uses (see, e.g., Tomasello 
2003:100). It may very well be that if the goal is to explain the emergence of constructions 
through the effects of frequency, it does not matter so much whether signs are clearly identified 
units with rigid boundaries. But for the goal of CS of explaining speakers’ choices and the 
resulting distribution by positing a signal and a meaning, the fuzzy boundaries proposed by the 
usage based approaches do not offer enough of an opportunity to falsify the hypothesized 
emergent units. 
  
23 
 
2.2.2   The problem of polysemy  
Analysis of word meaning in terms of polysemy has been proposed in cases where a word has 
multiple communicative functions (as virtually any word has) and, importantly, the speaker is 
not conscious of it being the same word used in different ways. In more recent times, one central 
avenue that has been posited that leads to polysemy is conceptual metaphor, a concept whose 
consequences on the analysis of look will be explored in detail in Chapter II. Briefly, conceptual 
metaphor, as argued by its proponents, involves a mapping across two conceptual domains where 
people see a similarity between two ranges of experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Sweetser 
1990). With respect to look, as well as other forms from the visual domain, a conceptual 
metaphor has been posited mapping the domain of vision to the domain of intellection (Sweetser 
1990). This conceptual mapping is intended to explain why speakers use look both in look at the 
picture and in look at the problem, each case exhibiting a different sense of look (visual and 
intellectual, respectively).  
The literature on metaphor explicitly acknowledges that the locus of conceptual metaphor 
is actually outside of language, that is, that metaphor is a fact of cognition generally rather than 
of language specifically (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1993). It is nonetheless maintained, 
however, that, over time, metaphorical usage influences linguistic structure (see, e.g., Sweetser 
1990). The effect of metaphorical usage on linguistic structure is polysemy, a concept involving 
the emergence of a structured interrelationship between metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses 
of a word – now promoted to the status of linguistically encoded senses. Sweetser (1990:8) 
explains the admittance of metaphorically-linked polysemous senses into the linguistic code: 
“When a specific linguistic usage, based on […] metaphorical structure, becomes no longer 
consciously metaphorical, then we can say that the linguistic form has acquired a metaphorically 
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motivated secondary sense.” Thus, look is taken to have evolved an intellectual sense, in addition 
to its visual sense (both senses forming a part of the linguistic unit look) because speakers are no 
longer conscious of the intellectual being a metaphorical usage.  
 The value of invoking conceptual metaphors in the course of linguistic analysis cannot be 
denied. But the appeal to conceptual metaphors for the purpose of justifying polysemy raises 
serious analytical problems. For example, a problem with positing two senses for look (one 
visual, one intellectual) linked by a conceptual metaphor is that there are many cases in which 
the communicated message simultaneously involves both vision and intellection. Examples with 
full discussion and analysis will be given in Chapter II, but consider, briefly, The doctor looked 
carefully over her notes, where the doctor is simultaneously directing both her eyes and mind to 
the notes. Of course, from the cognitive linguistic perspective, fuzzy boundaries of this sort are 
expected. But, as noted above, here too, the fuzzy boundaries view comes very close to yielding 
an untestable hypothesis. This is so because, if the analyst is going to test a two-sense hypothesis 
(in this case a visual sense and an intellectual sense), then it must be possible to determine which 
sense the analyst is faced with on each particular occasion. This problem will be avoided here by 
explaining the use of look both for visual and intellectual messages in terms of a monosemous 
meaning that includes the notion of visual only. Once such explanation is achieved, there is no 
longer a reason for positing multiple senses.  
Summing up the discussion of the cognitive approach, from a CS perspective, linguistic 
units are hypotheses intended to solve distributional problems, and so, cognitive status by itself 
provides no basis for positing a linguistic unit. CS analysts strictly distinguish between the 
linguistic code (an inventory of signs) and the cognitive effects that are a consequence of the use 
of the code, these effects including the cognitive storage and accessibility of sequences, as well 
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as speakers’ unconscious use of a sign for different messages, even messages that involve a 
conceptual metaphor. A sign is admitted as a properly linguistic unit only if it helps to solve a 
distributional problem, for which purpose the sign must be absolute, not fuzzy, so that its 
identification will be precise and its hypothesis clearly falsifiable.  
3   Methodology  
In setting out to propose a meaning hypothesis for look, the first step is to closely examine the 
message elements that are produced by a great many texts in which look occurs to see whether 
some common semantic feature can be identified that justifies all instances of this sign’s signal. 
This dissertation will offer analyses of both qualitative and quantitative data – all of attested 
occurrences of look – to support the hypothesized meaning, ATTENTION, VISUAL. The qualitative 
and quantitative methods of analysis will now each be explicated in turn. 
3.1   Qualitative support based on redundant information in texts  
Qualitative support for the meaning hypothesis consists of analyses of attested occurrences of 
look in contexts that provide redundant information. By redundant information we mean 
linguistic forms surrounding look whose semantic contribution appears to partially overlap with 
the hypothesized semantic contribution of look. These forms allow the linguist to get a handle on 
the message partial involved in the text under consideration without having to rely on intuitive 
understandings of what is being communicated. As a simple illustration of this analytical 
procedure, consider the following attested example. 
(1) We’ll take a careful look at it and make a journalistic decision about whether to publish 
it. (ABC Nightline)   
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First we note that the speaker in (1) uses look because the message concerns directing attention 
to the matter at hand (it) and, by hypothesis, ATTENTION figures in the meaning of look. Now the 
following pieces of contextual evidence support our hypothesis. First, while we do not have a 
meaning hypothesis for careful, it is safe to assume that this form contributes to a message 
partial of increased attention. The presence of careful thus partially supports the meaning 
hypothesis because both careful and the meaning of look redundantly contribute to a message 
involving attention. Further support in this short text comes from make a journalistic decision, an 
act which occurs as a result of looking. Making a decision involves conscious thinking and 
attention, and so, again, because ATTENTION figures in the hypothesized meaning of look, the 
presence of make a decision offers partial support for the hypothesis
13
.  
The presence of redundant information provides a relatively objective means for 
supporting the meaning hypothesis, first, because these redundant contextual features exist in the 
text independently of the analyst and of the hypothesis; and second, because these contextual 
features demonstrate that the hypothesized semantic contribution of look is present in the text 
independently of one’s interpretation of just look (careful suggests a message element of 
attention, too). 
Note that redundant information is prevalent in texts because any given feature of a 
message (e.g., attention) will typically play a part in determining the speaker’s choice of more 
than one linguistic sign (in example 1, the suggestion of a message involving attention guides the 
                                                          
13
 Of course, see may also sometimes occur in close proximity to decide/decision despite the fact that the hypothesis 
to be proposed for see consists of no element of attention. In that case, the presence of decide will not be used to 
provide evidence in support of the meaning hypothesis of see, and other contextual evidence will be sought. Now, 
because both look and decide are chosen for a partially overlapping message effect while see and decide are chosen 
each for different and non-overlapping message effects, it may be predicted that look and decide will co-occur at a 
higher than chance frequency in comparison to see and decide. This prediction has been tested on background and 
has been confirmed.  
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speakers’ choice of both careful and look). Consequently, the message elements to which each 
meaning individually contributes overlap, and reinforce one another (Reid 1991:302).  
 The text in example (1) offers redundant information in support of ATTENTION only, and 
gives no support for VISUAL. The examples chosen for analysis in this dissertation will focus 
mostly on redundant information in support of ATTENTION because VISUAL is taken to be rather 
more straightforward (in our present example, taking a careful look at the item mentioned is 
performed through the use of the sense of sight). Indeed, other hypotheses concerning the 
meaning of look that will be reviewed in Chapter V all posit visual in the meaning, while the 
notion of attention is unique to the hypothesis proposed here. Still, it is by no means trivial that 
VISUAL should figure in the meaning of look because there are many occurrences where no 
message element of visual is involved, such as in look at your thought process. Certain sections 
in Chapters III and IV will therefore be devoted specifically to supporting VISUAL in the meaning 
of look through both qualitative and quantitative data. In brief, we will see that it is precisely 
because of the conceptual metaphor that maps vision to intellection that a meaning consisting of 
visual alone can contribute to the suggestion of a message involving the intellect; in other words, 
there is no need to posit ‘intellectual’ in the code because the cognitive connection already exists 
in people’s minds independent of the linguistic system. 
 It should lastly be noted that the methodology of relying on redundant information in 
texts is quite different from the more familiar methodology of introspective judgments of 
sentences constructed by the analyst. In light of the goal of explaining speakers’ expressive 
choices in actual speech/writing events, introspective judgments of such sentences are of little 
interest here. Furthermore, constructed sentences offer what would inevitably be a highly 
restricted dataset, limited just to those cases that the analyst could think of or, more crucially, 
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that are of interest given the analyst’s goals and assumptions. For instance, consider again the 
generative analysis of Gruber (1967) who states that look “is obligatorily Agentive”; his analysis 
is restricting the data just to those instances where look co-occurs with activity-suggesting 
morphology, and consequently, classifying the meaning of look as a type of activity becomes 
inevitable. In search for a hypothesis of an invariant semantic contribution for look, the dataset 
examined here has not been biased or restricted in any way.  
3.2   Quantitative support based on overlapping communicative effects 
While the qualitative method of redundant information is seen as a reliable and objective means 
for testing the meaning hypothesis, it may nonetheless still be argued that the analyst has 
manipulatively selected out of hundreds of examples specifically the ones that consist of the 
redundant information that supports their hypothesis. In other words, how do we know that 
examples such as (1) above are not just lucky? Quantitative tests are intended to address this 
difficulty
14
. More specifically, the purpose of quantitative testing is to establish the generality of 
a rationale that is first proposed in the analysis of an individual example for a speaker’s choice to 
utter look. All the quantitative predictions in this dissertation, therefore, will follow from a 
preceding qualitative analysis.  
The quantitative method will be fully explicated in Chapter III, but let’s use example (1) 
for just a brief illustration. Following the analysis of example (1), we see that there is one shared 
reason – one overlapping communicative effect – that is leading the speaker to use both careful 
and look, that is, the suggestion of a message feature of attention. If it can be shown that example 
(1) is representative of a regular pattern, that is, if careful and look co-occur at a higher than 
                                                          
14
 Furthermore, as noted in the previous footnote, because see, for example, also sometimes co-occurs with 
decision/decide, quantitative testing may offer empirical justification for the claim that the presence of decide in an 
individual example provides redundant information in support of the hypothesized meaning of look but not for the 
hypothesized meaning of see. 
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chance frequency, then that will indirectly support the meaning hypothesis because it would 
show that a notion that, by hypothesis, figures in the meaning of look (i.e. attention) regularly 
motivates speakers’ choice to utter this sign’s signal.  
In order to test whether careful co-occurs with look at a higher than chance frequency, we 
must use a control term whose meaning has absolutely nothing to do with the notion of attention 
(or visual), so that we can compare the frequency of look with careful to the frequency of look 
with the control term. The control term here will be first. Consider an example. 
(2) Coming up, a first look at the man who may have killed Paula. (NBC Dateline) 
In this example, first is used to suggest a message element of initiation or of something that has 
not occurred previously, whereas look, by hypothesis, is still chosen to produce a message 
element of visual attention. What is important is that there is no shared reason – no overlapping 
communicative effect – that motivates the speaker to use look and first together. Unlike look and 
careful in example (1), here, each form – look and first – is chosen for reasons independent of the 
other and each produces completely different and non-overlapping message effects.  
Following the analyses of examples (1) and (2), it is predicted that look will favor careful 
in comparison to first. To test this prediction the following searches (Table 1) have been carried 
out in the Corpus of Contemporary American English, henceforth COCA.  
Table 1 COCA searches for careful and first 
Favored Disfavored 
a careful look a first look 
And here are the results of the prediction (Table 2).  
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Table 2 Total COCA occurrences of careful and first in the 
presence and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
careful  62 36 20469 4 
first  109 64 549314 96 
Total 171 100 569783 100 
p < .0001     
The prediction is confirmed. The right column of Table 2 (titled ‘look absent’) shows the 
baseline frequency of careful and first; the left column (titled ‘look present’) shows the 
prediction. The right side shows the number of all occurrences of careful and first except those 
where these words occur with look. Under these baseline conditions, that is, with no look to 
impact its distribution, careful represents only four percent of the careful-first total. Once look is 
introduced, however, careful skews in the predicted direction, accounting now for 36 percent of 
the total. The p value indicates that the probability of the association between look and careful 
being due to chance is extremely low. This data, therefore, confirms that speakers regularly use 
look to suggest a message feature of attention, and so supports ATTENTION in the meaning 
hypothesis. The confirmation of this and all the predictions made in this dissertation demonstrate 
through the use of a massive corpus that objective quantitative evidence can be brought to bear 
on the analyst’s interpretation of a particular example, either supporting it or failing to support it.  
 It is worth pointing out that, in Chapter III, we will see another quantitative test 
demonstrating that look and carefully also co-occur at a higher than chance frequency. The fact 
that look regularly co-occurs with both careful and carefully is but one strong indication that the 
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notion of attention contributes to the interpretation of texts where look occurs regardless of 
whether its surrounding morphology is what is traditionally called nominal (e.g., a/the) or verbal 
(e.g., -ed/-s).  
Note lastly that, while the meaning hypothesis gives rise to quantitative predictions and 
consequently uncovers novel distributional patterns, the purpose here of offering quantitative 
data is not to predict the distribution of look, but rather to explain it. To this end, careful in our 
example above functions as a surrogate for a message element of attention, and its regular co-
occurrence with look is explained due to the presence of ATTENTION in the hypothesized meaning 
of look. Because the predictions made in this dissertation have come out of an unbiased and 
unrestricted dataset, they have resulted in the discovery of many clear and strong distributional 
tendencies that have never been noted, much less explained, before. 
4   Preview of upcoming chapters 
The next three chapters consist of analyses of attested occurrences of look to support the 
meaning hypothesis, the fifth chapter reviews competing hypotheses of the meaning of look, and 
finally, the sixth chapter offers a discussion of the contributions of this study to CS analytical 
tradition. Briefly, of the three analysis-chapters, Chapter II is qualitative, Chapter III is 
quantitative, and Chapter IV is comparative. In a few more words, Chapter II develops in detail 
the meaning hypothesis for look, and thoroughly demonstrates the explanatory power of the 
hypothesis in accounting for the wide array of this sign’s uses through qualitative analyses of 
attested occurrences of look in contexts consisting of redundant information. In addition to 
explaining why speakers choose look for the communication of various different types of 
messages, Chapter II will also explicate how a meaning hypothesis for look that posits 
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ATTENTION for all its occurrences can explain the use of look for both visual and intellectual 
messages.  
Chapter III continues to support the hypothesis, now through large-scale quantitative 
predictions that are tested through the use of COCA. The chapter will begin with a thorough 
explication of the quantitative methodology that has been adopted for this study, that is, that each 
quantitative prediction follows from a particular qualitative analysis proposing one shared reason 
– one overlapping communicative effect – that motivates the use of both look and another form. 
This inductive rationale for the regular co-occurrence of forms will be contrasted with a 
deductive rationale claiming to explain regular co-occurrences directly in terms of the 
compatibility of the hypothesized meanings. The reasons for adopting the inductive rationale and 
rejecting the deductive one will be explained. The chapter will then proceed to support the 
hypothesis through numerous quantitative counts, first, focusing on ATTENTION, and then, on 
VISUAL.  
Chapter IV offers meaning hypotheses for the forms see, seem and appear and explains 
why speakers sometimes choose each of these forms in contexts where look may initially appear 
as a plausible alternative. Doing this is an integral part of an analysis of look because it serves to 
account for constraints on the distribution of look that cannot be explained in terms of the 
meaning of look alone. The chapter consists of both qualitative analyses and quantitative 
predictions that compare the use of look to that of each of these other forms and explicates how 
each sign’s respective meaning is responsible for creating its unique distributional patterns.  
Chapter V then reviews three previous analyses of the meaning of look: one is a 
generative proposal presented in Landau and Gleitman (1985), another is a construction grammar 
proposal presented in Wierzbicka (1988), and the third is another CS proposal presented in Tobin 
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(1993). These competing hypotheses should be seen as indications that the meaning proposed 
here is by no means obvious or trivial. The discussion of these other hypotheses is postponed 
until the end because, only following the full presentation of the current hypothesis will the 
reader be able to evaluate its advantages and compare it to others. 
Finally, Chapter VI discusses the contributions of this study to CS linguistics, including, 
in particular, the discovery that a CS meaning, normally applied only to the domain of grammar, 
can be made applicable to lexical forms, too. The implications of this study to the lexicon-
grammar distinction will be discussed in detail. 
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CHAPTER II 
ATTENTION, VISUAL as the explanation for speakers’ choice of look 
1   Introduction  
This chapter argues that the hypothesis of a sign whose signal is the phonological sequence /lʊk/ 
and whose meaning is ATTENTION, VISUAL successfully explains the full range of this sign’s 
attested distribution in terms of speakers’ expressive choices. The meaning of look involves two 
notions, the first of which, ATTENTION, expresses a conceptualization of a state of mind, while 
the other, VISUAL, expresses a conceptualization of the physical sense of sight. Together, the two 
notions make up a single semantic substance, which may be more fully stated as allocated 
mental resources focused by and directed through the visual track. It is important to stress that 
the notion of visual attention is offered as a unitary meaning hypothesis; that is, look is 
hypothesized to have a single meaning involving a particular sensory-mental semantic substance. 
The notion of visual in the hypothesized meaning is shared by other forms – including see – 
whose precise meaning will be outlined in Chapter IV; the notion of attention is probably shared 
by other perceptual forms that are not studied in this dissertation, such as listen. The 
combination, however, of the notion of visual and that of attention within a single meaning (that 
consists of nothing more) is, by hypothesis, unique to look. This is thus a monosemic analysis of 
look that invokes neither polysemy nor homonymy. The hypothesis is summarized in Figure 1. 
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Meaning Signal 
ATTENTION, VISUAL  /lʊk/ or look 
Fig. 1 The hypothesis of look as a monosemic sign 
  While the proposed meaning may strike some readers as a straightforward observation 
that is hardly in need of validation, that impression is deceptive. The proposed meaning is a 
hypothesis, not an observation. We will see in this and the following chapters that the hypothesis 
of ATTENTION, VISUAL, precisely as formulated and with neither more nor less detail, is the only 
one that can provide an explanation for the many peculiarities in the distribution of look. Indeed, 
while the meanings offered by other linguists for look all involve VISUAL, different notions have 
been proposed to accompany it, including EXPLORATORY (Landau and Gleitman 1985) and 
PROCESS (Tobin 1993). While such hypotheses may all appear plausible, each is quite different, 
and the explanatory power of each is different, too. These discarded hypotheses will be examined 
in Chapter V, after the presentation of the current hypothesis is complete. By then it will be 
evident that EXPLORATORY and PROCESS fail to explain many of the distributional patterns of look 
that have now been discovered specifically through the hypothesis of ATTENTION. 
  Throughout this chapter and the next two, the hypothesized meaning will elucidate 
numerous facts about the distribution of look, many of which were unknown before this research. 
We will come to understand why look is sometimes used in the absence of any visual sensory 
input; why look is sometimes used, and sometimes not, for what may at first appear to be 
essentially the same message; why look is used for messages of searching, either with or without 
a following for; and why look is used for messages involving the communication of an attitude or 
a state of mind. Finally, this chapter will deal with cases where instead of visual perception the 
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communication concerns rather only the intellect. An extensive discussion of the well-
established notion in cognitive-functionalist analyses of conceptual metaphor will be offered in 
connection with these uses of look. It will then further be demonstrated that a clear-cut 
dichotomy between visual and intellectual messages is impossible to sustain; instead, one finds a 
continuum of cases where metaphorical and non-metaphorical interpretations cannot be clearly 
distinguished. In the next chapter, we will show that the hypothesis leads to a substantial number 
of discoveries regarding clear-cut but previously unknown statistical tendencies of co-occurrence 
between look and other words and phrases in corpora.     
  Explanation versus Description. In connection with the proposals outlined above, we 
stress that this account offers an explanation of the distribution of look, not a description of it. To 
understand the difference, consider what appears within a dictionary entry of look. The following 
are just a handful of the dozens of definitions provided for look by the Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED Online 2015). 
a) To direct one’s sight (He looked at me) 
b) To direct one’s gaze in a manner expressive of a certain thought or feeling; to present 
a specified facial expression (The lion looked at Alice wearily) 
c) To ascertain by visual inspection (They open the book and they look if your name’s 
on it) 
d) To direct or apply one’s mind; to turn or fix one’s attention or regard; to engage in 
mental contemplation, investigation, examination, etc. (The situation, whichever way 
he looked at it, was uncomfortable) 
e) To expect, anticipate (I am a pop punk solo artist looking to be signed to a label 
soon) 
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f) To inspect, or peruse (From time to time doctors came to shine penlights into his eyes 
and to look over his notes) 
g) To seek, search for (She looks around for a food vendor) 
h) To have the appearance of being, to seem to the sight (She looked like a monument 
planted there) 
i) The action or act of looking (Those hoping for a look at the institution’s vast 
collection of coins, textiles and other cultural artifacts will be disappointed) 
j) A person’s (or animal’s) appearance, especially that of his or her countenance 
(Morden had the look of a schoolboy who has pulled off a glorious prank) 
What these entries show is that dictionaries provide a wide range of quite detailed message types 
where look can be found, without giving a unifying explanation underlying all its uses. There is 
no denying that look can be used for a wide range of messages, but the hypothesis proposed here 
goes beyond the description of usages in that it offers a unified reason for why look is used in all 
the different ways that it is.  
  To further appreciate the explanatory nature of the hypothesis proposed here as opposed 
to the descriptive account offered by the dictionary, let’s see what happens if we treat the 
dictionary definitions as if each were a separate explanatory hypothesis concerning the meaning 
of look. In order for these hypotheses to be tested the analyst would have to be able to determine 
which look is being confronted on each occasion. But even a cursory examination of the 
definitions above reveals that this would simply be impossible. Let’s take just one case to 
illustrate this point: definition (f) – ‘to inspect’ with its example doctors came to shine penlights 
into his eyes and to look over his notes. Now how could this ‘inspect-look’ (definition f) be 
distinguished from the ‘apply-one’s-mind-look’ (definition d), for aren’t the doctors inspecting 
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their notes while putting their minds to attending to them? And further, how could this be 
distinguished from the ‘direct-one’s-sight-look’ (definition a), for aren’t the doctors directing 
their sight to the notes, too?  
  The hypothesis proposed here can by itself explain the use of look in all of the examples 
offered under these different dictionary entries, because the notion of visual attention fits the 
message being communicated in each and every one of them. The fit of the hypothesized 
meaning to the many different types of messages suggested by look will be explicated throughout 
the chapter. But briefly, note, for instance, that the act of visually attending to something 
involves orienting one’s eyes in the direction of the stimulus attended to; this is why look is used 
both in he looked at me and the lion looked at Alice wearily. Notice that the portion of definition 
(b) which says ‘in a manner expressive of a certain thought or feeling’ has to do with the use of 
wearily, not with look. The dictionary is at fault here for mistakenly attributing something in the 
context (wearily) to the word that is being defined (look). As another brief illustration, consider 
the fact that visually attending to something is a volitional act, often motivated by some specific 
purpose, such as to ascertain or to inspect or to find something, etc. – through the use of the 
sense of sight; this is why look is used in They open the book and they look if your name’s on it, 
look over his notes and She looks around for a food vendor. Notice here too that definitions (c), 
(f) and (g) – ‘to ascertain’, ‘to inspect’ and ‘to search’, respectively, have to do with the purpose 
of visually attending to something – again a contextual feature not attributable to any one 
individual word, including look.  
  The dictionary treatment, much like many linguists, assumes that one can explicate the 
meaning of an individual word based on its interpretation within a given utterance. A central 
problem with this approach is that, if one attempts to define a word on the basis of its 
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interpretation, then it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to determine precisely which message 
elements of the gestalt interpretation come specifically from the individual word in question, 
leading thus to misattribution, as has been illustrated above. To avoid misattribution, it is 
necessary to examine a great number of utterances consisting of look in an attempt to see 
whether a single contribution can be identified that is constant across all utterances in which this 
form occurs. If such a consistent contribution is identified, then it provides the explanation for 
why the sign look occurs where it does.   
  The fact now needs reminding that look can be used for messages involving either an 
act/occurrence in time or a kind of thing; putting it in traditional terms, look can receive both 
verbal and nominal interpretations. In the account proposed here, however, neither of them is 
inherent in its meaning. In the examples provided in (a-h) above, look functions as what is 
traditionally called a verb, that is, as an act taking place in time. But note that the suggestion of a 
message concerning an occurrence in time comes not from the hypothesized meaning of look but 
from the meanings of the grammatical forms that occur in its surroundings, such as -ed, -0 or -s. 
Following Huffman (1989), and broadly speaking in accord with the grammatical tradition, these 
forms bear temporal distinctions, where, for instance, in She looked, it is hypothesized that the -
ed following look means PAST. But the grammatical forms surrounding look may also be the or a 
– signifying information concerning the differentiation and identifiability of entities (see e.g., 
Reid 1991:77-80); or they may be -0 or -s – signaling information concerning the Number of 
entities, that is, singular or plural (Reid 1991: Chapter 2). When look occurs with any of these 
entity-suggesting grammatical forms then ATTENTION, VISUAL is construed as a thing rather than 
an occurrence in time. The reader may be accustomed to thinking of noun and verb as separate 
lexical categories, but there is every reason to believe that the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL fits 
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the message regardless of what grammatical forms co-occur with look. The examples presented 
below intersperse noun and verb uses without distinguishing among them. 
  Turning to a quick reminder now about the methodological importance of redundant 
information. Throughout this chapter, analyses of attested occurrences will demonstrate that 
message partials involving the notion of visual attention are consistently suggested by the use of 
look. Such a demonstration relies on contextual evidence against which the meaning hypothesis 
is tested and, either supported or rejected. In particular, the analyses below rely crucially on 
redundant information in the text that will itself show, without appealing to the analyst’s or the 
reader’s intuitions or apprehensions of the message, that the notions of visual and of attention are 
present in all the messages for which look is used. For a brief illustration, consider the following 
attested utterance.  
(1) … looking at one spot of attention… (MBSR YOGA #1)  
In this case, the presence of one spot of attention straightforwardly suggests that a message 
partial of attention is at issue in this text, thus supporting ATTENTION in the hypothesized 
meaning of look. VISUAL does not find support in this short linguistic context, but the extra-
linguistic context unambiguously indicates that the addressee is instructed to direct their vision to 
a spot of attention. While it is necessary to show that both VISUAL and ATTENTION consistently 
contribute to the interpretation of messages where look occurs, the analyses to follow concentrate 
mostly on demonstrating that attention is a relevant feature of the message, given that visual is in 
most cases much more straightforward.  
  Finally, wherever relevant, the analyses here and in the next two chapters will appeal to 
aspects of the phenomenology of visual attention in humans as studied by psychologists. As will 
be demonstrated, the following phenomenological aspects of visual attention (summarized in 
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Hatfield 1998) prove relevant in explaining the distribution of look: (a) narrowing of the visual 
field and clarity of visual stimuli, (b) active directing of the eyes and mind, (c) temporary 
fixation of the eyes and mind, and (d) involuntary shifts of attention. These phenomenological 
aspects are distinct from the meaning hypothesis, and should not be taken as implying multiple 
senses of look. Rather, because in deploying the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL, speakers associate 
it with these experiential aspects, an appeal to them can sometimes facilitate our understanding 
of speakers’ motivation to use look. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly examines the most 
straightforward use of look for messages concerning acts of visual attention. The subsequent 
sections explore and explain the less straightforward uses of look. The fit of the hypothesized 
meaning with message partials where a visual stimulus is absent is discussed in Section 3; the fit 
with message partials involving the communication of one’s thoughts or feelings is in section 4; 
the fit with message partials involving attention-grabbing or attention-worthy visual features is 
discussed in Section 5; the fit with message partials concerning visual attribution is discussed in 
Section 6; the fit of the meaning with messages of either visual or intellectual attention is 
discussed in Section 7; the fit with message partials of searching is in Section 8; finally, Section 
9 discusses both the visual and intellectual uses of look in combination with the directional terms 
up, down, forward, back and after.  
The types of messages alluded to above by no means exhaust the uses of look, and not 
every use of look will fit neatly within one of these categories. In presenting the examples below 
under separate sections I am not positing a hard and fast taxonomy of usage types. The 
classification of uses is made purely for presentational purposes and has no theoretical import. 
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Every occurrence of look is equally motivated by the hypothesized meaning, and no claim is 
made that there exists a discrete or finite number of message types associated with look.  
2   The fit with messages involving acts of visual attention  
The first example provides clear-cut evidence for the hypothesized meaning in the form of quite 
explicit redundant information.  
(2) [Yoga instructor:] Twist the body to the right, as you bring your right arm behind you, 
[…] twisting the head and looking as far to the right as you can, even looking into the far 
right corners of your eyes, finding a spot to focus on and keeping your attention there as 
best you can. This helps to improve concentration and focus. (MBSR YOGA #1 – 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_pYoDdUijY8) 
In this example, the instructor chose look (as opposed to, say, see or stare) because the message 
involves an act of visual attention. This is evidenced, first, by the use of your eyes, supporting 
VISUAL, and by the use of finding a spot to focus on and keeping your attention there, supporting 
ATTENTION. 
  Deepening the analysis, example (2) nicely illustrates how the different aspects studied 
by psychologists in the phenomenology of visual attention play a role in explaining the use of 
look in terms of its hypothesized meaning. First, it has been noted by Hatfield (1998), relying on 
a much older tradition in the psychology of visual attention, that there is an inverse relation 
between the intensity of attention and the cognitive material that can be brought under it: “the 
greater the attention, the smaller the part of the visual field to which it extends” (1998:5). In 
example (2), the use of both spot (indicating a visual stimulus that is as narrow as can be) as well 
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as focus provide redundant information – independent of the use of look – that the message here 
concerns a narrowing of the visual field, thus supporting ATTENTION in the hypothesized 
meaning. Second, visual attention is experientially associated with an act of voluntarily 
orientating one’s eyes toward the direction of attention (Hatfield 1998:9). In example (2), to the 
right and into the far right provide partly redundant information of a message partial that 
involves actively orienting one’s eyes, thus again supporting ATTENTION. Third and finally, 
visual attention is also experientially associated with the human ability to choose to sustain one’s 
attention while retaining the eyes fixed toward one visual stimulus (Hatfield 1998:11). In 
example (2), the instructor says keeping your attention there, where the use of keeping suggests a 
message partial of fixation, again supporting the hypothesized meaning.  
  One may argue against us, as we have argued above against the dictionary, that it is these 
other forms (eyes, spot, attention, focus, to the right) that are responsible for suggesting a 
message involving visual attention, and that this notion in the message has mistakenly been 
attributed to look. If the hypothesis relied on just this one example, then such an argument would 
be perfectly in order. But, throughout this chapter and the next two, we will see that the notion of 
visual attention invariably accompanies texts where look occurs (even in the absence of 
contextual support).  
3   The fit with messages where a visual stimulus is absent  
(3) Maureen did not answer but sat on the bench looking into space. Her thin lips were 
pressed flat together in a way that made her seem heartless. I wondered if she felt the 
need to maintain her authority or if she simply didn’t want to involve herself in my 
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problems. Or perhaps she thought I was ranting and was deliberately ignoring me. (Quiet 
People) 
  The meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL may be used for messages that involve the active 
directing of the eyes (here, into space) irrespective of whether or not there is a visual stimulus to 
be perceived. This is so because, by hypothesis, the meaning of look only involves attention that 
is directed through the visual track, saying nothing about the reception of visual sensory input; 
the meaning of look thus leaves it to contextually-based inference whether such input is or is not 
part of the message. Look is used in example (3) because the message involves Maureen actively 
orienting her eyes. The purpose of orienting her eyes into space is not to perceive anything, but 
rather, as the context makes evident, to avoid her interlocutor by deliberately directing her visual 
attention away from him. Note that the sparseness of the hypothesized meaning is what enables a 
straightforward explanation of such examples; any hypothesis that went beyond ATTENTION, 
VISUAL and proposed a meaning that included the reception of a visual stimulus would not be 
able to account for cases like this one. In Chapter IV, the meaning of look will be compared to 
see, whose meaning hypothesis does involve a visual stimulus, impacting thereby its unique 
distribution, as will be shown. 
4   The fit with messages involving the communication of one’s thoughts or feelings  
Consider first the following expressions, all attested. 
(4) The eyes are the windows to the soul. 
(5) We have no need to speak. We communicate with deep soulful looks. 
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(6) Look into my eyes and hear what I’m not saying, for my eyes speak louder than my voice 
ever will.  
Example (4) does not feature look, but it is a well-known expression reflecting the fact that 
people consider the eyes to be a reliable source of information concerning a person’s thoughts 
and feelings. Because people sometimes communicate their thoughts and feelings through 
visually attending to one another, the meaning of look can be used for messages involving such 
acts, as demonstrated in examples (5) and (6). These examples do not provide much context, but 
example (7) below offers an abundance of redundant information in the text that supports the 
hypothesized meaning.  
(7) [A list of suggestions for successful courting:] Lock eyes. According to David Givens, 
PhD, a direct gaze triggers powerful physiological responses, such as increased heart rate 
and brainwave activity – two things that also happen when he’s turned on by you. Hold 
his gaze for about 8 to 10 seconds. That’s the ideal length of time to make eye contact 
with a guy, and men are most responsive to long, not short, glances. The scientists found 
that the more you share a look, the more attracted to you he’ll feel. Then you have to 
glance away. Because you are looking at him and then averting your eyes, this hard-to-
get type of eye contact subconsciously triggers him to want you even more. In fact, this is 
Mother Nature’s best man-magnet tool. In the animal kingdom, it’s called a copulatory 
gaze, and it will definitely appeal to your man’s primitive instincts. (Cosmopolitan – 
Touches that Lock Down His Love) 
Look has been chosen in this example because the message concerns communicating 
through the eyes (eye contact), an act which requires attracting the other person’s attention and 
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holding their gaze so that the person recognizes your intent. This attending with one’s eyes thus 
explains why the meaning of look has been chosen as opposed to, say, glance, which may also 
suggest actively turning one’s eyes, yet not specifically with attention. Note the redundant 
information in the text. First, lock eyes and eye contact clearly indicate that the message involves 
the sense of sight, thus supporting VISUAL; second, lock, contact and hold his gaze indicate that 
the message involves the eyes being intently fixated, thus supporting ATTENTION.  
  Speakers can use the meaning of look to conceptualize that communication which one 
transmits through one’s gaze (e.g., gave her a look of surprise) because the meaning of look may 
contribute to a message that involves one’s eyes communicating through their intent direction 
and fixation toward someone else. Consider the following attested example.  
(8) I looked at Elaine and she narrowed her eyes and gave me a look that said ‘go to hell’. 
(The Bachelor Party) 
The narrator uses the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL because the message involves Elaine intently 
directing her eyes toward the speaker, not in order to perceive him but rather to communicate 
something (go to hell) with her eyes. Redundant information in support of the hypothesis is 
found in narrowed her eyes, supporting both VISUAL (eyes) and ATTENTION (narrowed).  
5   The fit with messages involving attention-grabbing visual features 
This section explains the fit of the meaning of look for messages involving attention-grabbing or 
attention-worthy visual features. Take, for instance, the expression the new look; the reason why 
look is used here is to suggest that the visual features in question – typically in regard to fashion 
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– are the ones that now catch the public’s attention. Let’s turn now to the following attested 
example. 
(9) Models Toni Garrn (left) and Karlie Kloss show off one of the season’s most stunning 
trends backstage at Dior: perfect red lips paired with a luminous complexion. Makeup 
artist Pat McGrath painted models’ mouths with Cover Girl Lip Perfection Lip-color in 
Tempt, Hot, or Flame ($6.50 each), a look she hails as “refined, modern, and elegant.” 
(Harper’s Bazaar magazine) 
Look (as opposed to, say, appearance) is chosen because the message involves the visual 
features attained through the application of lipstick, a product that is expressly designed to draw 
visual attention to its wearer. Note the redundant information supporting the hypothesis. First, 
the models show off the new lipstick, suggesting that its visual features are interesting and 
attractive and capture people’s attention. Next we find the descriptive terms stunning, perfect red 
and luminous, all of which are strong accentuated visual properties clearly intended to grab 
people’s attention. Lastly, the names of the available lipstick colors are quite suggestive 
themselves, being called Tempt, Hot and Flame – all names that unequivocally bring out the fact 
that the visual features achieved by using this product are intended to attract attention.  
The next example involves a person’s inherent, attention-grabbing visual features; the 
hypothesized meaning explains why look is attested here, too (again, as opposed to appearance, 
which might have been a plausible alternative).  
(10) “When I was growing up, they called me La Prieta Fea – the Ugly Dark One. I’m 
the darkest one in the family. But I actually think it helped me develop a personality. I 
couldn’t rely on my looks.” (Esquire: The complete guide to women 2005) 
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The speaker uses look because she is contrasting between her attention-grabbing visual features 
(my looks) and her internal personality traits (develop a personality). VISUAL is trivially 
supported by the contrast between her external and internal features. ATTENTION is supported by 
the suggestion that she couldn’t rely on her visual characteristics. To rely on one’s visual 
characteristics would suggest that one accrues some benefit from other people due to one’s visual 
features. Now, if these features are going to affect people’s actions and behavior toward one then 
one’s visual features must be noticed and attended to. Indeed, note that the speaker’s visual 
features were attended to and did influence people’s behavior toward her (leading people to call 
her the Ugly Dark One); only these features were thought to be negative, so they did her no 
good. Thus, the use of rely on suggests that the message concerns attention to visual features and 
look, as opposed to appearance, is chosen because the meaning of look is ATTENTION, VISUAL 
whereas appearance, as we will see in Chapter IV, has no element of attention in its meaning. 
6   The fit with messages involving attribution based on visual attention  
Because people often make judgments of attribution on the basis of having visually attended to 
something (which, in turn, allows people to determine its properties), the meaning of look can be 
used to suggest message partials involving visual attribution, particularly when the message 
concerns the attention-worthiness of the attributed properties. As a brief illustration, by 
hypothesis, speakers will use look in the compliment You look beautiful rather than, say, are – 
You are beautiful – because the use of look suggests that the speaker has given attention to the 
addressee’s visual features. Out of context, it may seem that in such examples look and are are 
(sometimes, at least) interchangeable, but the analyses in this section demonstrate that this is not 
so. The analyses below thus rely on the different decisions speakers make to use or omit look in 
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what may at first appear as rather similar messages that are in fact, as we shall see, quite 
different. Let’s begin with the following pair of attested examples contrasting the presence of 
look in you look beautiful (example 11) to its absence in you’re beautiful (example 12). 
(11) You never want people to notice your accessories. When you walk into a room, 
heads should turn. The desired effect is for everyone to say or think that you look 
beautiful. If people comment on your shoes or bag, they’re not appreciating the entire 
essence that is you. If you go to a museum and see a statue on a podium, you don’t want 
people to say, “Wow, what a stunning podium. Where can I get one of those?” Your 
entire ensemble should be so captivating, so cohesive, that one particular thing can’t be 
singled out. It supports you; you don’t support it. (Harper’s Bazaar) 
 
(12) African-American parents must be especially vigilant, says Powell-Garlington, 
because some physical traits – dark skin, tightly coiled hair, thick lips – aren’t as widely 
embraced by society, even by other blacks. “The more you affirm your kids’ beauty and 
build their self-esteem, the more they’ll internalize it” she says. Bettye Barber of 
Columbia, South Carolina, took this to heart when her daughter, 5-year-old Mikki, 
became upset over the fact that her bead adorned braids were too short to shake and clank 
like Zaria’s, her 2-year-old sister, whose hair is shoulder length. “I had to do some fast 
talking” Barber explains. “I told her about how beautiful her hair is and how everybody 
has different hair lengths, and that when her hair is in its natural state, it’s just like 
Mommy’s.” Of course you don’t want to pile on the praise so much that your child can’t 
keep her little ego in check. So it’s also important to emphasize that beauty has a wide 
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range. You might say to her, “Yes, you’re beautiful, but so is she.” (Parenting 
Magazine) 
  The meaning hypothesis for look explains why it is used in (11) but not in (12). The 
message in (11) involves attention to visual features, as is amply supported by the redundant 
information in the form of notice your accessories, comment on your shoes, heads should turn, 
and captivating ensemble. Thus, as evidenced by the use of all of these surrounding forms, look 
is used in example (11) because the speaker wants to communicate a message feature of 
attention, and ATTENTION is a part of the meaning of look.  
  In (12), by contrast, there is no evidence suggesting that the message concerns attention 
to the child’s visual features. Note that, whereas in (11) the message involves a person’s visual 
features on a particular occasion – a particular evening of a social event, the mother in (12) is 
reaffirming not that the child has beautiful visual features that the mother has noticed at that 
moment, but rather that the child’s visual features are generally beautiful; that is, the mother is 
pointing to something intrinsic to the child, whether anyone is paying attention or not.  
We turn now to another pair of examples involving attribution, and again compare the 
decisions to include and omit look, contrasting now look like to be like.  
(13) [Katie sees Peter after a long time they haven’t met:] “You haven’t changed 
much,” she said. “You look a little thinner. It’s becoming. You’ll be very attractive when 
you’re fifty, Peter.” “That’s not very complimentary – by implication.” “Why? Oh, you 
mean I think you’re not attractive now? Oh, but you are.” “You shouldn’t say that right 
out to me like that.” “Why not? You know you are. But I’ve been thinking of what you’ll 
look like at fifty. You’ll have gray temples and you’ll wear a gray suit – I saw one in a 
window last week and I thought that would be the one. (The Fountainhead) 
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(14) I read an article that said every ten years we become a different person. It’s easier 
to look back and say, “I’m so different than I was ten years ago,” but it’s so hard to look 
forward and imagine what you’ll be like at fifty. Your entire life, you’re evolving and 
growing and changing as a person. (http://www.citypages.com/music/greycoats-if-our-
last-album-was-molasses-this-ones-san-pellegrino-6629417) 
Look is used in example (13) because the communicated message involves the notion of visual 
attention, as evidenced by Katie’s use of I’ve been thinking and I thought, indicating that she has 
consciously directed her attention toward Peter’s mentioned visual characteristics (thinner, 
attractive, gray temples and gray suit). In (14), by contrast, the message concerns neither 
attention nor visual features, and hence the absence of look. Instead, the message in (14) involves 
a person’s personality and character, as evidenced by we become a different person and evolving 
and growing and changing as a person. 
  It is worth finally pointing out that this phenomenon of using look when the person 
looking is not the Entity in Focus (roughly, what is traditionally called a subject) is by no means 
unique to look. It parallels the usage of such forms as wash or read, as for example in Silk 
washes easily or This novel reads well
15
. Both in the case of look and (presumably) in the case of 
                                                          
15
 The distinction between forms such as easy and easily is outside the scope of this dissertation. It may briefly be 
noted, however, that This book reads easily and This book reads easy – despite possible pressures of prescriptive 
grammar – are both found to occur in COCA (e.g., “This looks pretty good – reads easy as a book”), and seem to 
communicate rather similar messages. By contrast, examples such as, say, He looked diligently and He looked 
diligent clearly involve quite different communications. This difference between look and read in their interaction 
with forms like easy and easily may be explained by the fact that the meaning of look is suitable both for messages 
involving object attribution (e.g., diligent) as well as for messages involving action manner (e.g., diligently), while 
the meaning of read (though we do not know what it is precisely) seems suitable only for messages involving action 
manner. The consequence is that with read there is no potential for confusion whether easy or easily are used, 
whereas with look speakers use -ly to imply a message that specifically applies to an activity. 
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these other forms, the meanings of the forms underdetermine the number of participants involved 
as well as which roles these participants might be playing in particular communications.  
7   The fit with messages involving either visual or intellectual attention 
The hypothesized meaning of look is proposed in this dissertation in full awareness of one of the 
most difficult aspects of look’s distribution. In our view, the hypothesized meaning can explain 
why this meaning is used for messages where no physical visual perception or visual features are 
at issue.  
(15) There is something about your decision making that is flawed and you need to 
look carefully at why this is the case. 
(www.reddit.com/r/leaves/comments/2o0w96/i_need_to_change_my_marijuana_habits) 
  To explain such uses of look a discussion of the notion of conceptual metaphor is first in 
order. Since the groundbreaking work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) it has been recognized that 
metaphor is not merely an occasional poetic device, but rather that it is a central process of 
conceptualization, pervasive both in the ways people think as well as in the use of language. A 
conceptual metaphor is construed as a systemic correspondence or mapping between two 
conceptual domains where, typically, one is relatively concrete (the source domain) and the other 
is relatively abstract (the target domain).  
  In the case at hand, the relevant mapping is the one said to link our physical experience of 
vision to the abstract domain of intellection (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Sweetser 1990, Lakoff 
1993 inter alia). The experiential basis for this conceptual mapping is the primary status of vision 
as a source of knowledge about the world (Sweetser 1990). This status, of course, is peculiar to 
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humans; if we were more like bats then our experience might have led to a metaphorical 
mapping between auditory perception and intellection, but given the biological makeup of 
humans, sight is our primary source of information regarding physical objects. Indeed, studies in 
child language have shown that visual features play a crucial role in children’s early 
discrimination of one category from another (Clark 1976). Note that while people do gain 
knowledge through auditory perception (primarily because of the use of language), sight is a far 
more useful sense for data gathering, simply because so many objects in the world do not emit 
stimuli audible to humans. 
  Another experiential basis – and one of particular interest with respect to look – regarding 
why people think of the abstract domain of intellection in terms of physical vision has to do with 
the highly developed focusing ability that is unique in humans to the visual sense. The ability to 
willfully focus or concentrate attention on one stimulus at the expense of others is a salient 
characteristic of both vision and thought (Sweetser 1990). None of the other senses, with the 
exception of hearing, allows for such voluntary control, and even hearing is less consciously and 
readily focused in comparison to vision. Humans have the ability to move their eyeballs at will 
from one stimulus to another, and further, even with the eyeballs remaining fixed, we can easily 
shift focus across different distances; suppose, for instance, that you hold a pencil in front of 
your eyes – you can readily focus your vision on the pencil, seeing it perfectly sharp, and then in 
an instant turn to focus your vision beyond the pencil, causing it to blur while the objects in its 
background sharpen. Vision is the only sense that allows for such skillful maneuvering and 
focusing. In this respect, our experience with vision is quite similar to our mental experience 
where we likewise have the ability to focus on mental and intellectual content and shift our 
attention from one thought to another at will.  
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  The above has been a deductive explanation motivating the link between vision and 
intellection, yet there is, in addition, independent evidence in support of this metaphorical 
mapping. One of the strongest arguments found in the literature for the existence of conceptual 
metaphor is the fact that a conceptual link across two domains of experience spawns a whole 
family of metaphors that are pervasive throughout the language. When it is observed that an 
entire family of expressions from one domain are systematically used for messages in another 
domain then this strongly suggests that there exists an underlying conceptual link connecting the 
two domains. It is not only the word look that is used for messages involving both vision and 
intellection. Rather, there is a wide range of linguistic expressions in English whose meanings, 
though we may not have precise hypotheses for, nonetheless clearly have to do with the visual 
domain and yet are used to communicate messages concerning the intellectual domain, too. 
Consider: see the problem, the mind’s eye, keep her in the dark, shed light on the issue, 
illuminate the issue, obscure the issue, spotlight the important issues, be blind to her concerns, 
put her theory under a microscope, his ideas were just a blur, an opaque argument, a 
transparent conclusion, a clear concept, his view on the matter, etc.  
  This phenomenon is not unique to English, either. Many languages likewise deploy 
words from the visual domain for messages in the intellectual domain (Sweetser 1990). As one 
brief example, the Hebrew phrase raa et ha-or, which literally translates as ‘saw the light’, is 
used to convey a message of realization, a truth dawning on one.  
  Yet another piece of evidence for the cognitive link between vision and intellection 
comes from expressions such as I saw it with my own eyes, which conveys the utmost certainty in 
one’s knowledge. Indeed, in many languages that have grammatical markers for evidentials, 
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visual data is considered the most reliable, certain and objective kind of knowledge there is 
(Sweetser 1990:33).  
  Having established that there is a conceptual link between vision and intellection we can 
return now to example (15) (look carefully at why this is the case) and explain it quite 
straightforwardly. The explanation for the use of the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL in 
communicating this non-visual message is the conceptual connection between vision – which 
forms a part of the meaning of look, and intellection – which is a feature of the message being 
communicated. Thus, look is used because the writer is advising the addressee to direct their 
mental or intellectual attention, that is, to think carefully about their decision making. 
  It should be noted that the theoretical status of the cognitive metaphor is different from 
that of the sign look. The sign constitutes a unit in the linguistic code, whereas the metaphor is a 
way of thinking (Reid 2004). Indeed, while metaphor affects language, “the locus of metaphor is 
not in language at all, but in the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another” 
(Lakoff 1993:202-203). Once it is acknowledged that there exists a cognitive metaphor that maps 
the domain of vision to the domain of intellection, the intellectual use of look can be accounted 
for in a straightforward way in terms of this form’s visual meaning. Treating the visual metaphor 
for intellection as a (linguistically relevant) way of thinking rather than a feature of the linguistic 
system proper in no way diminishes its importance; indeed it has a critical role in explaining 
many occurrences of look. Still, the cognitive metaphor has a different ontological status from 
things that are in the linguistic code – signs consisting of signals and their meanings – and it 
plays a different role in the explanation (Reid 2004). 
 Now some linguists may ask – why not explicitly build the intellectual value into the 
meaning of look so that the meaning would posit two paths of directed attention, one through the 
56 
 
visual track and another through the intellectual track? In other words, why not give look two 
semantic values where each value would stand in a closer relation to the message it is being used 
to communicate?  
The answer is given in light of the objective of this account, that is, to explain speakers’ 
choice to use look. This explanation is given in terms of the contribution of the hypothesized 
meaning of look to speakers’ intended messages. Note that this account is entirely explanatory, 
and not descriptive. A comprehensive description of the uses of look would treat the visual and 
intellectual uses on a par, as we see in the Oxford English Dictionary. But ‘intellectual’ is not 
posited as part of the meaning because the meaning is an explanation of the use of its signal – not 
a description of usages. And, because of the conceptual metaphor mapping vision to intellection, 
the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL can explain the use of look for intellectual messages. In short, 
by the principle of Occam’s razor, the reason why no additional semantic values are posited here 
for look is that more are not needed to explain its use. 
Further and moreover, note that a polysemic analysis seems feasible only when the 
database is largely restricted. Thus, if the analyst only considers a handful of examples, some 
like look at the picture and others like look at the problem, then it may well appear that the uses 
of look fall neatly into discrete conceptual categories, one involving only vision and another 
involving only intellection. But as more examples are analyzed, the conceptual space between 
the various putative senses fills in, revealing a continuum that defies a principled partitioning. 
Thus, whereas it may seem that look concerns a purely visual message on some instances and a 
purely intellectual message on others, there are in fact many cases where the two are combined 
and blend into one another. The next two examples illustrate this point; first, example (16) shows 
a case where look suggests more of an intellectual message yet visual is involved, too; then 
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example (17) is a case where look clearly suggests a message of visual attention and yet 
intellectual attention is part of the message, too. 
(16) I compared two books to see how they exercised their option in reference to that. 
The first was Captain Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, a very serious 
and learned treatise written in a high level of academic style. In the whole first chapter of 
this volume, the Captain does not once omit that when he might have. The level of 
precision is retained in respect to that as in respect to all else. Then I looked at a modern 
detective novel, one of the Nero Wolfe series, where the narrative is in the first person, 
and the narrator is a very breezy and informal individual, with language to match. He 
omits that about half the time, responding readily to variations in precision. His sound 
waves would be very different, in this respect, from those of Captain Mahan. (The 
Elements of a Science of Language) 
The writer has directed intellectual attention to particular aspects of the narrative and language of 
the book, yet, at the same time, he did so through directing his vision to the printed text. If a 
polysemic hypothesis were advanced as an explanation for the use of look then the analyst must 
be able to tell which look is being faced on each particular occasion. But determining whether 
look in this example is the visual look or the intellectual look seems impossible, for both notions 
are simultaneously part of the message (note that if the writer had examined the book through the 
auditory track then perhaps listen would have been used instead of look). The meaning proposed 
here explains this use of look without any need to decide between vision and intellection.  
 The next example nicely demonstrates that when people direct their attention to some 
visual stimulus it is often because they have an intellectual interest in that stimulus, and the act of 
attending to the stimulus visually is performed by way of examining it intellectually.  
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(17) [Howard Roark, an aspiring architect, is introduced to the reader at the very start 
of the novel: standing on a cliff, observing the natural environment that surrounds him…] 
He looked at the granite. To be cut, he thought, and made into walls. He looked at a tree. 
To be split and made into rafters. He looked at a streak of rust on the stone and thought 
of iron ore under the ground. To be melted and to emerge as girders against the sky. 
These rocks, he thought, are here for me; waiting for the drill, the dynamite and my 
voice; waiting to be split, ripped, pounded, reborn; waiting for the shape my hands will 
give them. (The Fountainhead) 
While it is clear that Roark visually attends to these natural features, it is also clear that – at the 
same time – he directs his intellectual attention to them, too. This is indicated by the repeated use 
of thought that follow the occurrences of look, as well as by the fact that the message concerns 
active planning – an intellectual activity; that is, Howard has an intellectual interest in these 
natural features as he is going to use them in his architectural endeavors. What is important is 
that a clear-cut distinction between visual and intellectual messages is again impossible to make 
because attending to something visually may well involve attending to it intellectually at the 
same time. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that in the psychological literature it is noted that an 
act of visual attention involves the external directing of the eyes as well as the internal directing 
of the mind (Hatfield 1998); as an illustration, suppose you are perceiving a tree, and then 
directing your mind – through the visual track – to different parts of it e.g., to the leaves, or to the 
branches, or to the trunk, or to the shape of the tree or to its color, etc. (the illustration comes 
from Wolff 1738 §256, cited in Hatfield 1998:12). 
Examples like (16-17) provide further empirical confirmation of the naturalness of the 
connection between vision and intellection, as they show that the cognitive metaphor plays a role 
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even when there is physical visual perception involved, too; that is, these example confirm the 
conceptual connection between vision and intellection because both of these notions are 
simultaneously present in the message communicated by these texts. Whereas a polysemic 
analysis (if treated as hypothesis that is subject to falsification) would require the analyst to spell 
out which look it is on each particular occasion – the visual look or the intellectual look, the 
monosemic hypothesis can successfully explain – with, crucially, the aid of the conceptual 
metaphor – the fit of the hypothesized meaning to the message even when the message spans 
both the visual and intellectual domains.  
8   The fit with messages of searching 
Perhaps contrary to one’s initial assumption, the use of for following look is not a necessary 
condition for the suggestion of a message partial of searching produced through the use of look.   
(18) He looked around the airport, trying to find his friend, Alfred. 
(http://artzyrainbow.deviantart.com/art/America-x-Male-Reader-Gaming-Love-
523092833) 
In (18) there is a message partial of searching yet no for. Still, the use of look can be explained in 
terms of its hypothesized meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL; look is used because the message 
concerns a person directing their attention through the visual track all around the airport. 
  Of course, a message partial of searching is often produced through the use of look for. 
(19) [Jack enters the house to check if his friends are there:] Jack looked for Arlen, but 
didn’t see her. He looked for Haley and Ric, but they were still sitting on the pier. 
(Ghosting) 
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The question is what in the linguistic input is responsible for this message partial. There are at 
least two analytical possibilities. First, look for may be an unanalyzable unit (which one might 
want to spell lookfor) whose meaning is SEARCH, and that exists in addition to the hypothesized 
units look and for. Second, a message partial of searching may not be encoded but is rather 
inferred through the independent contributions of the hypothesized meaning of look and the 
hypothesized meaning of for, and in light of additional contextual features.  
  As regards the first possibility, if one were to posit SEARCH as the meaning of look-for 
then one clear advantage would be that that would offer a closer fit between the meaning and the 
communicated message in many cases, such as example (19). But as indicated in the previous 
section, the account here is purely explanatory, not descriptive; if the single meaning ATTENTION, 
VISUAL can explain the use of look in these examples then there is no need to posit an additional 
unit of which look is only a part. Indeed, if the hypothesized meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL fits the 
message conveyed in (19), as will be demonstrated soon below, then hypothesizing an additional 
unit look-for with the meaning SEARCH would result in an untestable hypothesis, for the analyst 
would not be able to determine in cases like (19) which of the two units it is – the ATTENTION, 
VISUAL look or the SEARCH look-for. Furthermore, suppose that the text in (19) had said instead 
Jack looked through Arlen; in that case the message of ‘search’ would seem to disappear (while a 
message partial of attention still seems to be at issue). This indicates that it is not look by itself 
that is responsible for the message of searching, but rather for in this case must be contributing to 
that interpretation as well, along with other contextual features, such as the fact that Arlen does 
not visually perceive his friends at the moment that the text says he is looking for them.  
   We are led then to the second possibility: the notion of ‘search’ is an emergent, 
contextually induced feature of the message that cannot be attributed to any single linguistic 
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component; that is, it is not encoded by look, or by for, or by the sequence look for, but is rather 
an inference suggested by the use of look and of for in combination with contextual evidence.  
  To understand the inferential process leading to a message of searching, a brief 
explanation of the hypothesized meaning of for is in order. According to an unpublished paper 
by Alan Huffman, for signals a meaning that concerns the notion of reason. As a brief 
illustration, consider an example such as I received a bill for $50; if I received a bill for $50, 
Huffman explains, then the $50 I owe is the reason I received the bill. Similarly, in example (20), 
Jack’s friends are the reason why he actively directs his attention through the visual track.  
  Now, how does this lead to a message of searching? As mentioned, it is clear from the 
context that Jack does not visually perceive his friends (didn’t see her). Given that, if Jack’s 
friends are the reason why he engages his eyes in an act of visual attention, then, presumably, his 
act of visual attention is motivated by wanting to perceive them, leading to the inference that he 
is searching for them. Think of the inferential process in this way. The givens are: (a) Jack does 
not visually perceive his friends, (b) Jack engages in an act of visual attention, (c) the reason 
Jack engages in an act of visual attention is his friends. This then may lead to the inference that 
what Jack is doing is searching for his friends. Notice, finally, that here, too, it would be difficult 
to separate visual attention from intellectual attention; while Jack directs his eyes to various 
places around the house he also directs his mind to the task of finding his friends (this may be 
even clearer in cases such as looking for a job reading posts online or in a newspaper). 
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9   Look in combination with directional terms: up, down, forward, back and after 
This section looks at some common expressions featuring look followed by a directional term, 
including up, down, forward, back and after. As demonstrated in the pairs of examples below, all 
of these sequences may be used either for messages involving physical visual perception (the (a) 
example in each pair) or for messages involving only the intellect (the (b) example).   
(20)  
(a) I turned slowly and looked up to the top of the castle wall. (The Remembering) 
(b) I admired you! Looked up to you! (Red and Green) 
 
(21)  
(a) You can look down at the floor or out over your fingertips. (Yoga # 1) 
(b) The Catholic Church looks down on involvement in pornography.  
 (Geographical Review: Religion in Sin City) 
 
(22)  
(a) Crush heard another knock and looked forward. “There’s a cub on my hood.” 
(Bear Meets Girl) 
(b) It’s so hard to look forward and imagine what you’ll be like at fifty. 
(http://www.citypages.com/music/greycoats-if-our-last-album-was-molasses-this-
ones-san-pellegrino-6629417) 
 
(23)  
(a) He would often look back to make sure he hadn’t been seen. (The Manipulator) 
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(b) It’s easier to look back and say, “I’m so different than I was ten years ago” 
(http://www.citypages.com/music/greycoats-if-our-last-album-was-molasses-this-
ones-san-pellegrino-6629417) 
 
(24)  
(a) She turned to look after him as he walked away. (His Mother’s son - 
http://archiveofourown.org/works/925344)  
(b) [said of a lion:] He did have a marvelous even-tempered, friendly nature and I 
think we just became part of his family like a pride of lions. He knew he was the 
center of the world and everyone was there to look after him. (NBC Dateline: 
Amazing Animals Caught on Tape)  
  First, regarding the (a) cases, the reason why look is used in these cases can be explained 
straightforwardly since these messages all involve actively orienting one’s attention through the 
visual track, toward some specified direction. Now, in the (b) cases there is no message partial of 
visual perception and, moreover, the metaphorical mapping between vision and intellection is 
insufficient to explain the messages that are suggested by these utterances. Yet, by hypothesis, 
the contribution of look in each case is one and the same; look is used here every time because its 
meaning – ATTENTION, VISUAL – contributes to the communication of a directional message. In 
addition to the meaning of look and the metaphorical mapping of vision to intellection, we must 
appeal to the metaphorical mappings that are operative with each of the directional terms as well 
in order to explain the unique message partial suggested by each of the examples. The 
metaphorical mappings involved in the cases of up and down, as well as forward and back are 
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quite well understood, while the case of after is somewhat less clear but can still be made sense 
of.  
  Beginning with up and down, two related metaphorical mappings have been posited that 
are relevant for the analysis of examples (20) and (21). The first is GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN; the 
second is HIGH STATUS IS UP, LOW STATUS IS DOWN (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1993). In 
the case of (20), the message partial of admiration comes from the suggestion that the person to 
whom the speaker directs her attention is up above her; that is, because the speaker must direct 
their attention upwards, the implication is that the speaker thinks of the addressee as someone 
good, someone held in high regard, in short, someone to be admired
16
. In the case of (21), the 
message partial of disdain and contempt comes from the suggestion that the Catholic Church has 
to direct their attention downwards to pornography; that is, pornography is conceived of as bad, 
and held in low regard. 
  Turning to forward and back, these are spatial terms that are metaphorically mapped to 
the domain of time; future times are in front, past times are behind (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 
Lakoff 1993). In (22), the speaker is expressing that it is hard to direct one’s intellectual attention 
to the future and think what one will be like at fifty. In (23), the speaker expresses that it is easier 
to direct one’s attention to the past and see how you have changed and developed. 
  The metaphor involved with after has not been studied, as far as I know. Still, we might 
consider other expressions that indicate that being physically behind someone is conceptually 
linked with protecting or supporting or taking care of them. Thus we have expressions like I’ve 
got your back and I’m behind you whatever path you take, both suggesting message partials of 
protection and support. In (24) then, the speaker conveys that the lion to whom the speaker and 
                                                          
16
 Many people must experience as children physically looking up – toward the people that they look up to.  
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her family have directed their (intellectual and/or visual) attention is in front of them; that is, 
they are in a position from which they can protect and support it.   
10   CONCLUSION  
This chapter has demonstrated that the hypothesized meaning of look fits the wide variety of 
different types of message partials that are communicated through its use. Indeed, we have seen 
that the meaning is sparse and underdetermines the message yet it is sufficiently precise to be 
explanatory of the meaning’s use. Unlike the dictionary treatment of look, the hypothesis here 
has isolated the consistent semantic contribution of look proper, allowing for particular messages 
to be inferred from the meaning of look as well as from the meanings of the forms surrounding it 
and any relevant aspect of the extra-linguistic context. 
  These are the various message partials to which the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL has 
been shown to render itself useful. First, the meaning allows for communications that involve no 
visual stimulus being attended to, but rather only the active directing of the eyes. Second, 
ATTENTION, VISUAL, which gives no indication as to entities or events, can consequently be 
construed in the message either as an occurrence in time or as a kind of thing. Construed as a 
kind of thing, we have seen that the meaning of look enables messages involving the 
communication of one’s thoughts or feelings through one’s attending eyes, and also that the 
meaning of look can be used for messages involving attention-grabbing visual features; in 
Chapter IV we will return to messages involving visual features when we compare the use of 
look to that of appearance. We have also examined why look is sometimes present and 
sometimes absent in messages involving attribution and have seen that look is used when the 
attribution is based on having given visual attention to something; in Chapter IV we will return 
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to messages of attribution and compare the use of look to that of seem and appear. This chapter 
has further argued that, because of the cognitive link mapping vision to intellection, the meaning 
ATTENTION, VISUAL can account for the uses of look that involve the intellect, too. It was argued 
here that there is no justification for positing two separate senses to look, first, because the 
account is explanatory rather than descriptive and a single meaning can by itself explain these 
non-visual uses; and second, because the visual and intellectual are quite often both features of 
the message and so a distinction of uses to purely visual and purely intellectual simply proves 
impossible. Finally, we have analyzed occurrences involving the combination of look with other 
forms, including for, up, down, forward, back and after, and have seen that, contrary to what 
might initially appear, none of these sequences has a single constant message effect with which it 
is associated. Still, throughout, the use of look has been shown to make the same consistent 
contribution in whatever context it appears.  
  The next chapter continues to motivate the hypothesized meaning of look through 
qualitative analyses that will lead to quantitative predictions. The quantitative data will 
demonstrate that the hypothesized meaning accounts for numerous large-scale distributional 
patterns of look, many of which have been discovered and are noted here for the first time.  
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CHAPTER III 
Using big data to test the hypothesized meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL 
1   Introduction 
This chapter continues to investigate how the hypothesized meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL impacts 
the distribution of look, now through large-scale quantitative predictions; these predictions will 
be tested through counts conducted over all occurrences of look in the Corpus of Contemporary 
American English (COCA). As will be explicated in this chapter, quantitative predictions follow 
from particular contextual co-occurrences observed in the course of qualitative analyses. Thus, 
quantitative predictions test the relative frequency at which look co-occurs with particular forms 
that will have already been observed to co-occur with look in the analyses of individual 
examples, and whose presence has been shown to support the meaning hypothesis of look. It will 
be shown, for example, that modification of look by carefully provides qualitative support for the 
meaning hypothesis. Then, in order to provide quantitative support, it will be predicted that, even 
though sequences of look carefully and look carelessly both occur, look should co-occur with 
carefully more frequently than with carelessly. In another example, the modification of look by 
with big eyes will be argued to offer qualitative support for the meaning hypothesis. Then, in 
order to provide quantitative support, eye will be used as the predictive term and hand as the 
control term, and the prediction will be that the combination look-eye should be more frequent 
than the combination look-hand. In these kinds of predictions that are advanced in order to 
provide quantitative support for the meaning hypothesis, items like carefully and eye are called 
the predictive term while items like carelessly and hand are called the control term. In this way, 
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a quantitative prediction is designed to establish the generality of a rationale that is first proposed 
in the analysis of an individual example for a speaker’s choice to utter look. The confirmation of 
such predictions offers objective evidence in support of the meaning hypothesis because it 
demonstrates that the meaning accounts for features of the distribution of look (such as its 
relatively frequent co-occurrence with carefully or with eye) throughout a corpus.  
Note that each quantitative prediction is constrained to test for only a single semantic 
parameter at a time. For example, the relatively frequent co-occurrence of look with carefully can 
only offer support for ATTENTION but not for VISUAL; this is because carefully is only suggestive 
of attention but not of visual. And similarly, the relatively frequent co-occurrence of look with 
eye can only offer support for VISUAL but not for ATTENTION; this is because eye is suggestive of 
a visual message but not of a message concerning attention. While each quantitative prediction 
zooms in on and isolates a single semantic parameter, the qualitative analyses will show that the 
choice to utter look is consistently motivated by both VISUAL and ATTENTION.  
Indeed, this simultaneous relevance of both VISUAL and ATTENTION, that is, the unitary 
character of the hypothesized meaning, points to an important difference between a qualitative 
analysis and a quantitative prediction. As indicated, a quantitative prediction tests the generality 
of uttering look in light of one particular effect on the message and so, it can only offer support 
for one semantic parameter at a time. A qualitative analysis, by contrast, can point to all 
available contextual evidence and is able to offer support that both VISUAL and ATTENTION are 
operative in motivating the speaker’s expressive choice to utter look on any particular occasion. 
A qualitative analysis is limited, however, in that it can only account for the occurrences of look 
on a case by case basis, whereas a single quantitative prediction can explain a great number of 
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occurrences (albeit in terms of only one notion in the meaning hypothesis at a time) through 
large-scale counts over all instances of look in the corpus. 
This chapter consists of three main sections. Section 2 raises the problem of explicating 
the rationale for the regular co-occurrence of forms and of what precisely is tested in making 
quantitative predictions; it then lays out in detail the methodology for quantitative predictions 
adopted here. Sections 3 and 4 motivate the meaning hypothesis through qualitative analyses that 
lead to quantitative predictions, demonstrating that the hypothesized meaning successfully 
explains why look occurs where it does throughout the corpus. These sections have been divided 
on the basis of the semantic parameter tested through quantitative predictions. Section 3 presents 
quantitative predictions testing the semantic parameter of attention, and Section 4 presents 
quantitative predictions testing the semantic parameter of visual. The reader should keep in mind 
that look – by hypothesis – has a unitary meaning, and that the quantitative testing of each of the 
two notions in the meaning is done in separate sections purely for presentational purposes, seeing 
as a quantitative prediction is limited to test only one semantic parameter at a time. 
2   Methodology 
2.1   The methodological problem 
While the explanation for the relatively frequent co-occurrence of forms – such as of look with 
carefully or of look with eye – may appear straightforward, it has nevertheless been an issue of 
dispute (see Reid 1995 and Davis 2004). There are two related questions here. One, what 
precisely motivates the regular co-occurrence of forms, and two, what precisely is being tested 
and what can predictions of regular co-occurrences affirm? At least two different types of 
explanation have been proposed in the course of CS history for the regular co-occurrence of 
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forms, one deductive, the other inductive. The deductive approach argues that regular co-
occurrences are motivated by the compatibility of the meanings combined, and that the 
predictions, therefore, test the meaning hypotheses directly (Davis 2004). The inductive 
approach, by contrast, argues that regular co-occurrences can be predicted only when a 
qualitative analysis has posited a shared reason that is motivating the speaker to utter the two 
forms in the combination together; the prediction, then, tests the reason for uttering the two 
forms, and the meaning hypothesis is only indirectly supported, through the reason posited for 
uttering it, which, in turn, follows from the hypothesized meaning (Reid 1995).  
  Let’s take the co-occurrence of look with carefully as example. The deductive rationale 
would argue that look and carefully both involve the notion of attention in their meanings, and 
that the meanings of the two forms are compatible in this respect; hence they are likely to co-
occur. On the other hand, the inductive rationale – and the one adopted here – argues as follows. 
Speakers choose to utter certain forms as these forms are expected to contribute to certain 
message effects; the expected contribution or effect on the message is seen as the reason 
motivating the speaker to utter the form. Now, one reason a speaker may have for choosing to 
utter look is – by hypothesis – its contribution to the message of the notion of visual attention17. 
As it happens, this contribution partially intersects with the contribution to the message made by 
uttering carefully, because carefully is also chosen to contribute to the message the notion of 
attention. Thus, there is one shared reason motivating a speaker to utter look and carefully 
together. Because the speaker’s reason to choose the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL partially 
intersects with their reason to choose carefully – a form also suggestive of attention, then the two 
forms are expected to co-occur with greater than chance frequency. This rationale will now be 
                                                          
17
 Another reason to choose to utter look may be to contribute to the message the notion of intellectual attention, as 
has been discussed in Chapter II. 
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developed in greater detail in Section 2.2 below; then, Section 2.3 will explicate the justification 
for choosing this rationale. 
2.2   Quantitative predictions test the generality of communicative strategies 
In order to understand the methodological procedure leading from qualitative analyses to 
quantitative predictions an explication of the term communicative strategy is in order. Following 
Reid (1995), a communicative strategy is a principle of choice motivating a speaker to utter a 
particular linguistic form in light of some specific message feature to which the form in question 
is expected to contribute upon its use. In the case of look the claim is that speakers are motivated 
to utter this form in order to contribute to the message the notion of visual attention. The idea is 
quite straightforward; speakers choose a meaning that best contributes to their intended message, 
and so the semantic notion that makes up the hypothesized meaning constitutes the motivating 
factor that leads a speaker to utter that meaning’s signal18. 
  Recall that each quantitative prediction isolates and tests for just one of the two notions 
present in the hypothesized meaning. In explicating the methodology below, the focus will be on 
the suggestion by look of a message feature of attention. Now, as has been amply demonstrated 
throughout the previous chapter, one prominent way to tell whether the notion of attention is a 
message feature in a particular utterance is by looking to the linguistic context in which look is 
used and checking whether there are other forms that might likewise contribute to a similar 
message effect of attention. Suppose, for instance, that notice is used in close proximity to look, 
as in (1).  
                                                          
18
 There may also be indirect communicative strategies, that is, reasons for choosing the meaning that follow from, 
yet nonetheless are distinct from, the semantic notion that makes up the meaning. For instance, as indicated, another 
reason for choosing the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL may be to suggest a message feature of intellectual attention. 
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1. He [=Peter] tried not to notice the faces of the people he passed, but he had to notice; 
he had always looked at people. (The Fountainhead) 
In this example, the writer uses notice to suggest a message feature of attention, that is, Peter 
could not help giving his attention to the faces of the people he passed. In light of our (limited 
but sufficient) understanding of the semantic contribution of notice (defined with the words 
‘attention, observation’ by Google dictionary), its use in the same utterance as look provides 
independent evidence that a message feature of attention is indeed at issue in this utterance of 
look. Thus, given the choice to use notice in the same context as look, we may conclude that the 
choice to utter look is likewise made in light of the suggestion of a message feature of attention. 
The two forms, then, partially overlap in their communicative effects, creating a kind of partial 
redundancy; there is one communicative strategy – one reason – that is motivating the speaker to 
utter both look and notice. Note that while look contributes to the message the notion of visual 
attention, VISUAL cannot by itself explain why look is the attested form in the example rather 
than, say, see, which by hypothesis also has VISUAL in its meaning. The presence of notice 
suggests a message feature of attention and thus offers support specifically for ATTENTION in the 
meaning of look.  
When, in the course of the analysis of a particular example, it is proposed that two forms 
are chosen for the same reason – as is the case here with notice and look – then, the generality of 
this claim may be tested through a quantitative count. The assumption that will guide the 
quantitative predictions presented here is that if two forms are chosen to produce partially 
intersecting message effects then they will have a higher than chance frequency of co-occurring 
than if each is chosen to produce completely independent and non-overlapping message effects 
(Reid 1995). A quantitative prediction, then, is designed to establish the generality of the 
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communicative strategy – the reason for using the form – proposed in the analysis of a particular 
example. Following the analysis of example (1), it is predicted that look and notice have a higher 
than chance frequency of co-occurring. In making this prediction, the predictive term notice 
functions as a surrogate for the suggestion of a message feature of attention; the confirmation of 
the prediction, that is, the greater than chance co-occurrence of the predictive term with look, 
affirms that this message feature – which is hypothesized to be part of the meaning of look – 
regularly motivates speakers’ choice to utter look19.  
Now, it would do no good to simply check the number of times look and notice co-occur 
in the corpus because an absolute number by itself cannot tell us whether the co-occurrence of 
two forms is to be considered higher than chance. Rather, another form must be recruited to 
serve as a control against which the relative frequency of look and the predictive term can be 
compared. The control term must be a form that speakers choose for reasons that are completely 
independent from and non-overlapping with the choice of look. Then, the prediction will be that 
look will co-occur with the predictive term more frequently than with the control term. The form 
walk will serve as the control term here because, while we do not have a full meaning hypothesis 
for walk, we know enough about it to assume that it is not chosen by speakers so as to suggest a 
message feature of attention (or of visual). Thus, when walk occurs in the same utterance as look 
then whatever reasons that may have led the speaker to utter walk are independent of the reasons 
leading to the choice of look. This is demonstrated in (2).  
                                                          
19
 The same method can be used to test other lexical meaning hypotheses. For example, if one were to hypothesize 
an element of attention in the meaning of listen, one may test whether listen and notice co-occur at a higher than 
chance frequency.  
74 
 
2. [Describing a bikers’ gathering:] You park your bike. You walk around. You look at 
the other bikes. You look at the women. You look at the concessions… (NPR; Return 
of the Wild Ones) 
In this example, the speaker uses walk to suggest a message feature of movement by foot, 
whereas look is still chosen to suggest a message feature of visual attention. There is, therefore, 
no shared reason that motivates the speaker to utter these two forms together. Note that this does 
not preclude the two forms from co-occurring sometimes, as they do in (2); it is just that when 
they co-occur the speaker is choosing each form to produce different and non-overlapping 
message effects.  
  It is predicted, then, that look will favor notice in comparison to walk. This is how the 
prediction is tested. First, the total number of occurrences is collected for each of the following 
ten sequences in COCA (Table 1). 
Table 1 COCA searches for notice and walk 
Favored Disfavored 
[notice] * [look] 
[notice] * * [look]  
[notice] * * * [look]  
[notice] * * * * [look] 
[notice] * * * * * [look] 
[walk] * [look] 
[walk] * * [look]  
[walk] * * * [look]  
[walk] * * * * [look] 
[walk] * * * * * [look] 
An asterisk indicates a wild card, allowing for any form including a word or a punctuation mark 
to intervene between the predictive/control term and look. The square brackets indicate that all 
possible forms of a word are counted in a single search (so, for example, look, looks, looked and 
looking are all counted together when searching for [look]). These searches indicate how many 
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times look occurs in proximity (of up to 5 intervening forms/punctuation marks) to notice and to 
walk. The numbers appearing in Table 2 below present the sum of the numbers collected in the 
searches presented in Table 1.  
Of course, mere proximity cannot guarantee that notice and look both respond to the 
same aspect of the message. For instance, the search may yield a result such as I told her that I 
never notice these things. She looked at me blankly… In such an example, notice and look occur 
in close proximity and each form may well suggest a message feature of attention, but a 
qualitative analysis of this example probably could not appeal to notice to support ATTENTION in 
the meaning of look, because each form has probably been chosen in response to a different 
aspect of the communication. The problem is not that notice and look are in different sentences; 
the two forms appear in different sentences back in example (1), too. In example (1), however, 
both forms respond to the same aspect of the communication, that is, both respond to a message 
concerning Peter’s attitude toward other people. But in the example given here the looking and 
the noticing are done by different people. Still, if there were no association between look and 
notice, that is, if any time these two forms co-occurred then each form were chosen for reasons 
completely independent of the other, then the results of the count ought to reveal no particular 
favoring of look toward notice in comparison to walk. 
Finally, in addition to the 10 searches described above, two more counts are required to 
make the prediction, that is, it is necessary to have the total number of occurrences of notice and 
the total number of occurrences of walk. These numbers provide the relative frequency of notice 
to walk in the corpus, independent of look. Then, the relative frequency of notice to walk in the 
absence of look can be compared to the relative frequency of notice to walk in the presence of 
look. The prediction is that, in the presence of look, the frequency of notice in comparison to 
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walk will be higher than the frequency of notice in comparison to walk in the absence of look. 
Table 2 presents the results of the prediction. 
Table 2 Total COCA occurrences of notice and walk in the 
presence and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
notice   554 44 52943 27 
walk  692 56 146791 73 
Total 1246 100 199734 100 
p < .0001     
The prediction is confirmed. The right column of Table 2 (titled ‘look absent’) shows the 
baseline frequency of notice and walk; the left column (titled ‘look present’) shows the 
prediction. The right side shows the number of all occurrences of notice and walk except those 
where these words occur with look. Under these baseline conditions, that is, with no look to 
impact its distribution, notice represents only 27 percent of the notice-walk total. The left side of 
the table shows the number of occurrences in the corpus of notice and walk in the presence of 
look. When counting only the occurrences of notice in the presence of look and of walk in the 
presence of look, it turns out that notice now represents 44 percent of the notice-walk total. In 
other words, the presence of look is associated with an increase of 17 percentage points (i.e., 
from 27 percent to 44 percent) in the frequency of notice compared to walk from the baseline 
rate. The very low p value shows that these results are highly statistically significant.  
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  Since the quantitative prediction was testing for the generality of the communicative 
strategy proposed in the analysis of example (1), Table 2 confirms that there exists one 
communicative strategy motivating speakers to choose both look and notice that is quite 
regularly deployed. Importantly, the meaning hypothesis itself has not been directly tested, and 
so has not been directly supported by the counts, either. Rather, the meaning hypothesis is only 
indirectly supported through the testing of the communicative strategy that, in turn, follows from 
the meaning hypothesis. In this case, the communicative strategy to suggest a message feature of 
attention follows from the meaning hypothesis ATTENTION, VISUAL (particularly, from 
ATTENTION) and so, indirectly supports it.  
2.3   Justification of the inductive over the deductive approach 
The reader may wonder why the analysis of a particular example was necessary; why not make 
quantitative predictions directly on the basis of the meaning hypothesis for look and the posited 
meaning of the predictive term, such as notice? Such a proposal would entail that a quantitative 
prediction can be derived deductively from the meanings themselves – that is, from a 
consideration of the meanings abstracted from particular occasions of their use. The reasons for 
rejecting this approach are discussed presently. 
  If a quantitative prediction were derived deductively directly from the meanings of the 
forms in question, the rationale for the predicted favoring would have to be stated in terms of the 
compatibility of the meanings themselves. In the case at hand, the rationale would be that look 
and notice are expected to co-occur relatively frequently because their meanings are compatible. 
It may be that the meanings of both look and notice have ATTENTION in them and are compatible 
in this sense; but, as we shall see in this and the next chapter, there are some predictive terms 
(e.g., at or but) whose meanings have no semantic substance in common with look and yet an 
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overlap in the reason for the choice of each form is still evident. But even for cases where the 
two meanings do share some semantic substance, the essential problem is that meanings are not 
free floating entities attracted to one another simply by virtue of their compatibility; rather, there 
is a person who must choose to utter certain forms as opposed to others. A purely deductive 
explanation would take the human out of the explanation. The express goal of the meaning 
hypothesis, however, is precisely to explain human speaking and writing behavior in terms of 
expressive choices. A rationale in terms of a communicative strategy is therefore preferred as it 
is based on a speaker’s expressive choice demonstrated in a particular case, and tests for the 
generality of that principle of choice.   
  Note that, if the analyst were to appeal to the compatibility rationale to explain speakers’ 
expressive choices, the consequence would be that a different type of explanation would be 
offered for quantitative predictions than is offered for qualitative analyses. Thus, in the 
qualitative analysis of example (1), no CS analyst would argue that the writer chooses to utter 
look and notice because the meanings are compatible. CS analytical experience has revealed time 
and again that speakers’ expressive choices are best explained in terms of the hypothesized 
meanings of individual forms, not in terms of compatibility of meanings. But if one were to 
adopt the compatibility rationale for quantitative predictions, the explanation for a form’s 
occurrence would not be its meaning, but rather the compatibility of its meaning with another 
meaning. This is so because compatibility rationale omits reference to communication and 
messages, notions critical to explaining speakers’ behavior.  
  The result of rejecting compatibility and thinking of quantitative predictions instead in 
terms of the communicative strategy rationale is that one can appeal to the same type of 
explanation in both the qualitative analysis and the quantitative predictions. Each form is chosen 
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in light of its meaning and the contribution of that meaning to the message. The writer of 
example (1) has chosen each of the two forms in question not because they are compatible but 
because each – due to its meaning – contributes a message feature involving attention. This 
partial overlap in the reasons for choosing each of the two forms explains their co-occurrence in 
example (1), as well as provides the basis for the rationale of why these forms are expected to 
co-occur at a higher than chance frequently in the corpus at large. 
  Now a communicative strategy cannot be appealed to in the absence of an initial 
demonstration through a particular example because without an example there is simply no 
evidence that the purported communicative strategy actually exists. It is true that, as speakers of 
the language, even without seeing a particular example, we may imagine that people would 
choose to use look and notice in the same utterance; but this would make the account dependent 
on our intuitions as speakers, that is, the quantitative count would then test our intuitions rather 
than testing speakers’ expressive choices. Thus, strict methodology requires first a demonstration 
that a certain communicative strategy – such as where look and notice are both chosen to suggest 
a message feature of attention – has indeed motivated a speaker, at least once. The quantitative 
prediction then tests the extent to which this communicative strategy is representative of the 
corpus at large. 
  Finally, we need to address the justification for the underlying rationale offered here for 
quantitative predictions. Why should forms chosen due to overlapping message effects be 
expected to co-occur more frequently in comparison to forms that are chosen in light of non-
overlapping message effects? In essence, the explanation has to do with expressive efficacy and 
the role of (partial) redundancy therein. The following example, well-known from many works 
of fiction or satire, may help to make this point.  
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3. Resemblances to actual people, living or dead, are accidental, coincidental and 
unintentional. (Figments of a Murder)  
In this example, the three words in bold all respond to the same semantic parameter of the 
message; all three words contribute to the suggestion of a message feature of chance. In other 
words, the communication of a message feature of chance is guiding the writer’s choice of all 
three forms. If multiple forms can be recruited for a particular communicative purpose, then it is 
likely that at least sometimes people will deploy more than one form to achieve the desired 
communicative effect because, within reason, people will want to maximize their resources in 
order to fully and most effectively express themselves and make sure that they are properly 
understood. Thus, just as the writer of (3) has deployed all of the three forms accidental, 
coincidental and unintentional to thoroughly express that any resemblance is entirely due to 
chance, so the writer of (1) has deployed both notice and look to more thoroughly express Peter’s 
attitude toward other people. In both cases, the writer exploits multiple resources to the same 
end, resulting in partial redundancy
20
.  
  While some writing manuals may instruct people to avoid redundancy, it seems people 
cannot help it. Deutscher (2005:97) writes of people’s constant “wish to enhance 
expressiveness”, explaining that “speakers sometimes go to great lengths to intensify the effect 
of their utterances in order to lend their speech more force and emphasis”. Indeed, example (3) is 
nothing unique and the reader should not suppose that the three bolded forms can be dismissed as 
just formulaic legal jargon. To put away doubt, consider the rather more mundane example 
                                                          
20
 It may be pointed out that redundancy is, in a sense, inevitable, because, in example (3) for instance, the three 
bolded forms are also different from one another; that is, their meanings are not completely identical but each is 
somewhat unique. The writer chooses each form due to its specific contribution and, in this respect redundancy 
appears to be a consequence of speakers wanting to articulate more precise, rich and nuanced messages. 
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below, in which again the two bolded sequences are obviously chosen in light of one 
communicative end and, as a result, redundancy is gained
21
.  
4. [T]his is one memorable film that you will never forget. (Amazon reviewer for The 
good, the bad and the ugly)  
  To sum up the methodological procedure, each subsection within Sections 3 and 4 below 
will begin with a qualitative analysis of a particular example demonstrating that a speaker’s 
choice to utter look plausibly follows from the hypothesized meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL. Each 
such demonstration will point to the presence of a certain other form whose contribution to the 
message partially overlaps with the contribution made by look – if the meaning hypothesis for 
look is correct. Section 3 will focus on forms suggestive of attention, while Section 4 will focus 
on forms suggestive of visual. Taking these predictive forms as surrogates for the message effect 
– of attention, in Section 3, and of visual, in Section 4 – each quantitative prediction will test the 
generality of the communicative strategy proposed in the analysis of the relevant example.  
3   Supporting ATTENTION in the meaning of look 
This section points to six different predictive terms that can serve as surrogates for the 
suggestion of a message feature of attention, and thereby support ATTENTION in the hypothesized 
meaning of look. These forms are: carefully, this, but, at, deliberately and think. While these 
patterns (that is, look carefully, look at this, etc.) all support ATTENTION in the meaning of look, it 
is worthwhile to go through the demonstration with each one of them, not only because each 
                                                          
21
 There is much more redundancy in this example than the two bolded sequences. For example, the forms this, is, 
one and the zero signal following film all redundantly contribute to a message feature of singularity. Note that rather 
than analyzing this co-occurrence of forms as a consequence of some formal rule of agreement, in CS it is seen 
instead as a result of the independent choice of each form being partially made in response to one message feature of 
singularity. See Reid 1991, Chapter 8 for details.  
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strengthens the meaning hypothesis but also because each furthers the goal of accounting for the 
asymmetries observed in the corpus with respect to look. 
  One final preliminary note is in order. In some of the subsections below, qualitative 
analyses are offered for both an example featuring the predictive term as well as an example 
featuring the control term; for instance, Section 3.1 analyzes an example of look carefully and 
also an example of look carelessly. In other subsections, however, a qualitative analysis is 
offered only for an example featuring the predictive term; for instance, Section 3.2 analyzes an 
example of look at this but not an example of look at the (the is the control term). The reason for 
this discrepancy in the presentation is that some control terms – such as carelessly – seem to 
suggest message features that may appear inherently incompatible with the message feature of 
attention suggested by look, and so, it is of special interest to demonstrate to skeptical readers 
how it is that the two forms do, nonetheless, sometimes co-occur. Other control terms – such as 
the – suggest message features that, while having no overlap with the notion of visual attention 
suggested by look, are simply neutral to it, and so, there is no reason for any reader to suppose 
that these control terms and look should not co-occur sometimes.  
3.1   Using carefully to support ATTENTION 
5. “We have had intelligence reports that Germany is developing a very large missile. I 
ordered photo reconnaissance of the Baltic Coast, where the test flights were taking 
place. These photographs are the result.” He handed me an envelope. The 
photographs were dated the twelfth and twenty third of June, 1943, and upon both 
were circles drawn in black ink. I looked carefully at the blurred but sleek images 
within the circles. “These are indeed rockets,” I said. “How big are they?” “About 
forty feet long, and they are sitting on thirty-ton trailers.” (Ninety Thousand Horses) 
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In this text, the speaker chose look because the message involves the speaker having directed 
visual attention to the image in the photo (for proper examination of its content), and, by 
hypothesis, ATTENTION, VISUAL is the meaning of look. Various contextual features indicate that 
visual attention is at issue. First, the object of attention is the image in a photo, thus supporting 
VISUAL. Second, the image is blurred, and yet, despite its blurriness, the speaker can still 
perceive rockets, and even indicate their size and precisely what they are sitting on; the 
perception of such details thus supports ATTENTION. Third, the use of carefully suggests that the 
act is performed with some degree of concentration and care, again supporting ATTENTION. 
  In regard to the third point, note that the writer’s reason for choosing carefully partially 
intersects with the reason for choosing look (as opposed to, say, see). Carefully, therefore, may 
function as a surrogate for a message feature of attention in order to test the generality of the 
claim that speakers choose look in light of the suggestion of a message feature of attention. The 
form carelessly, which suggests lack of attention, will serve as the control term against which the 
predicted favoring of look to carefully can be tested. It is predicted, then, that look will favor 
carefully in comparison to carelessly because look and carefully may be chosen by speakers in 
light of one and the same communicative intent whereas look and carelessly are not.  
  To test this prediction the following searches in COCA are carried out (Table 3). 
Table 3 COCA searches for carefully and carelessly 
Favored Disfavored 
[look] carefully 
carefully [look] 
[look] carelessly 
carelessly [look] 
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In addition, two more counts were made, one for the total number of occurrences of carefully and 
another for the total number of occurrences carelessly, in order to compare the relative frequency 
of carefully to carelessly in the absence of look to the relative frequency of carefully to 
carelessly in the presence of look. Table 4 presents the results of the prediction. 
Table 4 Total COCA occurrences of carefully and carelessly in 
the presence and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
carefully    485 100 25220 97.5 
carelessly  0 0 638 2.5 
Total 485 100 25917 100 
p < .001     
The prediction is confirmed. Again, the right column shows the baseline distribution; the left 
column shows the prediction. In the right column we see that carefully comprises 97.5 percent of 
the carefully-carelessly total. The left column then shows the forms’ relative distribution once 
look is introduced as the immediately preceding or immediately following word, showing an 
increase from 97.5 to 100 percent in the context of look, indicating that look favors carefully in 
comparison to carelessly. It is true that the percentage skewing is not much, only 2.5 percentage 
points, yet as indicated by the p value the probability of this favoring being due to chance is quite 
low. This data confirms the generality of the communicative strategy proposed in the analysis of 
example (5). In making the quantitative prediction, the predictive term carefully functions as a 
surrogate for the suggestion of the message feature of attention. Its relatively frequent co-
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occurrence with look, therefore, indirectly supports the meaning hypothesis because, following 
the hypothesis, look is also (partially) chosen to suggest the same message feature of attention. 
  Now two further points are in order concerning the above data, having to do with the low 
numbers for carelessly and the complete absence of look-carelessly combinations in COCA. 
First, carelessly occurs in the corpus at large merely 638 times. Yet it does not follow from this 
low number that carelessly will be disfavored in the context of just any form, as it is disfavored 
in the context of look. Thus, in the context of the word say, for instance, carelessly is in fact the 
favored form
22
.  
Table 5 Total COCA occurrences of carefully and carelessly in 
the presence and absence of say 
 say present say absent 
 N % N % 
carefully  215 95 25490 97.5 
carelessly   12 5 626 2.5 
Total 216 100 26116 100 
p < .01     
As Table 5 indicates, in direct opposition to the skewing observed with look, in the context of 
say it is the percentage of carelessly that rises, from 2.5 to 5 percent
23
.   
                                                          
22
 A quantitative test run on background reveals that in the context of what is perhaps the most generic activity – do 
– neither carefully nor carelessly are favored; that is, neither form occurs at a higher than chance frequency in the 
presence of do compared to in the absence of do. This fact further strengthens the claim that the favoring of look 
toward carefully is indeed unique to look and follows from its hypothesized meaning.  
23
 Another reason this supplemental comparison of look to say is worthwhile is in light of Vendler’s (1957) 
distinction between activity verbs and state verbs. According to Vendler, one of the tests for distinguishing between 
these two types of verbs is whether the word carefully can modify it; if carefully is a proper modification then it 
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  Coming now to the second point, while not a single occurrence of look carelessly is 
found in COCA, this does not mean that such a sequence is ungrammatical or communicatively 
incoherent. It may seem that such a sequence ought to be incoherent, for if look suggests the 
notion of attention, and carelessly the lack of attention then, their being used together should 
seem inherently incompatible. But a context may arise in which look carelessly is precisely what 
the speaker or writer wants to communicate, as in (6).  
6. A pleasant method of giving a child a lesson in attention may be found in Ogden’s 
“Science of Education”. He says: “A little expedient to which I have resorted, on 
some occasions, may be suggestive of means that may be adopted for correcting these 
evils, and of fixing the attention. Holding up my watch to the school, I have said: 
‘How many of these little boys and girls can look at it for one minute at a time?’ The 
idea, perhaps, is a novel one, and their little voices and hands will respond, anxious 
for the experiment. Some will say, boastingly, ‘I can look at it an hour!’, ‘two hours!’ 
responds another little captain, who is anxious to make a display of his prowess. At 
this juncture, I ask, how many would be willing to make the experiment of one 
minute continuous looking? There is a shower of hands and a shout of voices raised 
to the highest pitch. ‘Well, let us try; all ready; now!’ And their forms straighten up, 
and all eyes are bent with intense earnestness upon the watch. It grows very quiet, and 
everyone listens and looks. Presently it occurs to half a dozen, or more, of them, that 
they are doing it about right. ‘I wonder if John, or Charles, or Mary, or Ellen, is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
must be an activity verb. Thus, one might argue that carefully is expected to co-occur with look simply because look 
is an activity verb, not necessarily because of the suggestion of attention in particular. But at least some activities 
can be performed either carefully or carelessly, that is, either with or without concentration of attention. The fact that 
look favors carefully in comparison to carelessly is a specific consequence of the meaning hypothesis of look, and 
cannot be attributed simply to a classification of look as an activity verb; indeed, other activity verbs, such as say, 
may (and in the case of say, do) favor carelessly in comparison to carefully. 
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looking too? Wonder if they all are doing as well I am?’ And their thoughts leave the 
watch and the promise, and wander after Charles, or Ellen, and the temptation to look 
away becomes so great that in about half a minute, or less, you will see an occasional 
pair of eyes glance hurriedly to some convenient corner of the room, and back quick 
to the watch again; others, still less cautious, will turn the head, and look carelessly 
away; others, again, will drop off entirely, and cease to look, while some, more 
resolute and determined and careful than the rest, will not remove their eyes for a 
moment, and at the expiration of the time, will announce their triumph with evident 
satisfaction. (Proceedings of the California State Teachers’ Institute and Educational 
Convention) 
  Look is used many times throughout this text because its topic concerns teaching children 
attention
24
. Redundant information supporting the hypothesis is provided in sequences such as 
fixing the attention, their forms straighten up and all eyes are bent with intense earnestness. 
Now, we all know how difficult it can be to sustain attention for extended periods of time 
without interruption. Other stimuli, whether visual or not, may catch hold of one’s attention, 
causing one to involuntarily divert their eyes without intending to do so (Hatfield 1998). The use 
of both carelessly and less cautious suggest that some children involuntarily shift their attention 
away from the watch without intention or notice. 
  What is important is that the writer’s choice of carelessly and the choice of look are each 
made in light of independent, non-overlapping, message effects. Look produces a message 
feature of visual attention, as is well supported throughout the text, while carelessly contributes 
                                                          
24
 Note that look accounts for 2.3 percent of the words in this text whereas in COCA at large look accounts for 
merely 0.1 percent. This prominence of look in a text whose entire theme is visual attention in and of itself provides 
strong support for the meaning hypothesis. 
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to a message feature of momentary mindlessness, indeed, the opposite of attention. Example (6) 
thus demonstrates how it is that look and carelessly can sometimes co-occur, and also explains 
why the two forms are expected to co-occur less frequently in comparison to look with carefully.  
3.2   Using this to support ATTENTION 
7. [Dominique and Peter are discussing their dinner plans:] “We have the Palmers for 
dinner tomorrow night,” she said. “Oh, Christ!” he moaned. “They’re such awful 
bores! Why do we have to have them?” She stood holding the calendar forward 
between the tips of her fingers, as if she were a photograph with the focus on the 
calendar and her own figure blurred in its background. […] “Would you like to look 
at this calendar, Peter?” (The Fountainhead) 
In this example, the author chose look because Dominique is trying to direct Peter’s attention to 
the calendar she is holding. Contextual evidence is provided in the sequence as if she were a 
photograph with the focus on the calendar and her own figure blurred in its background, where 
the use of photograph and blurred clearly support VISUAL, and the use of both focus on the 
calendar and her own figure is blurred in its background support ATTENTION. Yet further support 
for the hypothesis comes from the use of this. To understand the author’s choice of this, a brief 
explanation concerning this form’s meaning hypothesis is necessary.  
  Following Diver (2012), the forms this and that (as well as these and those) are 
hypothesized to constitute a grammatical system that signals information concerning what Diver 
called Deixis, that is, degree of attention. The meaning of this, by hypothesis is MORE DEIXIS. In 
our example, this is used in response to the attention-worthiness or emphasis given by the 
speaker to the entity at hand (the calendar). Indeed, the choice of this in (7) contributes to the 
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high degree of prominence given to the calendar, as evidenced also by focus on the calendar 
mentioned above. Similarly, the choice of look is, by hypothesis, partially made in response to 
the same notional fragment of the message, that is, the prominence or attention-worthiness of the 
calendar in the scene. It is therefore predicted that look will co-occur with this at a higher than 
chance frequency because both forms are chosen to produce a message feature of attention.  
  As before, a control term must be recruited to compare to the predictive term this. It may 
appear that this should be compared to that. Such a comparison, however, is not useful here 
because that, like this, is also a member of the system of Deixis; though the hypothesized 
meaning of that is LESS DEIXIS, still, speakers utter that to produce a message feature of increased 
attention, too. The communicative strategy rationale cannot, therefore, distinguish between this 
and that because both of these forms, much like look, are chosen to suggest the notion of 
attention. In order to test the favoring of look to this we need a control term whose choice is 
completely independent of the suggestion of attention (and of visual, too). The form the fits the 
bill. Without going into unnecessary detail, the hypothesized meaning of the is DIFFERENTIATION 
REQUIRED AND COMPLETE (Reid 1991:79). This meaning instructs the addressee that a discrete 
entity is at issue (differentiation required) and that the addressee has sufficient information to 
identify which entity it is (complete). What is important is that the meaning of the has nothing to 
do with the suggestion of the notion of visual attention, and so, when it co-occurs with look, the 
reason for its deployment is completely independent of the speaker’s reason for choosing look.  
  To test this prediction the following searches in COCA are carried out (Table 6). 
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Table 6 COCA searches for this and the 
Favored Disfavored 
[look] at this 
look, this 
[look] at the 
look, the 
The search is sensitive to punctuation so that only occurrences where there is a comma between 
look and the predictive/control term are counted for the second sequence on each side of Table 6. 
Note that many of the occurrences of look, this and look, the are cases where conceptual 
metaphor is involved, as for example in Look, this is what I’m trying to say or look, the idea is 
simple. The confirmation of the prediction thus demonstrates that the hypothesized meaning 
ATTENTION, VISUAL is applicable to both the literal and metaphorical uses
25
. Table 7 presents the 
results of this prediction. 
Table 7 Total COCA occurrences of this and the in the presence 
and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
this  7953 15 2169579 8 
the    44798 85 25019156 92 
Total 52751 100 27188735 100 
p < .0001     
                                                          
25
 Table 7, as all tables, shows the sum total of all the sequences searched, but the prediction is confirmed for each 
sequence alone, too. 
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The right column shows that, in the absence of look, this constitutes 8 percent of the this-the 
total. Once look is introduced, however, this skews in the predicted direction, accounting now for 
15 percent of the total. The p value indicates that the probability of the association between look 
and this being due to chance is extremely low. This data, therefore, confirms the generality of the 
communicative strategy that speakers deploy look to suggest a message feature of attention, and 
so indirectly (and partially) supports the hypothesized meaning of look. 
  We will now take the opportunity to demonstrate (a) that look favors this in comparison 
to the even when look is used as part of what cognitive linguists might posit to be constructions, 
including the sequences have a look and look like (Tables 9 and 11), and (b) that this favoring is 
unique to look and that other forms from the visual domain, including glance and stare, do not 
show any such favoring toward this (Tables 13 and 15)
26
. 
Table 8 COCA searches for this and the (for have a look) 
Favored Disfavored 
have a look at this have a look at the 
 
  
                                                          
26
 A detailed comparative analysis of look and see is offered in Chapter IV. 
92 
 
Table 9 Total COCA occurrences of this and the in the presence 
and absence of have a look 
 have a look present have a look absent 
 N % N % 
this  42 25 2177490 8 
the      123 75 25063831 92 
Total 165 100 27241321 100 
p < .0001     
 
Table 10 COCA searches for this and the (for look like) 
Favored Disfavored 
[look] like this [look] like the 
 
Table 11 Total COCA occurrences of this and the in the 
presence and absence of look like 
 look like present look like absent 
 N % N % 
this  753 16 2176779 8 
the    3811 84 25060143 92 
Total 3166 100 8002352 100 
p < .0001     
As is evident, in the presence of look – even when look is found in a relatively high frequency 
sequence that may well be cognitively stored as a unit – this is clearly favored, showing an 
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increase of 17 and eight percentage points from the baseline condition, in Tables 9 and 11, 
respectively. This data strongly suggests that there is a single linguistic unit look that consistently 
contributes to a message feature of attention and that there is no reason for positing these 
putative constructions to explain the distribution of look. In Chapter V we will review an analysis 
by Wierzbicka who posits have a look as a construction with an invariant meaning. We will see 
that Wierzbicka’s hypothesis is unable to make predictions like the one presented here.  
  Turning now to data involving glance and stare, note that, for reasons currently 
unknown
27
, in the presence of these forms – unlike in the presence of look – the is favored. 
Table 12 COCA searches for this and the (for glance) 
[glance] at this [glance] at the 
 
Table 13 Total COCA occurrences of this and the in the 
presence and absence of glance 
 glance present glance absent 
 N % N % 
the   3139 99 25060815 92 
this  27 1 2177505 8 
Total 3166 100 8002352 100 
p < .0001     
 
  
                                                          
27
 It is interesting that glance and stare favor the in comparison to this, yet it is outside the scope of this dissertation 
to explain this tendency. A thorough analysis of the forms glance and stare would be required. 
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Table 14 COCA searches for this and the (for stare) 
[stare] at this [stare] at the 
 
Table 15 Total COCA occurrences of this and the in the 
presence and absence of stare 
 stare present stare absent 
 N % N % 
the      7235 98 25056719 92 
this  112 2 2177420 8 
Total 7347 100 8002352 100 
p < .0001     
In both the presence of glance and stare, the frequency of the in comparison to this increases by 
seven and six percentage points, respectively. 
3.3   Using but to support ATTENTION 
8. [Peter Keating, a relatively new employee, offers to do a favor to his colleague, 
Davis, to complete Davis’s drawings:] “Wait,” said Keating, and leaned closer to him. 
“Wait! There’s another way. I’ll finish them for you.” “Huh?” “I’ll stay. I’ll do them. 
Don’t be afraid. No one’ll tell the difference.” “Pete! Would you?” “Sure. I’ve 
nothing to do tonight. You just stay till they all go home, then skip.” “Oh, gee, Pete!” 
Davis sighed, tempted. “But look, if they find out, they’ll can me. You’re too new for 
this kind of job.” “They won’t find out.” “I can’t lose my job, Pete. You know I can’t. 
95 
 
Elaine and I are going to be married soon. If anything happens...” “Nothing will 
happen.” (The Fountainhead) 
In regard to this example, we will now argue that the use of but provides contextual 
evidence in support of ATTENTION. To understand the argument, a brief explanation of the 
semantic contribution of but is in order. According to Crupi (2004), the form but is used so as to 
override whatever in the discourse that precedes it; Crupi calls this the override-effect. In this 
example, Davis is using but so as to override his initial expression of excitement (Oh, gee, Pete!) 
in order to clear the way for expressing his grave concerns (if they find out, they’ll can me). 
Crupi goes on to demonstrate that by overriding what comes before but, the use of but 
simultaneously suggests the thematic importance of what follows. In this text, the thematic 
importance of the information following but is evident in the sequences I can’t lose my job and 
you know I can’t, suggesting the high stakes at issue.  
  Now, the choice to utter look contributes to the same message effect that is achieved by 
uttering but; that is, Davis is choosing look so as to further strengthen the thematic importance of 
the following information by expressly calling for Peter’s attention before presenting it. Thus, 
but and look function harmoniously to yield one message effect, both suggesting that what is 
coming up is quite important.  
  It is worth pointing out that the compatibility of meanings rationale could not predict that 
look would favor but because the meanings of these two signs share no common semantic 
substance and thus do not overlap semantically. Rather, it is the communicative strategy of when 
to use but that overlaps with that of look. Both words are sometimes used to produce the same 
effect in the message even though they have nothing semantically in common.  
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  To make a prediction concerning the regular co-occurrence of but and look, the form and 
is recruited as a control term. And, like but, serves as a link between two pieces of information, 
yet unlike but, and is used merely to signal an additive connection, and has nothing to do with 
suggesting the thematic importance of, or calling attention to, information that follows it (Crupi 
2004). The prediction then is that look will favor but in comparison to and. The following COCA 
searches are carried out (Table 16). 
Table 16 COCA searches for but and and 
Favored Disfavored 
but look 
but, look 
and look 
and, look 
 
Table 17 Total COCA occurrences of but and and in the 
presence and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
but  2136 20 2079131 14 
and  8569 80 12343025 86 
Total 10705 100 14422156 100 
p < .0001     
The right column shows that in the absence of look, but accounts for 14 percent of the but-and 
total. In the presence of look, however, it accounts for 20 percent. As indicated by the p value, 
the probability of this association being due to chance is quite low. This quantitative data shows 
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that example (8) is only a part of a more general pattern of distribution of look and but. Again, 
the same rationale that explains the individual example also explains the quantitative favoring 
throughout a large corpus. 
  Note now that though example (8) appears not to involve any element of visual in the 
message, the choice to utter look still follows from the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL due to the 
cognitive metaphor mapping vision to intellection, as has been discussed in Chapter II (in this 
example, Peter is asked to direct his intellectual attention to Davis’s concerns). As was noted in 
regard to Tables 6 and 7 above (look, this/the), here too, the confirmation of the prediction shows 
that the hypothesized meaning is applicable to both the literal and metaphorical uses. 
3.4   Using at to support ATTENTION 
9. [Yoga instructor:] The tree is a balancing posture. Now the trick to doing balancing 
postures is to find one spot of attention on the floor or, in front of you on the wall, 
and this gives you concentration, by looking at one spot. […] We’re going to start by 
moving your weight over to your right foot, and bringing your left foot either to your 
ankle, calf or to the inside of your thigh, taking your time, finding your position, 
bringing your hands into a prayer position in front of your chest, looking at one spot 
of attention either in front of you or on the floor... (MBSR YOGA #2 – 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PElmyy_kwN0) 
  Look is chosen because the message involves an instruction to visually attend to one spot. 
Note the contextual evidence supporting the hypothesized meaning of look. First, the fact that 
balancing oneself is the goal of this set of instructions is in and of itself suggestive that attention 
is a message feature operative in this text, as concentration is required to maintain balance. 
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Second, the word attention straightforwardly figures in the text twice, clearly supporting 
ATTENTION. Third, the use of spot also supports ATTENTION as it indicates a visual stimulus that 
is as narrow as can be; recall, in this respect, the discussion in Chapter II concerning the 
experiential association between visual attention and narrowing of the visual field (“the greater 
the attention, the smaller the part of the visual field to which it extends”, Hatfield 1998). Lastly, 
the use of at further contributes to the same message feature of focus and attention.  
  To understand this contribution of at, a brief explanation of its hypothesized meaning is 
in order. The form at, along with on and in, constitute a system of signs signaling information 
concerning the number of dimensions conceptualized for a location (Reid 2004); at signals the 
meaning ZERO DIMENSIONAL LOCATION (i.e., point-like location), in signals THREE DIMENSIONAL 
LOCATION and on signals OTHER THAN ZERO AND THREE DIMENSIONAL LOCATION.  
  Thus, much like the use of spot, the meaning of at contributes to a message feature of 
focus and attention because it suggests, in this context, a narrowing of the visual field up to just a 
single point. And look, by hypothesis, also suggests a narrowing of the visual field because 
visual attention involves selecting and focusing one’s eyes to a particular visual stimulus at the 
expense of the surrounding stimuli. Indeed, attention inherently involves shutting things out, 
seeing as one’s attention cannot be everywhere at once. In example (9), the instructor suggests 
with the use of at that all visual stimuli are to be shut out except for the narrow point where one’s 
visual attention is focused.   
  Because both look and at may contribute to the same message effect of attention, it is 
predicted that look will co-occur with at at a higher than chance frequency. This prediction will 
be tested through a comparison to on and in, serving as the control terms. On and in, due to their 
hypothesized meanings, cannot contribute to a message concerning the narrowing of the visual 
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field because the spatial location their meanings suggest is broader than a mere point. Thus, 
when these forms occur following look, the reason for their deployment has nothing to do with 
the notions of focus or attention, and so, look is not expected to have any particular favoring 
toward these forms.  
  The following searches in COCA are carried out (Table 18). 
Table 18 COCA searches for at, on and in 
Favored Disfavored 
[look] at [look] on 
[look] in 
 
Table 19 Total COCA occurrences of at, on and in in the presence 
and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
at  176841 93 2089402 15 
on  5353 3 3129481 23 
in  8170 4 8355017 62 
Total 190364 100 13573900 100 
p < .0001     
The prediction is confirmed. The right column shows that when neutralizing the effect of look, at 
accounts for merely 15 percent of the at-on-in total. The left column shows that in the context of 
look the relative frequency of at jumps to 93 percent of the at-on-in total.  
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  The results of this prediction are probably not too surprising (we all probably already 
knew that look at is most frequent). Yet it is important to appreciate that the prediction follows 
from the meaning hypotheses for the forms look, at, on and in. In the absence of a meaning 
hypothesis, the relatively frequent co-occurrence of look and at could seem arbitrary or purely 
conventional. It is also worthwhile to note that the sequences look on and look in, though they 
occur less frequently, nonetheless do occur. Indeed, there is nothing ungrammatical or 
semantically incoherent about putting these two forms together. Still, the reason these occur 
relatively infrequently is because each expressive choice – of look on the one hand and of either 
on or in on the other – is made in light of different, independent communicative intents. This can 
be briefly demonstrated by means of the following example.  
10. Mr. Gupton was the last man to stir the stew before they served it up, and he had been 
carrying his teeth in his shirt pocket to rest his gums. Well, everybody had 
commenced eating their portion except Mr. Gupton, and Milo noticed him frowning 
hard and feeling his pockets and looking on the ground all round the pot, so Milo 
went over and asked him was anything wrong, and he said, “I have mislaid my teeth.” 
(A Long and Happy Life) 
  In this example, the writer’s motivation for choosing on is clearly not to suggest a 
message of a point-like location; Mr. Gupton is not directing his attention just to one point, but 
rather, his visual attention goes all round the pot. The author’s choice of look is still motivated 
by the suggestion of a message feature of visual attention, as the message involves Mr. Gupton 
thoroughly scanning the floor with his eyes. Thus, in (10), the author’s reason for choosing look 
and the reason for choosing on do not overlap; each contributes to a different aspect of the 
message (look to a message partial involving visual attention, on to a message partial involving a 
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two-dimensional surface). In (9), by contrast, at and look both contribute to a message partial 
that involves focusing and attention, at because its meaning involves a narrowing (of the visual 
field) to a single point in space, and look because its hypothesized meaning consists of 
ATTENTION. 
3.5   Using deliberately to support ATTENTION 
11. [Once the baby begins crawling…] The baby […] is no longer restricted by the 
entertaining items within arm’s reach. Now he can go after what he wants without 
crying for help. Climbing is often another pleasure newly discovered at this stage. 
Malek says that crawling and creeping babies will deliberately look for small items 
to climb over in their path. (Today Parent – magazine; From Birth to One: Mobility) 
  The writer here chose look because the message involves babies visually attending to and 
examining objects in their path and, on that basis, making a decision. Support for the hypothesis 
is evident in the use of deliberately, suggesting that the act is done through the use of conscious 
thought and willful, intentional direction of attention.  
  Because look and deliberately may both be chosen in light of a message feature of 
attention, the two forms are expected to co-occur at a higher than chance frequency. Again, a 
comparison to a control term is required, and to this end the form accidentally, which suggests 
that an act is performed inattentively and unintentionally, is recruited. It is predicted, then, that 
look will favor deliberately in comparison to accidentally. The COCA searches for this 
prediction are the following (Table 20). 
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Table 20 COCA searches for deliberately and accidentally 
Favored Disfavored 
deliberately [look] accidentally [look] 
 
Table 21 Total COCA occurrences of deliberately and accidentally 
in the presence and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
deliberately  21 91 5950 66 
accidentally 2 9 3130 34 
Total 23 100 9080 100 
p < .01     
The prediction is confirmed. The right column shows that in the neutralized condition, that is, in 
the absence of any potential effect of look, deliberately accounts for 66 percent of the 
deliberately-accidentally total. In the context of look, however, deliberately is clearly favored, 
constituting now 91 percent of the total. This data confirms the generality of the communicative 
strategy to utter both look and deliberately in light of the suggestion of a message feature of 
attention.  
  Now, it might appear that accidentally should never co-occur with look because it implies 
no deliberation and so seems to contradict the notion of attention suggested by the hypothesized 
meaning of look. But there is no contradiction. As noted, while humans do have a strong degree 
of control over where they direct their visual attention, it is not absolute, and involuntary shifts of 
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attention may occur; we have already seen evidence of this in example (6) above, where some of 
the children carelessly directed their attention away from the teacher’s watch. Consider now 
example (12) featuring accidentally.  
12. [In the course of rock climbing…] [He] tightened his grip and moved up to the next 
knot, and then the next. He was doing it by feel now, because his eyes stung so badly 
from the sweat. Maybe it was a good thing he couldn’t see, he told himself – then it 
wouldn’t matter if he accidentally looked down. (Rope) 
  While it is true that the act of looking in this example is performed without intention or 
deliberation, the hypothesized meaning of look is still supported. The choice of look is here made 
in order to suggest the direction that the climber’s eyes might follow, namely down. Indeed, the 
meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL can be used to contribute to a message concerning the direction that 
the eyes are facing because in an act of visual attention one naturally orients one’s eyes toward 
the direction of attention. Now, as for accidentally, the climber is worried about the prospect of 
his eyes facing downward, because that would be quite frightening; still, his eyes might go 
facing downward without his intending to do so. The choice in accidentally suggests that the 
direction of the eyes downward might happen without intention, deliberation or conscious 
thought. What is important here is that each expressive choice – that of look on the one hand and 
of accidentally on the other – is made in light of different and non-overlapping communicative 
effects. 
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3.6   Using think to support ATTENTION 
13. [Learning from the mistakes of the past in gardening:] Other plants had to be 
discarded either because their habit of growth offended me or they were ill placed. A 
whole group of Prunus subhirtella’ Pendula’ on the riverside lawn had to go; […] Six 
Swedish birches at the end of the south lawn also had to go (one good specimen still 
remains), for a glade of birches was not the answer there. My mistakes have taught 
me a lesson: Look and think very hard before you leap! (Horticulture magazine) 
  In this example, the writer chose look to express that, in the future, he must visually (and 
intellectually) attend to his garden to allow him to better plan his actions. Support for the 
hypothesis comes from the use of think, suggesting that the writer must devote some conscious 
mental concentration to considering his actions. When one is actively directing their thoughts 
toward something, then one is at the same time giving attention to that object of thought; indeed, 
our running thoughts are indicative of where our (intellectual/mental) attention is at a given 
moment. It may lastly be noted that both look and think are together modified by very hard, 
suggesting that both the attending and the considering will be performed rigorously, further 
supporting ATTENTION.  
  Following this example, it is predicted that look and think will co-occur at a higher than 
chance frequency because, through its suggestion of directed mental activity, think contributes to 
a message feature of attention, as, by hypothesis, look does too. For this prediction, the form 
believe will serve as the control term. While we do not know what precisely is the semantic 
contribution of believe, it is safe to assume that believe does not indicate mental activity but a 
rather passive mental state or disposition. Thus, when look and believe co-occur then each form 
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produces different and non-overlapping effects in the message. The COCA searches are the 
following (Table 22). 
Table 22 COCA searches for think and believe 
Favored Disfavored 
look and think 
look * and think 
look * * and think 
look * * * and think 
look and believe 
look * and believe 
look * * and believe 
look * * * and believe 
 
Table 23 Total COCA occurrences of think and believe in the 
presence and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
think  472 96 889446 82 
believe     21 4 201765 18 
Total 493 100 1091211 100 
p < .0001     
The prediction is confirmed. The right column shows that, in the absence of look, think accounts 
for 82 percent of the think-believe total. In the context of look, however, there is a clear favoring 
toward think, as in the left column it now rises to 96 percent of the total.  
 An objection may be raised as to the interpretation of the results of this prediction. 
Vendler (1957) distinguishes between activity verbs and state verbs. This distinction is relevant 
here because, whereas believe is clearly classified as a state verb, Vendler observes that think is 
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ambiguous. Thus, Vendler argues, in a sentence such as I am thinking about John, then think 
indeed denotes a mental activity and so, I say, suggests that the speaker is directing their 
attention to John; but in a sentence such as I think John is nice, then here, argues Vendler, think 
denotes merely a mental state, without necessarily implying that the speaker is actively attending 
their thoughts toward John.  
Of course, these examples are made up by the analyst and further, a meaning hypothesis 
for think is currently not available. Still, it is acknowledged that there may be a problem here. 
Thus, while it is clear in example (13) that think suggests a message of mental activity, where the 
speaker conveys that they ought to devote thought to or direct their attention to the garden, one 
cannot be certain that think suggests such mental activity in all the other 471 occurrences in 
COCA where think coincides with look. This is important because the entire basis for the 
rationale of this prediction rests on the assumption that think functions as a surrogate for a 
message feature of mental activity.  
 There is a way, however, to handle this difficulty even in the absence of a full-fledged 
meaning hypothesis for think. Vendler proposes that the presence of -ing is indicative of an 
activity use. Observe, then, that the prediction that look favors think in comparison to believe is 
confirmed even when counting only the cases of thinking and believing (Table 24). 
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Table 24 Total COCA occurrences of thinking and believing in 
the presence and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
thinking 88 97 889830 82 
believing 3 3 201783 18 
Total 91 100 1091613 100 
p < .0005     
As is evident, the results in Table 24 are quite similar to the results in Table 23.  
4   Supporting VISUAL in the meaning of look 
This section offers qualitative analyses leading to quantitative predictions that support VISUAL in 
the meaning of look. The examples as well as the discussions in this section are shorter than 
above because motivating VISUAL is easier than motivating ATTENTION. Still, in light of theories 
that analyze look in terms of polysemy, it is important to demonstrate that the inclusion of 
VISUAL in the hypothesized meaning of look is statistically supported. While look is used both for 
visual and intellectual messages, the counts below reveal that visual messages are highly 
statistically favored, thus supporting the inclusion of VISUAL in the meaning hypothesis. 
  Each of the three subsections below presents an example featuring a form other than look 
that suggests a visual message; these forms are eye, painting and see. 
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4.1   Using eye to support VISUAL 
14. Vincent kept his mouth shut and looked with big eyes at his mother. Never before 
had he noticed how much skin she had. (The Crystal Song) 
Look is used because the message involves Vincent visually attending to his mother. First, we 
may observe that the modification in big eyes, along with the use of notice, provide support for 
ATTENTION. Second, eye is clearly chosen in light of the suggestion of a message involving 
visual perception, thus supporting VISUAL. Because look, by hypothesis, is also chosen to suggest 
a message feature of visual perception, this is then one aspect of the message to which the two 
forms – look and eye – both contribute. It is predicted, therefore, that look will co-occur with eye 
at a higher than chance frequency.  
For this prediction, the form hand will serve as the control term because hand is not used 
to contribute to the message the notion of visual perception. The prediction is, then, that look will 
favor eye in comparison to hand. The following COCA searches are carried out (Table 25). 
Table 25 COCA searches for eye and hand 
Favored Disfavored 
[look] with * [eye] [look] with * [hand] 
(Eye and hand are put in square brackets to allow for both singular and plural forms). Table 26 
shows the results. 
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Table 26 Total COCA occurrences of eye and hand in the 
presence and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
eye 29 100 196765 42 
hand   0 0 275885 58 
Total 29 100 472650 100 
p < .0001     
As is evident, eye accounts for merely 42 percent of the eye-hand total in the absence of look. In 
the presence of look, however, there are no occurrences of hand, and eye accounts for 100 
percent of the cases. Note that the same prediction is confirmed when, instead of hand, other 
control terms are used, such as ear, nose, tongue, etc.   
4.2   Using painting to support VISUAL 
15. There are also painters like El Greco and Jan Vermeer, who […] produced one or two 
anomalous but remarkable meteorological landscapes. […] Next time you visit an art 
museum, use your meteorological eye. Scrutinize the painted skies as you would scan 
the real sky when looking for weather signs. This is a legitimate way to look at 
paintings, for the great artists created their skies lovingly and with great care. # 
Photo: THE CRUCIFIXION, c. 1435 (attributed to Jan van Eyck) is the closest thing 
to a cloud atlas in the history of art. (Weatherwise; the Sky in Art) 
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Look is chosen in this example because the writer wants to encourage the reader to visually 
attend to the skies found in paintings. Note the contextual evidence in support of the hypothesis. 
First, both scrutinize and scan support ATTENTION. Second, meteorological eye clearly supports 
VISUAL. Finally, the word painting itself also suggests that visual perception is at issue because 
paintings are objects that people perceive through the sense of sight. This is in contrast to, say, 
music, which is experienced through auditory perception, rendering music a good control term 
for our next prediction.  
It is predicted, then, that look will favor painting in comparison to music. This is because 
painting suggests that visual perception is at issue and look is chosen in response to a message 
that concerns visual perception. The COCA searches are as follows (Table 27).  
Table 27 COCA searches for painting and music 
Favored Disfavored 
[look] at [painting] 
[look] at * [painting] 
[look] at [music] 
[look] at * [music] 
 
Table 28 Total COCA occurrences of painting and music in the 
presence and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
painting  230 78 42109 26 
music    64 22 118090 74 
Total 294 100 160199 100 
p < .0001     
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In the absence of look, painting accounts for merely 26 percent of the painting-music total. In the 
presence of look, however, painting has significantly increased to 78 percent, leaving music with 
only 22 percent.  
It is indeed of interest to observe that music does sometimes co-occur with look. When 
look occurs with music, however, the use of music does not suggest a message involving visual 
perception. Consider example (16).  
16. In July, Tower will test a digital kiosk at its store in Berkeley, Calif., where 
consumers can have digital compilations made in the store or have songs downloaded 
to their MP3 players. “Digital is a major part of our lives now, whether we like it or 
not,” Farrace says. “We look at digital music as just another configuration, like CDs 
and cassettes.” (USA Today; One band’s piracy is another’s treasure) 
In this example, digital music does not suggest a message feature of visual perception, nor of 
attention. Thus, the choice to utter look does not intersect with anything suggested by the choice 
to utter music. In Chapter II it has been argued that look contributes its hypothesized meaning 
even in this example because of the cognitive metaphor that maps vision to intellection. What is 
important for the present purposes is that while look contributes to a message of visual (or 
intellectual) attention, music contributes to other message features entirely; therefore, no 
favoring is predicted between these two forms, as has been confirmed in the counts presented in 
Table 28. 
 It is lastly worth mentioning here that this quantitative prediction is indicative of a great 
number of potential predictions that can be made in light of an analysis of other attested 
examples. Thus, whenever an example of look involves an object that is visually perceived, it 
may be predicted that look will favor the form referring to that visible entity in comparison to 
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another form that indicates a non-visible entity. For instance, much like look favors painting in 
comparison to music, it may also be predicted that look will favor statue in comparison to 
symphony, or again, tree in comparison to idea, etc. While examples of look at the trees and look 
at this idea have been observed and analyzed, for ease of presentation we present here only the 
quantitative data that follows from these examples. Observe, then, that look indeed favors tree in 
comparison to idea (Table 30).  
Table 29 COCA searches for tree and idea 
Favored Disfavored 
[look] * * [tree] [look] * * [idea] 
 
Table 30 Total COCA occurrences of tree and idea in the 
presence and absence of look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
tree   224 61 76491 35 
idea     144 39 141298 65 
Total 368 100 217789 100 
p < .0001     
This data is quite important in supporting VISUAL in the hypothesized meaning. The explanation 
for these highly significant statistical tendencies is that look and a form that is indicative of a 
113 
 
visual entity (such as painting or tree) together contribute to the same visual aspect of the 
message because, by hypothesis, VISUAL figures in the meaning of look.  
4.3   Using see to support VISUAL 
17. When Ralphie woke the next morning he forgot how he had gotten home. He 
stumbled from bed to look and see if the car was in the yard. (Those Who Hunt the 
Wounded Dawn) 
In this example, look is chosen because the message involves Ralphie directing his visual 
attention to the yard in order to check whether the car is there. Support for VISUAL is evidenced 
in the use of see, which is also chosen in light of its contribution to a message of visual 
perception. Thus, the speaker’s reason for choosing see partially intersects with the reason for 
choosing look, both forms contributing to a visual feature of the message. Indeed, Chapter IV 
outlines the hypothesized meaning of see, which, like look, also includes VISUAL in it. It is 
predicted, then, that look and see will co-occur at a higher than chance frequency. The form say 
will serve as the control term for this prediction
28
. 
Table 31 COCA searches for see and say 
Favored Disfavored 
[look] and [see] [look] and [say] 
 
                                                          
28
 The reason the control term here is not hear, which might appear as a more obvious choice, is that, while hear 
certainly does not contribute the notion of visual to the message, it might contribute a notion of attention, as in, say, 
hear me out. Further investigation of the semantic contribution of the forms hear, listen (and perhaps sound) would 
be required to tell what precisely is contributed by each one of these. Still, it may be noted that the test with hear has 
been run on background, and the result is that look favors see also in comparison to hear.  
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Table 32 Total COCA occurrences of see and say in the 
presence and absence look 
 look present look absent 
 N % N % 
see   366 66 805435 27 
say     185 34 2197350 73 
Total 551 100 3002785 100 
p < .0001     
In the absence of look, see accounts for 27 percent of the see-say total. In the presence of look, 
however, see now rises to 66 percent of the total.  
5   Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that the hypothesized meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL successfully explains 
the occurrences of look in naturally produced speech and writing throughout a large corpus. Each 
qualitative analysis has demonstrated that the hypothesized meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL 
motivates the speaker or writer’s expressive choice to utter a token of the form look. In each 
qualitative analysis, a certain form – the predictive term – has been isolated in the text to serve as 
a surrogate for the suggestion of a certain message effect that – if the meaning hypothesis for 
look is correct – is also contributed by look. Then, to make a quantitative prediction, a control 
term has been selected, one whose expressive choice is motivated in light of message effects that 
are completely different and non-overlapping with the message effects contributed by look. The 
quantitative predictions have all confirmed that look consistently favors the predictive term in 
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comparison to the control term; the explanation for the favoring is that the predictive term and 
look each contribute to partially overlapping message effects. These predictions indirectly 
support the meaning hypothesis because the communicative strategies tested for, namely, of 
attention and of visual, follow from the hypothesized meaning. Lastly, for some of the cases, it 
has been demonstrated that there is nothing incoherent in putting together the two disfavored 
forms, such as, for instance, look carelessly, look accidentally or look on. It is just that when 
these sequences occur, each form is chosen in light of different and non-overlapping message 
effects. 
  In adopting this methodology, this chapter has also argued against the idea that the 
relatively frequent co-occurrence of forms in a corpus can be explained in terms of the 
compatibility of the meanings involved. The central problem in the compatibility rationale is that 
it purports to explain the co-occurrence of forms without recourse to the humans who utter them, 
as if meanings are by themselves attracted to one another because they are compatible. If the 
speaker would be brought into the explanation of the compatibility rationale, it seems that this 
rationale would argue that a speaker chooses to utter, say, carefully, in the presence of look, 
because carefully has a meaning that is compatible with the meaning of look. But speakers do not 
choose to utter a word because it is compatible with another word. Indeed, no qualitative analysis 
in CS has ever appealed to compatibility in explaining a speaker’s choice to utter a certain form. 
Rather, the form’s meaning has consistently been the basis for explanation.  
  The communicative strategies rationale proposed here offers the same kind of 
explanation both in the qualitative analyses and in the rationale for quantitative predictions; in 
both cases the occurrence of a given form is explained in terms of the form’s meaning, and in 
both cases support for the meaning hypothesis comes in the form of proposed communicative 
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strategies. In making a quantitative prediction, the generality of the communicative strategy is 
being tested directly, and the meaning hypothesis is indirectly supported because the 
communicative strategy proposed follows from the hypothesized meaning.  
  The next chapter provides tentative invariant meaning hypotheses for the forms see, seem 
and appear. The purpose of these tentative hypotheses is to gain a better understanding of some 
of the forms that might compete with look when speakers make expressive choices. Accounting 
for the distribution of look requires both accounting for where it does occur and where it does not 
occur, and often the reason for the latter is due to the other choices available to speakers. The 
comparison between look and these forms is intended, therefore, to demonstrate that speakers 
choose which form to use on the basis of the meaning of look as well as on the basis of the 
meanings of these other forms. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ATTENTION, VISUAL in competition with the meanings of 
see, seem, and appear 
1   Introduction 
This chapter investigates the semantic parameters that guide speakers’ choice to use either look 
or one of the forms see, seem or appear. The tentative hypotheses of see, seem and appear will 
be elaborated in Sections 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Here in brief, the hypotheses are as follows.  
 The meaning of see involves the event of registering or internalizing visual sensory input. 
 The meaning of seem involves a particular perspective or point of view. 
 The meaning of appear involves the turning point at which something first becomes 
available to perception.  
The interest in comparing look to these forms in particular stems from the fact that where 
these forms occur, look is sometimes – on the basis of its hypothesized meaning – an unchosen 
expressive alternative. This is so because of certain similarities – shared conceptual elements – 
between the meaning of look and the meaning of each of these other forms. To begin with the 
most straightforward case, look and see share VISUAL in their meanings, and both may be chosen 
for a message involving visual perception (e.g., I saw the painting; I looked at the painting). The 
two forms differ, by hypothesis, in that only look conceptualizes attention in the visual act while 
only see conceptualizes the registering and internalization of visual sensory input. Accordingly, 
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the suggestion of the notion of attention on the one hand and of registering on the other, 
constitute the semantic parameters that guide speakers’ choice between look and see.  
Second, look and seem do not formally share, by hypothesis, any notional content at all in 
their respective meanings. The two forms, however, functionally converge in that the meanings 
of both may lead to message partials involving a judgment or opinion. In the case of look, the act 
of attending to something, whether visually or intellectually, may often lead one to form some 
judgment or opinion about the object of attention (e.g., I noticed it looks weird); indeed, the 
motivation for paying attention to something is often precisely to come to some judgment or 
opinion about it. In the case of seem, the notion of perspective in its hypothesized meaning 
suggests a particular way or point of view for regarding something; in other words, perspective 
suggests a personal judgment or opinion about something (e.g., to me it seems obvious). Because 
both meanings may lead to inferences involving the idea of a judgment, both look and seem suit 
messages of attribution, that is, messages that convey some judgment whose source is 
conceptualized either as stemming from visual attention (look) or from a particular perspective 
(seem). The semantic parameters that will be used to differentiate speakers’ choice of look and 
seem will be the notion of visual on the one hand and of perspective dependency on the other. 
Finally, the meaning of appear suits messages of attribution, too, particularly when the 
attribution is based on an initial perception. Look and appear differ, by hypothesis, in that only 
appear contains the notion of initiation, which may be used to suggest that an attribution is 
tentative and subject to subsequent change (e.g., it appears white but actually has a semi-
translucent color). Furthermore, both look and the derived form appearance are fit for messages 
concerning visual features, but the two forms differ in that only look characterizes the visual 
features as attention-grabbing or attention-worthy while only appearance delimits the perception 
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to INITIAL, which may, again, be used to suggest that the characterization of the visual features is 
provisional (e.g., please pardon our appearance during construction, where the present visual 
features change as construction takes place).  
Each section below presents contrasting pairs of examples that illuminate why look is 
chosen in some cases and why each of the other forms is chosen in others. Most of the qualitative 
analyses will lead to quantitative predictions, following the same methodology that has been 
delineated in chapter III. Note that, in this chapter, look itself will function as a control term 
whenever the predictive term serves as a surrogate for a semantic parameter that is also 
contributed by either see, seem or appear
29
. For instance, in the course of the analysis of example 
(6) below, the presence of believe will be offered as evidence for the hypothesized meaning of 
see; then, to test the prediction that believe and see co-occur at a higher than chance frequency, 
look will be used as the control term, so that see will be predicted to favor believe more so than 
look. Conversely, when the predictive term serves as a surrogate for a semantic parameter that is 
contributed by look, then in that case either see, seem or appear will serve as the control term. 
For instance, in the course of the analysis of example (4), the presence of notice will be offered 
as evidence for the meaning of look; then, to test the prediction that notice and look co-occur at a 
higher than chance frequency, see will be used as the control term. In this way, each section 
below will demonstrate how the choices made by speakers on the basis of the semantic 
parameters differentiating (by hypothesis) look, see, seem and appear are responsible for creating 
the distributional facts observed in texts.  
The reader is reminded that while look and notice are often chosen to produce the same 
message effect when they co-occur, they may sometimes be chosen to produce different, non-
                                                          
29
 Forms other than look may also serve as control terms in testing the hypotheses of see, seem and appear. For our 
purposes, however, using look as a control term serves to explicate why this form is not chosen where – given its 
hypothesized meaning – we might have expected it.  
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overlapping message effects (e.g., I said I never notice these things. She looked at me blankly…). 
By contrast, see and notice are always chosen to produce different message effects and hence are 
expected to co-occur no more frequently than chance would predict. It is this difference between 
‘sometimes’ and ‘always’ that produces the statistical favoring of look and notice compared to 
see and notice. 
Two final preliminary notes are in order. First, when we say that where see, seem or 
appear occur, look might also have occurred, we are not talking of structural substitution; that is, 
our interest in the comparison is not in the fact that, say, either look or seem may occur in the 
empty slot in the frame She _____ nice. In the context of the present analysis, the possibility of 
structural substitution is seen as an epiphenomenon, a consequence of the hypothesized 
meanings and their fit for particular types of messages, here messages of attribution, as explained 
above. The goal here, to repeat, is not to explain structural substitution, but rather to explain 
individual expressive choices; that is, to explicate why a particular form has been chosen on each 
occasion of that form’s use. 
Finally, it is outside the scope of this dissertation to offer a full account of the distribution 
of see, seem and appear, as has been done for look. The hypotheses for these other forms are put 
forth only so as to provide further support for the meaning of look by comparing it to these other 
meanings and explaining both why look occurs where it does and why it fails to occur where it 
might have been expected in light of its hypothesized meaning.  
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2   Look and see – ATTENTION, VISUAL versus EXPERIENCING VISUALLY 
This section focuses on the contrast between look and see. Two terms – turn to and notice – are 
shown to be chosen in response to a message feature of attention and so are predicted to be 
favored by look more so than by see. This supports the claim that look and see differ by a feature 
of attention. Then, we turn to three terms – believe, understand and the meaning LESS CONTROL – 
that are chosen in response to a message feature of perceptual registering or internalization of 
stimuli, and are predicted to be favored by see more so than by look. This supports the claim that 
look and see differ by a feature of experiencing. 
2.1   The hypothesis of see as a monosemic sign 
The hypothesized meaning of see involves two notions, the first of which, EXPERIENCING, 
expresses a conceptualization of an event in which visual stimuli make an impression on one’s 
mind, that is, the notion of experience is intended to encapsulate the following concepts: 
registering, internalizing, processing, being aware of or consciously taking in visual stimuli; the 
other notion, VISUAL, expresses a conceptualization of the physical sense of sight, just as it does 
in look. As in the case of look, the two notions make up a single semantic substance, which may 
be more fully stated as registering and internalizing visual sensory input. This hypothesis is 
summarized in Figure 1. 
Meaning Signal 
EXPERIENCING VISUALLY  /si/ or see 
Fig. 1 The hypothesis of see as a monosemic sign 
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 As a simple initial demonstration, consider the following example. 
(1) [Tour guide:] If you look to your right you will see the Empire State Building. 
Look is chosen because the guide is instructing the tourists to direct their visual attention to their 
right (to your right providing contextual support for ATTENTION); see is chosen because, as a 
result of having directed their attention, the tourists will have visually experienced the Empire 
State Building, that is, register the building through the sense of sight (the meaning LESS 
CONTROL signaled for the Empire State Building provides contextual support for EXPERIENCING, 
as will be explicated in Section 2.3.3 below). 
2.2   ATTENTION as the explanation for the choice of look over see  
2.2.1   Using turn to to support ATTENTION 
(2) People turned to look at Howard Roark as he passed. Some remained staring after him 
with sudden resentment. They could give no reason for it: it was an instinct his presence 
awakened in most people. Howard Roark saw no one. For him, the streets were empty. 
He could have walked there naked without concern. (The Fountainhead) 
Why did the author not write People turned to see Howard Roark as he passed and 
Howard Roark looked at no one, that is, why did the author make the expressive choices that she 
did? The meaning hypotheses explain each of these choices, as follows. To begin with look, there 
is plenty of contextual evidence that attention is a feature of the communicated message. First, 
people turned to look, implying that people took special notice of Howard as he passed. Second, 
people remained staring after him, suggesting that Howard’s presence is quite enthralling; 
indeed, it awakens an instinct in most people. Finally, a wider contextual consideration relevant 
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to explaining the choice of look here: Howard is the hero of the novel, and so, in the text quoted 
in (2), which appears quite at the beginning, the use of look – due to its hypothesized meaning – 
serves to establish Howard as a prominent character to whom attention ought to be directed. 
Thus, as evidenced by the use of turned to as well as the other contextual features, we see that 
this is a message involving attention, and the writer chose look rather than see because 
ATTENTION figures in the meaning of look, whereas see contains no element of attention in its 
meaning. 
Turning now to the author’s choice of the meaning EXPERIENCING VISUALLY in Howard 
saw no one. The author chose here see because the communicated message is that Howard does 
not register other people, so much so that for him, the streets were empty, allowing him to have 
walked [the streets] naked without concern. Notice that had the author written Howard Roark 
looked at no one then the continuation for him, the streets were empty would make little sense, as 
it would imply that he is aware of other people, only chooses not to give them his attention. 
Larger contextual features again further support the choice of see here; for instance, a few 
paragraphs following the text in example (2), the author writes of Howard that he made people 
feel as if they did not exist, again indicating that Howard fails to register or acknowledge other 
people. Indeed, Howard’s character is generally portrayed throughout the novel as an extreme 
individualist who strictly follows his own path without allowing anyone else to influence his 
decisions or choices in any aspect of his life
30
. It is worth noting finally that the message 
concerns more than mere visual perception, that is, it is not about light waves striking Howard’s 
retina; rather, the issue is that Howard fails to acknowledge other people. This example thus 
provides a nice illustration of why VISUAL (or VISUAL PERCEPTION) alone would be insufficient to 
                                                          
30
 This may read as if it were a literary analysis, but in fact it is a highly rigorous linguistic analysis, highlighting 
relevant contextual considerations that explain the author’s choices of look and of see and hence support these sign’s 
hypothesized meanings.  
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explain the writer’s choice, and why EXPERIENCING is a necessary part of the meaning 
hypothesis.  
If the considerations mentioned above regularly guide speakers in their choice between 
look and see, they lead to a quantitative prediction. It is predicted that look will favor turn to 
more so than see. The use of turn to, through its suggestion of active directing, contributes to a 
message feature of attention, as does the use of look. To test this prediction, the total number of 
occurrences is collected for each of the following six sequences in COCA.  
Table 1 COCA searches for turn to 
Favored Disfavored 
[turn] to look 
[turn] * head to look 
[turn] * face to look 
[turn] to see 
[turn] * head to see 
[turn] * face to see 
 
Table 2 Total COCA occurrences of look and see in the presence and 
absence of turn to 
 turn to present turn to absent 
 N % N % 
look  1639 62 638695 44 
see  1010 38 804791 56 
Total 2649 100 1443486 100 
p < .0001     
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The prediction is confirmed. The right column shows that in the neutralized condition look 
accounts for 44 percent of the look-see total. In the context of turn to, however, look is clearly 
favored, constituting now 62 percent of the total. The greater frequency of turn to look over turn 
to see is beyond what mere chance would predict. This data confirms the generality of the 
communicative strategy to utter both look and turn to so as to suggest a message feature of 
attention.  
As indicated in Table 2, turn to see occurs, too. When it does occur, however, each form 
is chosen for a completely different reason; each contributes to different, non-overlapping 
message effects. Consider the following example. 
(3) [At a department store:] “That’s a gorgeous jean on you,” says a voice as I exit my 
dressing room. I turn to see a glam soccer mom awaiting her teenage princess. (Harper’s 
Bazaar magazine: Finding the perfect jeans)  
In (3), turn to still contributes to a message feature of active directing, but see does not. See was 
chosen because the motivation to turn was not to observe a particular person or object of 
attention, but rather, it was simply to identify an unfamiliar voice. The perception or registering 
of a glam soccer mom was an incidental consequence of doing that, not the actual reason for the 
turning.  
This rationale for see rather than look finds support in the fact that the writer uses 
a preceding glam soccer mom. The meaning of a – DIFFERENTIATION REQUIRED yet INCOMPLETE 
(Reid 1991:79) – suggests that the writer had no idea what visual stimulus she was about to 
register by turning, implying, thereby, that she did not turn in order to observe the glam soccer 
mom. By contrast, in example (2) people turned specifically to observe Howard Roark: People 
turned to look at Howard Roark as he passed. In other words, people first had a visual 
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experience of Howard as he passed and then proceeded to orient their eyes in order to visually 
attend to him.  
This rationale for see rather than look in example (3) is supported quantitatively through a 
count checking for the total number of occurrences of the form a following turn to look and turn 
to see. It is predicted that turn to see will favor a more so than turn to look. The following COCA 
searches were carried out.  
Table 3 COCA searches for turn to a 
Favored Disfavored 
[turn] to see a [turn] to look * a 
 
Table 4 Total COCA occurrences of turn to look and turn to see in the 
presence and absence of a 
 a present a absent 
 N % N % 
turn  to see 117 92 840 36 
turn  to look 10 8 1490 64 
Total 127 100 2457 100 
p < .0001     
Whereas turn to see accounts for merely 36 percent of the turn to look-turn to see total, in the 
context of a, turn to see now accounts for 92 percent of the total. This favoring of the co-
occurrence of turn to see and a is due to the fact that the reason for the choice of a partially 
127 
 
overlaps with the reason for the choice of turn to see
31
: both contribute to a message partial 
involving a turning of one’s eyes that is unmotivated by an expectation of what is about to be 
observed. 
2.2.2   Using notice to support ATTENTION 
There are many more predictive terms suggestive of the notion of attention. Indeed, quantitative 
tests involving all of the predictive terms examined in Section 3 of Chapter III – carefully, this, 
but, at, deliberately and think – have been run on background and it has been confirmed that look 
favors each and every one of these forms more so than see, thus supporting the presence of 
ATTENTION in the meaning of look and its absence in the meaning of see. For ease of 
presentation, however, and to avoid unnecessary repetition, this data will not be shown here. It 
will suffice to point to one more predictive term – notice – to demonstrate that the choice of look 
over see is motivated by the suggestion of a message feature of attention (example 4 repeats data 
from the previous chapter, used here for a different purpose). 
(4) He [Peter Keating] tried not to notice the faces of the people he passed, but he had to 
notice; he had always looked at people. 
 
(5) [Describing the feats of a man in a wheelchair:] Day one, Waddell climbed three 
thousand vertical feet in seven and a half hours. Expedition porters used boards to help 
him tackle the deep drainage ditches in his path. Day two is brutal. Waddell pedals for ten 
and a half hours to rise thirty three hundred feet in a dust storm. Day three, he covers 
                                                          
31
 Of course, turn to see involves three independent expressive choices – of turn, of to and of see. The sequence is 
treated here as if it were a single choice purely for methodological purposes, in order to show that the overall effect 
on the message produced by turn to see partially overlaps with the effect of a. 
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nearly ten miles. CHRIS-WADDELL: It was really, really tough and steep and loose and 
rocky. KAREN-BROWN: What drives Waddell [is] his desire that the world stop seeing 
the wheelchair and notice the man. CHRIS-WADDELL: I want them to see the 
possibilities in me and people like me. But I also want them to see the possibilities in 
themselves. (CBS News Evening) 
First, in regard to example (4), note now that Peter is portrayed in the novel as having the 
exact opposite characteristics from Howard. Whereas Howard is a self-made man and an extreme 
individualist, Peter heavily relies on other people, constantly needing others to tell him what to 
do and think and seeking other’s approval. The author chose here look because the message is 
about how Peter has his attention constantly directed toward other people. This is also conveyed 
through the use of notice, the two forms – look and notice – together contributing to a message 
feature of attention. 
When notice occurs in the presence of see, by contrast, then each form is chosen to 
produce different and non-overlapping message effects. The use of notice in (5) is still motivated 
by the suggestion of a message feature of attention; Waddell’s desire is that people will actively 
think of him and attend to him as a capable man. The use of see, however, suggests not attention 
but experiencing; Waddell uses the meaning EXPERIENCING VISUALLY because he wants people 
to stop registering just the wheelchair. Indeed, through his amazing travels, Waddell strives to 
make people recognize more in him than might strike one superficially. What is important is that 
see is motivated not by the suggestion of visual attention but by a message that concerns what 
people visually internalize, or register, when they perceive a man in a wheelchair.  
Following these examples, it is predicted that look will favor notice more so than see. To 
test this prediction, the following COCA searches are carried out.  
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Table 5 COCA searches for notice 
Favored Disfavored 
[look] and [notice] 
[look] * and [notice] 
[look] * * and [notice] 
[look] * * * and [notice] 
[see] and [notice] 
[see] * and [notice] 
[see] * * and [notice] 
[see] * * * and [notice] 
 
Table 6 Total COCA occurrences of look and see in the presence 
and absence of notice 
 notice present notice absent 
 N % N % 
look  125 92 640209 44 
see  11 8 805790 56 
Total 136 100 1445999 100 
p < .0001     
In the context of notice, look is strongly favored, accounting for 92 percent of the look-see total.  
 Summing up, the above two quantitative predictions have confirmed the generality of the 
communicative strategy motivating speakers to choose look over see in light of the suggestion of 
a message feature attention. The next subsection points to three predictive terms that favor see 
over look.   
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2.3   EXPERIENCING as the explanation for the choice of see over look 
2.3.1   Using believe to support EXPERIENCING 
(6) When Chris went to school he told everybody about the T-Rex, but no one believed him. 
[…] Chris took [the T-Rex] to the local zoo. […] One day the class went to visit the zoo. 
They saw the T-Rex and believed Chris. (News for Kids; Young authors share their 
holiday stories) 
 
(7) You are quite right in saying that the law changes and interpretations of the law change. 
Where you’re wrong is where you want the law to go and it seems to me that where you 
want the law to go is to give every community the sort of local option to define what is 
proper for their citizens to read and watch and look at and believe in. […] If Cincinnati 
wants people not to watch this painting, they can determine it – I don’t think so. MR-
MacNeil: In other words, you’re saying that even if a large majority of the citizens in 
Cincinnati don’t like that exhibition, they should not be able to prevent citizens, perhaps 
the small number of citizens who do want to go and see it. (PBS Newshour, 1990) 
 
In (6), see is chosen because the message is that the kids had visually registered or 
experienced the T-Rex when they came to stand in front of it, and the meaning of see is, by 
hypothesis, EXPERIENCING VISUALLY. Contextual support for the meaning EXPERIENCING 
VISUALLY comes from the choice of believed, suggesting that the T-Rex had become a part of the 
kids’ internalized cognition; in other words, now that the kids have visually registered the T-Rex 
they accept its existence as truth (consider also, in this respect, the well-known saying “seeing is 
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believing”). The two forms, then, see and believe contribute to a partially overlapping message 
effect of internalized cognition. 
In (7), by contrast, each of the forms – look and believe – contributes to a different 
message effect. The speaker protests against the idea that the local community should be able to 
decide what is proper for its people, and makes this point by gradually evoking higher degrees of 
control that the law might exert. The sequence read, watch, look and believe creates a kind of 
crescendo, making the law seem more and more extreme in its degree of control. Look is chosen 
to suggest that the law would dictate what a person is allowed to give their attention to. Believe, 
in turn, suggests that the law will even control one’s faith and personal truths, that is, the most 
extreme level of control over one’s most personal internal convictions. The two forms, then, look 
and believe contribute each to different message effects, one involving acts of visual attention 
and another involving one’s internal cognition.  
Following these examples, it is predicted that see will favor believe more so than look. To 
test this prediction, the following COCA searches are carried out. 
Table 7 COCA searches for believe 
Favored Disfavored 
[see] and [believe] 
[see] * and [believe] 
[see] * * and [believe] 
[look] and [believe] 
[look] * and [believe] 
[look] * * and [believe] 
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Table 8 Total COCA occurrences of look and see in the presence 
and absence of believe 
 believe present believe absent 
 N % N % 
see     34 77 805767 56 
look  10 23 640324 44 
Total 44 100 1446091 100 
p < .01     
While see accounts for 56 percent of the look-see total in the absence of believe, it rises to 77 
percent of the total in the presence of believe. This prediction confirms the generality of the 
communicative strategy of using both see and believe in light of a message feature concerning 
registered information or internalized cognition. 
2.3.2   Using understand to support EXPERIENCING 
(8) Rohm paints in the great outdoors. […] “Working directly from life,” he says, “is always 
a better way to see and understand color, value, and form.” (American Artist) 
 
(9) Again and again Diehl returns to the importance of simplifying details. He is in awe of 
Renaissance works that depict books so minutely that every bit of text on a painted page 
is readable. But the artist doesn’t spend his time going into such a fine detail. He states, 
“My concern is not to paint every word on a page or every pore on an orange but 
to look closely and understand exactly how the light and shadow play off the object. It's 
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a fine-tuning of my eye so that I can see the detail clearly and tackle more intricate 
surfaces. (American Artist) 
In (8), the writer chose see because the message involves the artist visually experiencing 
nature (working directly from life is a better way to visually register color, value and form). Note 
that the use of understand likewise contributes to a message of taking in and processing the 
visual information that strikes the artist in the outdoors. Thus, see and understand partially 
overlap in their contribution to the message, both forms suggesting the registering and processing 
of received input. 
In example (9), by contrast, each of the forms look and understand contributes to 
different and non-overlapping message effects. The writer chose look because the message 
involves the artist directing his attention to the visual features of an object of interest. Notice that 
look is modified by closely, which is suggestive of special care and attention in the visual act. 
Furthermore, the artist is interested in exactly how the light and shadow play off the object, again 
indicating that attention to detail is here at issue. Finally, the next sentence says it’s a fine tuning 
of my eye, yet again suggestive of directed visual attention.  
The use of understand, on the other hand, does not contribute to a message of visual 
attention. It suggests, rather, the registering and processing of the visual information attended to. 
In this respect, the use of look and understand in example (9) is rather similar to the sequence 
where look is followed by see in example (1) where, to recall, the tourists direct their visual 
attention in order to visually register the Empire State Building; in both cases the act of visual 
attention is intended to lead to the registering of visual sensory input. Indeed, note the parallel in 
(9) between the sequence look and understand and the sequence that appears in the following 
sentence, It's a fine-tuning of my eye so that I can see the detail clearly; as noted it’s a fine 
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tuning of my eye suggests a message similar to the one communicated with look, whereas the use 
of see the detail clearly suggests a messages similar in its effect to the one communicated with 
understand. Thus, we see that the meanings of see and of understand independently contribute to 
overlapping message effects while the meanings of look and understand do not. 
Following the analysis of these examples, it is predicted that see will favor understand 
more so than look. To test this prediction, the following COCA searches are carried out.  
Table 9 COCA searches for understand 
Favored Disfavored 
[see] and [understand] 
[see] * and [understand] 
[see] * * and [understand] 
[look] and [understand] 
[look] * and [understand] 
[look] * * and [understand] 
 
Table 10 Total COCA occurrences of look and see in the presence and 
absence of understand 
 understand present understand absent 
 N % N % 
see   117 79 805684 56 
look  32 21 640302 44 
Total 149 100 1445986 100 
p < .0001     
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While see accounts for 56 percent of the look-see total in the absence of understand, it comprises 
79 percent in its presence. This confirms the generality of the communicative strategy to use both 
see and understand in light of a message feature of registered information.  
2.3.3   Using LESS CONTROL to support EXPERIENCING 
Note now that while look conceptualizes attention that is directed through the visual track, see 
conceptualized experiencing that is mediated through the visual track. In other words, the 
meaning of see has the visual stimulus built into it, because experiencing necessarily involves 
something being experienced, that is, something that is registered in the visual act. (One can 
attend even when there is nothing to attend to simply by the active directing of one’s eyes and 
mind, but it is impossible to experience unless there is something being experienced). This points 
to a most salient difference in the two forms’ distribution, namely, the fact that see is much more 
likely than look to occur with the meaning LESS CONTROL (roughly what the grammatical 
tradition calls a ‘direct object’).  
(10) [Mrs. Keating is passing a message to Howard Roark:] She [=the dean’s 
secretary] said to tell you that the Dean wanted to see you immediately the moment you 
got back. (The Fountainhead)  
 
(11) I sat down with Rob Kissel and I looked him right across the table at the China 
Club and I said, “Rob, I think Nancy’s trying to kill you.” (NBC Dateline) 
In (10), the use of the meaning LESS CONTROL signaled by the form you following (rather than 
preceding) see suggests that Howard has some degree of control over bringing about the event of 
visual experience suggested by the use of see. Indeed, the Dean cannot have a visual experience 
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of Howard unless Howard comes to stand in front of the Dean’s eyes. Accordingly, the use of the 
meaning LESS CONTROL conceptualizes the event of visual experience as one where both the 
Dean and Howard have some degree of responsibility in bringing the event about. Now the form 
see is partially chosen in light of this same message feature, that is, in light of the suggestion that 
the perceived object plays a controlling role in the visual event. This message feature is 
suggested by the meaning EXPERIENCING VISUALLY because this meaning necessarily invokes 
some visual stimulus that is being experienced.  
By contrast, when look is used with the meaning LESS CONTROL (him in 11), then each 
choice produces different and non-overlapping message effects. LESS CONTROL is still chosen in 
light of the controlling role of the visually perceived entity in bringing about the visual event. 
Thus, Rob Kissel has a crucial role in bringing about the speaker’s act of visual attention, as the 
speaker is visually attending to Rob for Rob’s benefit, that is, in order to bring him some vital 
news. The choice of look, however, is not made in light of a controlling role to the visual 
stimulus, but rather to suggest visual attention. Note that the sequence I sat down with already 
suggests that the speaker is visually experiencing Rob Kissel. Look is here chosen (as opposed to 
see) because of the gravity of the information that the speaker has for Rob; in other words, the 
speaker is prompted to conceptualize the event as one of visual attention (look) as opposed to a 
visual experience (see) because the interaction between the speaker and Rob is not just another 
everyday conversation, but one which compels the speaker to sit and seriously attend to Rob
32
.    
                                                          
32
 Linguists who talk about transitive uses of look will typically only mention sequences like look him in the eye, 
which is sometimes posited to be a construction (see, e.g., Wierzbicka 1988:188-9). But it is quite improbable that 
looked him right across the table is an idiom or a construction; at any rate, this sequence has not been mentioned 
anywhere in the literature. Our hypothesis of the meaning of look together with the established CS hypothesis of the 
system of Degree of Control make it possible to explain this example as well as examples of look him in the eye 
without the need to posit a construction that exists over and above the sign look. 
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  Following the rationale for see in 10 and for look in 11 proposed above, it is predicted 
that see will favor co-occurrence with the meaning LESS CONTROL more so than look. This is 
because both EXPERIENCING VISUALLY and LESS CONTROL contribute to a message where there is 
a controlling role to the visual stimulus in bringing about the visual event, whereas the meaning 
of look does not contribute to such a message partial. To test this prediction, the total number of 
occurrences is collected for the following sequences in COCA.  
Table 11 COCA searches for proper nouns and pronouns 
Favored Disfavored 
[see] [proper noun] 
[see] [pronoun] 
[look] [proper noun] 
[look] [pronoun] 
 
Table 12 Total COCA occurrences of look and see in the presence and absence of a 
proper noun or pronoun 
 proper name/pronoun present proper name/pronoun absent 
 N % N % 
see  133310 96 672491 51 
look   5402 4 634932 49 
Total 138712 100 1307423 100 
p < .0001     
See accounts for 96 percent of the look-see total in the presence of LESS CONTROL (again, what is 
traditionally called a direct object), an increase of 45 percentage points from the neutralized 
condition. While the reader certainly already knew that see occurs with LESS CONTROL more 
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frequently than look, it is worth stressing that the meaning hypotheses for each of the forms 
explain why this is so. This underscores the fact that a CS analysis aims at explaining the 
distribution of linguistic forms, rather than just describing their distribution. 
3   Look and seem – ATTENTION, VISUAL versus PERSPECTIVE DEPENDENCY 
This section focuses on the contrast between look and seem. Both of these forms may be used for 
both visual and non-visual attributions (e.g., looks green and seems green, looks logical and 
seems logical are all found to occur). Likewise, both forms are sometimes found with an 
expression indicating who makes the attribution (e.g., looks nice to me and seems nice to me). 
None of these sequences is incoherent or ungrammatical, and the reader is reminded that the 
predictions below involve statistical favorings rather than categorical rules.  
One term – green – is shown to be chosen in response to a message feature of visual, and 
so is predicted to be favored by look more so than by seem. This supports the claim that look and 
seem differ by a feature of visual. Then, three predictive terms – logical, to me and at the time – 
are shown to be chosen in response to a message feature of perspective dependency, and so are 
predicted to be favored by seem more so than by look. This supports the claim that look and seem 
differ by a feature of perspective dependency. 
3.1   The hypothesis of seem as a monosemic sign 
The hypothesized meaning of seem – PERSPECTIVE DEPENDENCY – expresses a conceptualization 
of what is said as relative only to a particular mental point of view, or as stemming from some 
particular attitude or stance. The hypothesis may be more fully stated as dependency upon a 
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mental state or point of view from which one’s experience is categorized or assessed. This 
hypothesis is summarized in Figure 2.  
Meaning Signal 
PERSPECTIVE DEPENDENCY  /sim/ or seem 
Fig. 2 The hypothesis of seem as a monosemic sign 
As an initial demonstration of the difference between look and seem consider the 
following two examples, featuring the sequences seems correct and looks correct.  
(12) [T]o the question “is it easy for you to get interested in new ideas?” [the gifted 
pupil] answered: “I get interested if it seems to me the idea is correct, and I reject it if I 
believe the idea is wrong… Perhaps it is not generally correct, but personally for me it 
seems correct. A new idea is great if I feel it in my heart… (The international handbook 
on Giftedness)  
 
(13) Fix recording of QML visual tests when using a QGL Widget viewport. Center 
and clip QML startup animation so it looks correct in full-screen. 
(https://bugreports.qt.io/browse/QTCREATORBUG-2627) 
The first thing to note is that in the case of seem, the word correct applies to something abstract 
and completely intellectual – an idea – whereas in the case of look, by contrast, correct applies 
now to something that is visually perceived, that is, the visual features of the startup animation in 
full screen. Second, note that seem is chosen because the message is that an idea is deemed as 
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correct specifically from the perspective of the child (perhaps it is not generally correct, but 
personally for me it seems correct). By contrast, there is no evidence for perspective dependency 
in the use of look. Indeed, information gained through sight is generally regarded as the most 
objective source of information there is (Sweetser 1990)
33
.   
3.2   VISUAL as the explanation for the choice of look over seem  
3.2.1   Using green to support VISUAL  
(14) That fall we prepared a bed and planted it with lettuce, but we didn’t place the 
pod on the bed until February. When we shoveled off the snow and uncovered the bed, 
which we had protected with a scrap of fiberglass, to our surprise the lettuce still looked 
green and edible underneath all that snow. (Mother Earth News – American Intensive 
Solar Gardening) 
 
(15) The qualities that the object actually has are entirely irrelevant to the explanation 
of the subjective difference between our experiences. In order to explain the difference 
[in our experience], one must advert to a difference in the way the object seems. […] 
Suppose [Norm] has an experience that seems green to him. We can ask whether the 
experience really is green. If it is, his experience is represented to him accurately; if it is 
not, it is represented to him inaccurately. (Consciousness and Cognition)  
                                                          
33
 It may be argued that because the meaning of look suggests a message partial of attention, it also implies 
perspective, namely the perspective from which attention is coming. But the meaning of seem, by hypothesis, 
explicitly involves perspective and therefore proves a far better fit – a far more effective instrument to use – for the 
communication of a message partial of perspective. In other words, when the notion of perspective is central to the 
communicated message, seem rather than look will be the form of choice. 
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In (14), look is chosen to suggest a message involving visual attention; the speaker has 
shoveled off the snow and uncovered the bed in order to attend to and examine the condition of 
the lettuce. The use of green supports the claim that visual perception is at issue because, 
straightforwardly, the color of the lettuce is a property perceived through the sense of sight.  
In (15), by contrast, seem is chosen because the message clearly concerns the gap that 
exists between reality and people’s personal perspectives. While green denotes a visual property 
in this example as well, here the point is precisely that the color depends on the individual’s 
personal perspective. Contextual evidence for a message of perspective comes from the 
sequences the qualities that the object actually has are entirely irrelevant, difference between 
[people’s] experiences, to him and the statement that one may judge an object as green whether 
it really is green or not. It is thus evident that the message concerns a feature of perspective and, 
the writer chose seem rather than look because the meaning of seem is, by hypothesis, 
PERSPECTIVE DEPENDENCY, whereas look contains no element of perspective in its meaning. 
If the rationales for the occurrence of look in (14) and seem in (15) guide speakers’ 
choice between these two words generally, then one would expect look to favor green more so 
than seem. This, to repeat, is because the choice of look is linked to the choice of green 
semantically: each is partially chosen for the same reason (in light of a visual message feature); 
but the choice of seem is not linked semantically to that of green and each is chosen for a 
different reason. It is predicted then that look will favor green more so than seem. To test this 
prediction, the following searches are carried out in COCA.  
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Table 13 COCA searches for green 
Favored Disfavored 
[look] green [seem] green 
 
Table 14 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the presence 
and absence of green 
 green present green absent 
 N % N % 
look   68 97 640266 72 
seem  2 3 247307 28 
Total 70 100 887573 100 
p < .0001     
Look is strongly favored in the context of green, accounting for 97 percent of the look-seem total. 
This data indirectly supports the presence of VISUAL in the hypothesized meaning of look and its 
absence in the hypothesized meaning of seem. 
We have now seen a case where both look and green contribute to the same visual aspect 
of a message. There are many examples where look and a form denoting a visual attribute 
together contribute to a visual message element. For ease of presentation, we will show only the 
quantitative data (without the qualitative analyses) for two more cases, having to do with the 
forms white and round (Tables 15 and 16).  
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Table 15 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the presence 
and absence of white 
 white present white absent 
 N % N % 
look    90 95 640244 72 
seem  5 5 247304 28 
Total 95 100 887548 100 
p < .0001     
 
Table 16 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the presence 
and absence of round 
 round present round absent 
 N % N % 
look  173 99 640161 72 
seem  1 1 247308 28 
Total 174 100 887469 100 
p < .0001     
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3.3   PERSPECTIVE DEPENDENCY as the explanation for the choice of seem over look 
3.3.1   Using logical to support PERSPECTIVE  
(16) People who depended on interest income were hurting. […] So savers and 
investors turned to bond mutual funds. It seemed logical at the time. […] What could go 
wrong? Plenty. Interest rates began rising in October 1993, sparking huge bond losses. 
(USA Today) 
 
(17) I’m […] a multimedia designer. […] I like to create as few tabs as possible in the 
back-office of Umbraco, to keep everything organized for me and my clients. This means 
that I get myself in trouble whenever I create a tab with more than one ‘category’ under 
it. For example: when I have two text-fields with titles on the homepage, say one ‘About 
us’ and ‘Team’, I could create a tab called ‘Text’ in the Umbraco back-office, which 
contains the next fields: About us_Title; About us_Text; Team_Title; Team_Text [the 
display features have been eliminated here, N.S]. As you can see, this doesn’t look too 
well. It looks logical to me as a developer, but it’s a lot of unfriendly text to an end-user. 
(https://our.umbraco.org/forum/using/ui-questions/33446-Creating-categories) 
To begin with (16), in contrast to green, the characterization of the idea to invest in bond mutual 
funds as logical constitutes a judgment that is clearly not based on the sense of sight. Rather, this 
abstract attribution is based on multiple and complex financial considerations that must be 
analyzed and interpreted to be deemed logical, and of course, as is well known, people often 
disagree in the interpretation of such complex data. Seem is here the form of choice because the 
message involves a judgment that depends on the limited perspective that the investors had at the 
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time. Indeed, from the vantage point of the present time, it is known that interest rates began 
rising […] sparking huge bond losses.  
 In (17), by contrast, look is chosen because the writer, a multimedia designer, is 
concerned with the visual features of the pages she designs and how people interact with them. 
While the message certainly involves visual attributes, the use of logical suggests a rather more 
abstract judgment; logical is not seen directly in the visual features the same way that green is 
seen in lettuce (example 14). Indeed, in saying to me as a developer, the designer explicitly 
differentiates between how the visual features of the page are judged by herself as opposed to her 
clients; that is precisely the reason for her question. Look is the attested form because the 
designer’s question quite explicitly concerns the visual characteristics of the text in the page.   
Following these examples, it is predicted that seem will favor logical more so than look
34
. 
The rationale for this prediction is that logical alludes to an abstract characterization whose 
attribution is not straightforward but rather depends on one’s personal interpretation and 
perspective, and this same message feature of perspective is, by hypothesis, contributed by seem 
as well. To test this prediction, the following searches have been carried out in COCA.  
Table 17 COCA searches for logical 
Favored Disfavored 
[seem] logical [look] logical 
 
                                                          
34
 The rationale for why look disfavors logical may simply be the fact that logical is not a visual attribute. If the 
meaning of seem were hypothesized to be something like NON-VISUAL ATTRIBUTION then the favoring of seem 
toward logical would be explained equally well. Note, however, that such a hypothesis for seem would fail to 
explain the other co-occurrence favorings that are coming up in the next sections; e.g., it would have nothing to say 
about why seem favors at the time. By the same token, the results presented in the table below might have served to 
support a hypothesis according to which the meaning of seem is LOGICALITY; but here too, such a hypothesis would 
fail to explain why seem and at the time also co-occur at a higher than chance frequency. The hypothesis of seem 
proposed here can explain (and has led to the discovery of) this and the rest of the predictions presented below.  
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Table 18 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in 
the presence and absence of logical 
 logical present logical absent 
 N % N % 
seem 235 100 247074 28 
look 0 0 640334 72 
Total 235 100 887408 100 
p < .0001     
As indicated in Table 18, look logical does not occur in COCA even once, and seem accounts for 
100 percent of the look-seem total in the presence of logical. Still, as demonstrated by example 
(17), look and logical may co-occur sometimes. But when these two forms co-occur then each is 
contributing to a different message effect. 
It may again be noted that there are many examples where the choice of both seem and 
another form denoting an abstract or intellectual attribute is made in response to a message 
feature of perspective dependency. Again, for ease of presentation, we will show only the 
quantitative data for two more cases involving the forms inevitable and reasonable (Tables 19 
and 20). 
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Table 19 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the 
presence and absence of inevitable 
 inevitable present inevitable absent 
 N % N % 
seem 253 95 247056 28 
look 14 5 640320 72 
Total 267 100 887376 100 
p < .0001     
 
Table 20 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in the 
presence and absence of reasonable 
 reasonable present reasonable absent 
 N % N % 
seem 518 97 246791 28 
look 14 3 640320 72 
Total 532 100 887111 100 
p < .0001     
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3.3.2   Using to me to support PERSPECTIVE  
While of course there are many examples that feature the sequence seem/look to me, for ease of 
presentation we return to examples (12) and (17), repeated below as (18) and (19), respectively.  
(18) “I get interested if it seems to me the idea is correct, and I reject it if I believe the 
idea is wrong… Perhaps it is not generally correct, but personally for me it seems 
correct. (The international handbook on Giftedness) 
 
(19) It looks logical to me as a developer, but it’s a lot of unfriendly text to an end-
user. (https://our.umbraco.org/forum/using/ui-questions/33446-Creating-categories) 
As noted in the analysis above, evidence for the choice of seem in (18) comes from the 
use of to me, as well as personally for me, these sequences both suggestive of a message feature 
of perspective dependency, to which the meaning of seem, by hypothesis, contributes as well. In 
example (19), by contrast, while to me still suggests perspective dependency, look is motivated 
by the suggestion of visual attention, as has been analyzed above. Following these examples, it is 
predicted that seem will favor to me more so than look
35
. To test this prediction, the following 
searches are carried out in COCA.  
  
                                                          
35
 This prediction might have been made if the meaning hypothesized for seem were PERSPECTIVE UNDERSPECIFIED 
while the meaning proposed for look were PERSPECTIVE SPECIFIC TO SPEAKER. But such hypotheses would not be 
able to explain all the other predictions that the hypotheses proposed here have discovered and explained.  
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Table 21 COCA searches for to me 
Favored Disfavored 
[seem] to me 
to me, it [seem] [adj.] 
to me it [seem] [adj.] 
[seem] [adj.] to me 
[look] to me 
to me, it [look] [adj.] 
to me it [look] [adj.] 
[look] [adj.] to me 
 
Table 22 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem 
in the presence and absence of to me 
 to me present to me absent 
 N % N % 
seem  8591 91 238718 27 
look  865 9 639469 73 
Total 9456 100 878187 100 
p < .0001     
In the presence of to me, seem accounts for a full 91 percent of the look-seem total, an increase of 
64 percentage points from the baseline condition.  
Observe now that the prediction is confirmed also for the sequences seem like and look 
like. This data is of interest as it suggests that there is no reason to think that look or seem are 
chosen on different grounds than the hypotheses proposed here – even when they occur as part of 
this putative construction. 
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Table 23 COCA searches for to me (for look/seem like) 
Favored Disfavored 
[seem] like to me 
[seem] like * to me 
[seem] like * * to me 
[seem] like * * * to me 
[seem] to me like 
[look] like to me 
[look] like * to me 
[look] like * * to me 
[look] like * * * to me 
[look] to me like 
 
Table 24 Total COCA occurrences of look like and seem 
like in the presence and absence of to me 
 to me present to me absent 
 N % N % 
seem like  365 35 15257 21 
look like  672 65 56114 79 
Total 1037 100 71371 100 
p < .0001     
While here seem like increases by only 14 percentage points in the presence of to me, this 
increase is nonetheless highly statistically significant, as indicated by the low p value.  
3.3.3   Using at the time to support PERSPECTIVE  
Example (16), which features seemed…at the time, is repeated below as (20); (21) is new. 
(20) People who depended on interest income were hurting. […] So savers and 
investors turned to bond mutual funds. It seemed logical at the time. […] What could go 
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wrong? Plenty. Interest rates began rising in October 1993, sparking huge bond losses. 
(USA Today) 
 
(21) LB: What was your biggest fashion mistake? BS: Ten years ago at the Billboard 
awards, I wore this orange hat and orange bra and orange booty pants and purple fishnets. 
Oh, and I had an orange jacket on. LB: Was it Halloween? BS laughs: No, it wasn’t 
Halloween. I actually thought I looked hot at the time. But, um, I definitely stood out. 
(Harper’s Bazaar) 
Recall that in example (20) the use of at the time implies a message feature of perspective 
dependency; the judgment of the investment as logical was made on the basis of the inevitably 
limited information available at the time. The use of seem, by hypothesis, likewise contributes to 
a message feature of perspective dependency. In example (21), by contrast, at the time still 
suggests perspective dependency, but the writer chose look because the message involves visual 
attention, as is evidenced by the fact that BS is describing her ensemble on a particular occasion 
and that she definitely stood out. Thus, look and at the time each contribute to different and non-
overlapping message effects; each was chosen for a different expressive reason. It is predicted, 
then, that seem will favor at the time more so than look. To test this prediction, the following 
searches are carried out in COCA.  
  
152 
 
Table 25 COCA searches for at the time 
Favored Disfavored 
[seem] * at the time 
[seem] * * at the time 
[seem] * * * at the time 
at the time, * [seem] 
at the time, * * [seem] 
at the time, * * * [seem] 
[look] * at the time 
[look] * * at the time 
[look] * * * at the time  
at the time, * [look] 
at the time, * * [look] 
at the time, * * * [look] 
 
Table 26 Total COCA occurrences of look and seem in 
the presence and absence of at the time 
 at the time present at the time absent 
 N % N % 
seem  337 77 246972 28 
look  102 23 640232 72 
Total 134 100 887204 100 
p < .0001     
Here we see an almost complete flip toward seem in the presence of at the time. 
4   Look and appear – ATTENTION, VISUAL versus INITIATION OF PERCEPTION 
This section focuses on the contrast between look and appear. Four terms – introduce, first, 
[adjective]-er than, and but – are shown to be chosen in response to a message feature of 
initiation and so are predicted to be favored by appear more so than by look. This will support 
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the claim that look and appear differ by a feature of initiation, as explicated below. Then, some 
contrasting pairs of examples of look and appearance will be examined. 
4.1   The hypothesis of appear as a monosemic sign 
The hypothesized meaning of appear – INITIATION OF PERCEPTION – expresses a 
conceptualization involving the point of emergence of a stimulus onto a scene. Again, the 
hypothesis may be more fully stated as sensory stimuli as they first enter or become available to 
perception. This hypothesis is summarized in Figure 3. 
Meaning Signal 
INITIATION OF PERCEPTION  /əpir/ or appear 
Fig. 3 The hypothesis of appear as a monosemic sign 
4.2   INITIATION as the explanation for the choice of appear over look 
4.2.1   Using introduce to support INITIATION 
(22) It is commonly suggested to correct perspective using a general projective 
transformation tool, correcting vertical tilt by stretching out the top; this is the “Distort 
Transform” in Photoshop, and the “Perspective Tool” in GIMP. However, this 
introduces vertical distortion – objects appear squat (vertically compressed, horizontally 
extended) – unless the vertical dimension is also stretched. This effect is minor for small 
angles, and can be corrected by hand, manually stretching the vertical dimension until the 
proportions look right. (Wikipedia: Perspective Control) 
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Notice, first, that look might have occurred in the place where appear is attested. Appear, 
however, is here the form of choice because the characterization of the objects as squat is only an 
initial state of affairs, and INITIATION OF PERCEPTION is, by hypothesis, the meaning of appear. 
There are several pieces of contextual evidence indicating that squat is only an initial 
characterization. First, the tool introduces vertical distortion, indicating that vertical distortion 
emerges – and hence, comes to sight – only upon the use of the tool. Second, the sequence unless 
the vertical dimension is also stretched suggests that if this additional procedure is executed then 
the initial squat will no longer obtain. And third, the effect is minor and can be corrected 
suggests yet again that squat will not obtain. Thus, the message concerns a feature of initiation 
and, the writer chose appear rather than look because the meaning of appear is, by hypothesis, 
INITIATION OF PERCEPTION, whereas look contains no element of initiation in its meaning. 
Turning now to the use of look in the example, here the message clearly involves a 
visually attending agent, and hence the choice of the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL. Note that the 
user must fine-tune the image – manually stretching it – until its relevant visual features are 
deemed to be right
36. This procedure requires the user’s visual attention, so that they could tell 
when the image has achieved its proper dimensions. Further evidence comes from correct by 
hand, which is also indicative of an attending agent.   
If the considerations mentioned above regularly guide speakers in their choice between 
look and appear, they lead to a quantitative prediction. As noted, the use of introduce suggests a 
message feature of initiation in that it alludes to visual features as they first enter onto the scene. 
Appear, by hypothesis, is likewise used to suggest a message feature involving visual properties 
                                                          
36
 There is of course an initial moment of perception at which the visual features are deemed right. But look is a 
better fit here than appear because the communication here does not concern these visual features being provisional 
in any way; that is, the message is not about the initiation of this perception. Rather, the message does involve the 
visual features being attended to in order to be deemed as right, as explained.  
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first entering onto a scene, whereas look does not. It is therefore predicted that appear will favor 
introduce more so than look. To test this prediction, the following searches are carried out in 
COCA.  
Table 27 COCA searches for introduce 
Favored Disfavored 
[introduce] * [appear] 
[introduce] * * [appear] 
[introduce] * * * [appear] 
[introduce] * * * * [appear] 
[introduce] * * * * * [appear] 
[introduce] * * * * * * [appear] 
[introduce] * * * * * * * [appear] 
[introduce] * [look] 
[introduce] * * [look] 
[introduce] * * * [look] 
[introduce] * * * * [look] 
[introduce] * * * * * [look] 
[introduce] * * * * * * [look] 
[introduce] * * * * * * * [look] 
 
Table 28 Total COCA occurrences of look and appear in 
the presence and absence of introduce 
 introduce present introduce absent 
 N % N % 
appear 49 32 113160 15 
look 105 68 640229 85 
Total 154 100 753389 100 
p < .0001     
Appear accounts for merely 15 percent of the look-appear total in the neutralized condition. In 
the presence of introduce, however, appear now comprises 32 percent of the total, an increase of 
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17 percentage points. The favoring of introduce by appear in comparison to look confirms that 
appear is regularly used for a message partial of initiation, thus indirectly supporting its 
hypothesized meaning.  
4.2.2   Using first to support INITIATION 
(23) As they entered, the snap of the closing door echoed off the walls of the quiet 
house. The living room was dimly lit and at first appeared empty. Then something 
stirred across the room, and an opaque figure rose and came forward. Crow switched on 
the light, exposing a teenage girl, eyes heavily mascaraed, hair overly teased. The 
distinctive odor of baby powder drew the couple’s attention to an infant asleep in her 
boyish arms. (Jitterbug Descending) 
 
(24) [A designer explains his philosophy:] “Simplify, then exaggerate,” is how he 
explains his design philosophy. “Have one color, beige, but have 15 shades of beige. The 
result at first looks simple, but after looking at it a while, you realize there are 15 
textures of beige and it’s all quite complex.” (Atlanta Journal Constitution – The Grand 
Designs of Charles Gandy) 
 
In (23) appear was chosen because the narrative clearly focuses on how the room was 
perceived initially, preparing the reader for what will be discovered subsequently. Evidence of a 
message feature concerning only an initial state of affairs comes from the following sequences: 
as they entered, evoking an image of the characters entering a new scene; the quiet house, 
suggesting that the house is probably empty; at first, suggesting that subsequent moments will 
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bring the discovery of something new; and finally, following the initially deceptive perception, 
an opaque figure rose […] exposing a teenage girl, these underlined forms indicating how the 
figure suddenly entered the character’s perception. The author thus chose appear rather than look 
because, by hypothesis, the meaning of appear contributes to a message involving the initial 
moment of perception whereas the meaning of look does not. 
In (24), the use of first similarly produces a message effect of an initial state of affairs, 
suggesting changes in subsequent moments. Here, however, the writer chose look because the 
designs are intended to be noticed and visually attended to. The use of but after looking at it a 
while suggests that, initially, the spectator gives visual attention to the design only briefly, which 
would lead one to think of the design as simple, then a longer act of visual attention would bring 
one to notice that it’s all quite complex. 
Because first and appear produce a partially overlapping message effect, it is predicted 
that appear will favor first more so than look. The following searches are carried out in COCA.  
Table 29 COCA searches for first 
Favored Disfavored 
first [appear] 
[appear] * at first 
[appear] * * at first 
[appear] * * * at first 
first [look] 
[look] * at first 
[look] * * at first 
[look] * * * at first 
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Table 30 Total COCA occurrences of look and appear in 
the presence and absence of first 
 first present first absent 
 N % N % 
appear  1256 57 111953 15 
look  962 43 639372 85 
Total 2218 100 751325 100 
p < .0001     
Appear is strongly favored in the context of first, accounting for 57 percent of the look-appear 
total. Now some of the results in this search include cases such as The book first appeared in 
1972, where look is not a viable option. Note, however, that even if the search is restricted so that 
an adjective immediately follows first look/appear the prediction is still confirmed. The 
following searches are carried out in COCA. 
Table 31 COCA searches for first-adjective 
Favored Disfavored 
first [appear] [adj.] 
[appear] [adj.] at first 
first [look] [adj.] 
[look] [adj.] at first 
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Table 32 Total COCA occurrences of look and appear in 
the presence and absence of first-adjective 
 first-adjective present first-adjective absent 
 N % N % 
appear  37 45 113172 15 
look  46 55 640288 85 
Total 83 100 753460 100 
p < .0001     
4.2.3   Using comparative adjectives to support INITIATION 
(25) Objects in mirror are closer than they appear. (posted on the side mirror of 
vehicles) 
 
(26) Here are six ways that passenger vehicle motorists can help to keep motorcyclists 
safe on the roads: […] 2. It can be tough to judge a motorcycle’s speed. Before inching 
out into an intersection, assume a motorcycle is closer than it looks. 
(http://www.vanweylaw.com/blog/motorcycle-safety-lawyer-motorcyclists-deserve-
respect-too.cfm) 
Beginning with (25), notice again that look could have been used here (and seem too, for that 
matter). But appear is the form attested and its choice can be explained in light of the hypothesis. 
At the first moment it is perceived, the object in the mirror may be deemed far; but, in fact, 
unlike the perceiver may initially suppose, it is close. Evidence for a message of initial 
perception comes from the use of -er than, which simultaneously alludes to two different states 
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of affairs; in this case, one which is merely perceived and another which is real. The use of -er 
than thus renders the visual features as only tentative, an initial approximation, and because, by 
hypothesis, the meaning of appear is INITIATION OF PERCEPTION this tentativeness is also here 
suggested by the use of appear. The meaning of appear has been chosen because the message 
involves immediately overriding the given attribution. 
 In (26), while the use of -er than still suggests that the visual features characterized as 
close are possibly only tentative, the use of look, by hypothesis, does not. Rather, the writer 
chose look because the theme of the text involves visual attention to motorcyclists on the road, 
and, by hypothesis, ATTENTION, VISUAL is the meaning of look. Contextual evidence for the 
notion of attention is found in tough to judge, which involves an agent directing their attention to 
the motorcycle in an attempt to determine its speed. What is important is that the choice of look 
on the one hand and of -er than on the other are each made for independent communicative 
effects. 
Following the rationales articulated above, it is predicted that appear will favor the 
sequence [comparative adjective] than more so than look. The following searches are carried out 
in COCA. 
Table 33 COCA searches for comparative adjectives 
Favored Disfavored 
[comp. adj.] than * [appear] 
more [adj.] than * [appear] 
less [adj.] than * [appear] 
[comp. adj.] than * [look] 
more [adj.] than * [look] 
less [adj.] than * [look] 
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Table 34 Total COCA occurrences of look and appear in 
the presence and absence of comparative adjectives 
 comp. adj. present comp. adj. absent 
 N % N % 
appear 132 30 113077 15 
look 304 70 640030 85 
Total 436 100 753107 100 
p < .0001     
Whereas appear accounts for 15 percent of the look-appear total in the neutralized condition, in 
the presence of a comparative adjective appear rises to 30 percent of the total. This supports the 
presence of INITIATION in the hypothesized meaning of appear and its absence in the meaning of 
look. 
It is worth pointing out that example (25) – but not (26) – alludes to a kind of optical 
illusion. Indeed, the meaning of appear is suitable for messages involving optical illusions 
because it specifically concerns the initial moment of visual perception, allowing thereby for the 
possibility of a different perception at subsequent moments. An optical illusion strikes one as 
having certain visual features, but because it is an illusion, these visual features do not in fact 
obtain. For instance, at the initial moment of perception, it may appear that the sun and the moon 
are the same size (example from Wikipedia, Optical Illusions), but then this is an illusion, so 
actually they are not. Indeed, it is of interest to note that, while look is by far the more frequent 
form of the two – occurring in COCA about five times more frequently than appear, still, within 
the Wikipedia article Optical Illusions (April, 2015) it is the form appear that outnumbers look 
by a ratio of three to one.  
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4.2.4   Using but to support INITIATION 
(27) As semiaquatic rodents, beavers have closable ears and nostrils, webbed hind feet 
and very dense fur coats. Their paddle-like tails appear to be covered in scales like a 
fish, but they aren’t. Rather, the skin is grooved in a scaly pattern which makes the thick 
tail more flexible. (Plaque at the American Museum of Natural History) 
 
(28) If you can’t afford to have garments altered, try different brands or designers until 
you find the one that fits you perfectly. Small Details Make a Big Difference. Two items 
of clothing may look exactly alike, but subtle variations can dramatically alter how it 
looks on you. (Ebony) 
In (27), appear is chosen because the message involves a contrast between an initial 
approximation and a subsequent realization. Evidence for the initial aspect in the message comes 
from but they aren’t and rather, indicating that the preceding information is only an initial 
semblance; indeed, recall from Chapter III that but is used to override information preceding it 
(Crupi 2004). 
 In (28), but is still used to override the information that precedes it, but look is chosen to 
suggest a message feature of visual attention, which is evidenced throughout the text. First, the 
text provides fashion advice, a topic clearly associated with attention to visual features. Second, 
until you find the one that fits you perfectly suggests assessment and decision, acts that clearly 
require conscious thought and attention. Third, small details alludes to visual details, and these 
can make a big difference only if someone pays attention to them. 
Because, as demonstrated in the analyses above, appear and a following but together 
suggest a message concerning an initial approximation, whereas look and a following but 
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contribute each to non-overlapping message effects, we predict that appear will favor a 
following but more so than look
37
. The following searches are carried out in COCA.  
Table 35 COCA searches for but 
Favored Disfavored 
[appear] * but 
[appear] * * but 
[appear] * * * but 
[appear] * * * * but 
[appear] * * * * * but 
[look] * but 
[look] * * but 
[look] * * * but 
[look] * * * * but 
[look] * * * * * but 
 
Table 36 Total COCA occurrences of look and 
appear in the presence and absence of but 
 but present but absent 
 N % N % 
appear 778 22 112431 15 
look 2823 78 637511 85 
Total 3601 100 749942 100 
p < .0001     
In the context of a following but, appear accounts for 22 percent of the look-appear total. While 
this is an increase of only 7 percent from the neutralized condition, as indicated by the p value, 
this favoring is highly significant statistically.  
                                                          
37
 Note that in Chapter III it was predicted that look will favor a preceding but whereas the prediction now involves a 
following but. In both cases we rely on Crupi’s (2004) hypothesis that but involves the overriding of preceding 
information. 
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4.3   Messages involving visual features: look versus appearance 
We first note that further research is required to determine whether the appear in appearance is 
the same signal as in the hypothesis presented in Figure 3 above. For our purposes, we will see 
that appearance can be treated as a derived form that more or less retains the same meaning as 
appear.   
Let us compare the expressions in (29) and (30), all attested.  
(29)  
(a) Keeping up appearances. 
(b) Please pardon our appearance during construction. 
(30)  
(a) You shouldn’t rely on your looks to get what you need and want. 
(b) It’s the new look. 
First, appearance is chosen in (29) because both of these expressions communicate a message 
that involves the notion of initiation: keeping up appearances is used to refer to a person who 
consistently wants to maintain the effect of a first impression, never going any deeper but always 
remaining on the surface; pardon our appearance is used for messages involving temporary 
states of affairs, indicating how the visual features are now, but suggesting, by hypothesis, 
through the use of appear, that they will change soon. By contrast, look is chosen in (30) because 
here both expressions involve attention to visual features. As has already been discussed in 
Chapter II, a person who relies on their looks expects special treatment from other people, 
contingent on them noticing (and hence being affected by) the person’s visual features. And, 
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when a fashion magazine declares some style to be the new look, then the message is that the 
visual characteristics of this style currently catch the (fashion tuned) public’s attention.  
The following attested examples provide further evidence for the different 
communicative effect of look and appearance, now specifically in alluding to the visual features 
of someone’s face. 
(31) [Dominique’s father, Francon, wants to set up a date between Dominique and 
Peter. Francon invites both Dominique and Peter for a lunch without Dominique knowing 
of the setup. Dominique begins:] “It was wonderful of you to take time off to see me, 
Father. Particularly when you’re so busy and have so many appointments.” Francon’s 
face assumed a look of consternation. “My God, Dominique, that reminds me!” “You 
have an appointment you forgot?” she asked gently. “Confound it, yes! It slipped my 
mind entirely. Old Andrew Colson phoned this morning and I forgot to make a note of it 
and he insisted on seeing me at two o’clock, you know how it is, I just simply can’t 
refuse to see Andrew Colson, confound it!--today of all...” He added, suspiciously: “How 
did you know it?” “Why, I didn’t know it at all. It’s perfectly all right, Father. Mr. 
Keating and I will excuse you, and we’ll have a lovely luncheon together. (The 
Fountainhead) 
(32) [Peter has come over to Katie’s apt.] He sat down and stretched out his arm in 
silent invitation. She came to him promptly, she put her hand in his, and he pulled her 
down to the arm of his chair. The lamplight fell on him, and she had recovered enough to 
notice the appearance of his face. “Peter,” she gasped, “what have you been doing to 
yourself? You look awful.” “Drinking.” “Not...like that!” “Like that…” “Darling...what 
have they done to you?” (The Fountainhead) 
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Beginning with (31), the author here chose look because Francon is visually attending to 
Dominique while deliberately and willfully assuming a particular facial expression. Note that 
Francon’s look of consternation is made for Dominique’s sake, that is, it is essential to his plan 
that Dominique will pay attention to his face as he assumes the expression. His plan works, as 
indicated by Dominique asking You have an appointment you forgot?  
By contrast, in (32) there is no evidence that Peter intends for Katie to pay attention to the 
visual features of his face. Indeed, Peter does not assume a facial expression, but rather the visual 
features of his face are as they are whether or not Katie is paying attention to them. The author 
chose appear because the message involves the visual features of Peter’s face suddenly entering 
Katie’s perception. Note the contextual evidence. First, the lamplight fell on him suggests that 
previously Peter was rather in the dark and only now Katie first sees him in a proper light. 
Second, she had recovered enough suggests a message involving how the image of his face is 
taking shape for her. Lastly, in response to what she suddenly sees, she gasped, indicating her 
shock as she sees Peter’s face for the first time38. Examples (31) and (32) thus illustrate how the 
same author sometimes chooses look and sometimes appearance in response to different 
intended effects on the message; look is chosen because the message concerns attention to visual 
features while appearance is chosen because the message involves visual features first entering 
one’s perception. 
We turn now to one final pair of examples, again contrasting look and appearance, this 
time both forms used in reference to Dominique.  
                                                          
38
 Notice that appearance is used by the omniscient narrator, describing from an outside perspective how Peter’s 
face suddenly entered Katie’s field of vision, whereas Katie herself utters look awful. Katie uses look because she, in 
her utterance, communicates a message involving her concerns having visually attended to Peter’s face. 
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(33) [Before Peter has ever seen Dominique] He [=Peter] looked at Francon’s squat 
figure and wondered what appearance his daughter must have inherited to earn her 
father’s so obvious disfavor. (The Fountainhead) 
(34) [After Peter has met Dominique for the first time:] “Well?” Francon asked 
ominously. Keating smiled. “You’re a pig, Guy. You don’t know how to appreciate what 
you’ve got. Why didn’t you tell me? She’s the most beautiful woman I’ve ever seen.” 
“Oh, yes,” said Francon darkly. “Maybe that’s the trouble.” “What trouble? Where do 
you see any trouble?” “What do you really think of her, Peter? Forget the looks. You’ll 
see how quickly you’ll forget that. What do you think?” (The Fountainhead) 
Beginning with (33), note first that look would seem inappropriate here because inherited 
visual features are as they are regardless of whether or not anyone is paying attention. The author 
chose appearance because, first, inherited visual features emerge with birth, and further, they are 
inherently provisional, subject to change throughout one’s life. In (34), by contrast, look is 
chosen because Peter has seen Dominique and has clearly paid attention to her visual features. 
This is evidenced by the fact that he is somewhat upset at Francon because he doesn’t know how 
to appreciate what he’s got and because he didn’t tell Peter of her beauty; Peter even exclaims 
that Dominique is the most beautiful woman he has ever seen. Lastly, forget the looks and what 
do you think are used by Francon to get Peter to quit attending to her visual features and direct 
attention instead to her personality. 
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5   Conclusion 
This chapter has offered tentative meaning hypotheses for the forms see, seem and appear. These 
hypotheses, along with the meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL, explain speakers’ expressive choices 
between look and each of these other forms. The forms differ from one another along several 
semantic parameters, according to their respective meanings. We have seen that see and look 
differ on the basis of the semantic parameters of attention and experiencing. When the speaker 
wants to highlight attention in the visual act then look is chosen, and when the speaker wants to 
highlight the registering of visual stimuli then see is chosen. We have also seen that this 
registering aspect in the meaning of see explains its relatively frequent co-occurrence with LESS 
CONTROL, as both meanings contribute to a message involving a controlling role to the object of 
perception in bringing about the visual event. Then we have seen that look and seem differ on the 
basis of the semantic parameters of visual and perspective dependency. When the message 
concerns a visual attribute then look is chosen; when the message concerns an abstract or 
intellectual attribution then seem is chosen. Seem is also chosen when the speaker wants to 
underscore the attribution as stemming from a particular perspective, as was evidenced by the 
frequent co-occurrence of seem with to me and at the time. Finally it was demonstrated that look 
and appear differ on the basis of the semantic parameters of attention and initiation. We have 
seen that when the message involves an attribution being tentative or merely an initial 
approximation then appear is chosen. It was lastly shown that in messages involving visual 
features only look may imply that these features are attention-worthy or attention-grabbing. 
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CHAPTER V 
Competing analyses of the meaning of look 
1   Introduction 
The case has been made that the hypothesized meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL successfully explains 
why look occurs where it does in texts, as characterized in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms, including why look is chosen where see, seem and appear may initially appear as 
plausible alternatives. This chapter reviews three competing proposals of the meaning of look 
and explicates why I believe that the hypothesis provided here constitutes a more comprehensive 
explanation of the distribution of look than the other hypotheses found in the literature. In 
particular, our hypothesis is the only one that has led to the discovery of new large-scale 
distributional patterns not previously noted, much less explained. Throughout this chapter we 
will return to some of the themes that were introduced in Chapter I and see how they impact the 
analyses of other researchers, including (a) the issue of beginning analysis with the adoption of 
the a priori grammatical categories, (b) the issue of limiting one’s dataset to sentences 
constructed by the analyst, and (c) the issue of identifying linguistically encoded meaning with 
fractions of the interpretive whole.  
Briefly, the analyses to be reviewed are the following. The first proposal comes from a 
generative approach to language acquisition presented in Landau and Gleitman (1985) 
(henceforth, LG) that offers a componential analysis of the meaning of look. The second 
proposal comes from a construction grammar analysis presented in Wierzbicka (1988) who 
posits a meaning to the putative construction have a look. Finally, the third proposal comes from 
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a study presented in Tobin (1993) who offers, as we do, meaning hypotheses to explain the 
distributions of look and see. Tobin’s analysis, while akin to a CS-style meaning hypothesis, 
nonetheless relies, as we will see, on the notion of markedness – an a priori theoretical apparatus 
generally not appealed to in CS hypotheses. Each of these proposals will now be explicated in 
turn. 
2   A componential analysis 
LG’s analysis of the meaning of look is part of a larger enterprise carried in the spirit of 
Chomsky’s well known argument of the poverty of the stimulus. LG’s essential argument is that 
external input from speech events provides insufficient evidence for learning a verb’s meaning, 
and so, they propose, the set of subcategorization frames of a verb provides crucial clues for a 
child to figure out what the meaning of a verb is (1985:138). Accordingly, each of the syntactic 
environments within which the verb look regularly occurs is taken to be indicative of some 
aspect of its meaning.  
Note that in our analysis as well, we have relied on the linguistic contexts within which 
look regularly occurs to formulate and support our meaning hypothesis. Unlike LG, however, we 
did not bias our investigation and examine only cases where look co-occurs with act or event-
suggesting grammatical forms (e.g., -ed). Moreover, and as discussed extensively in Chapter I, 
we recognize that a hypothesized meaning need not be identified with the messages or message 
partials that the form is used to communicate. But, because LG do seem to identify the 
linguistically encoded meaning with the communicated message, they inevitably conclude that, 
because look occurs in multiple syntactic environments, its meaning involves multiple 
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components (1985:144), each component corresponding to some partial of the message that is 
communicated in each syntactic environment in which look occurs.  
First, LG note that look is regularly used with locative prepositions, such as to, into, up, 
down, back, forward, behind, etc. Following Gruber (1967), LG appeal to the intuition that, 
when one looks then one’s gaze is moving along a path in the direction indicated by the locative 
(1985:128-9). They conclude therefore that one component in the meaning of look is ‘motion’. In 
order to distinguish look from other ‘verbs of motion’, such as come and go, LG posit another 
meaning component in look, ‘perceptual’. The subcategorization frame that is hypothesized to 
facilitate the acquisition of this component of the meaning of look is the fact that look – unlike 
come and go – occurs with ‘how-relatives’, such as in look how I do it (1985:130). To continue, 
because both ‘motion’ and ‘perceptual’ also figure as components in the meaning proposed for 
see, in order to distinguish look from see LG note that look occurs significantly more frequently 
than see both as an imperative (Look!) and in the progressive (looking), leading them to posit that 
yet another component in the meaning of look – absent in the meaning of see – is ‘activity’ 
(1985:133).  
 Now when LG come to occurrences of look as found in He looks like a kangaroo, they 
seem uncertain whether this presents the same, or a different, lexical entry from the look found in 
cases like He looked at the picture (1985:142-4). The meaning components they posited so far – 
‘motion’, ‘perception’ and ‘activity’ – seem to them to be insufficient to explain these uses of 
look, and so they initially propose that look like is a special type of construction meaning either 
‘resemble’ or ‘appear’ (1985:143). But then they note that a meaning component they call 
‘inspect by eye’ may be seen as applicable to both He looked at the picture and to He looks like a 
kangaroo because, even in He looks like a kangaroo, an agent inspecting by eye is implicit and 
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can be made explicit with the addition of to me. They therefore provisionally conclude that it is 
the same verb look in both cases.  
In this dissertation, too, it has been argued that it is the same sign (not verb) look in both 
of these cases. It is of interest to note, however, that the consequence of it being the same look in 
both cases simplifies our analysis yet complicates LG’s (which is partially why they are hesitant 
in proposing it). Our own analysis is simplified because the hypothesis of a single sign has been 
shown to successfully explain by itself the full range of the distribution of look. LG’s analysis, 
byntrast, becomes more complex because now they have the same look in quite different 
syntactic patterns, and “a construal rule of some complexity would be required to relate the 
surface form required in these cases (patient as subject NP, experiencer as indirect object NP, 
and so on) [e.g., He looks like a kangaroo, N.S] to the more familiar formats [e.g., He looked at 
a kangaroo, N.S] in which look participates” (1985:144). Note the use of the expression 
“relate… to the more familiar formats”, suggesting that for LG some syntactic patterns in which 
look occurs are in some sense primary and require other (surface) syntactic patterns to be 
assimilated to them through some theoretical mechanism
39
.  
 Alongside the syntactic analysis, LG report a number of experiments that examine blind 
and sighted people’s behavior to commands involving look. It is outside the scope of this 
dissertation to review these experiments, but two conclusions LG come to are worth mentioning. 
The first is that, while for sighted people the meaning of look consists of a ‘visual’ component, 
for blind people the meaning seems to have instead a ‘haptic’ (i.e. relating to touch) component; 
and the second is that for both blind and sighted people the meaning of look centrally involves a 
                                                          
39
 In our analysis of look, no syntactically defined pattern is seen as primary in any way. We do consider, however, 
the visual uses of look to be, in a sense, primary in comparison to the purely intellectual usages (e.g., look carefully 
at the problem), and we have appealed to the mechanism of conceptual metaphor to explain such usages. The appeal 
to conceptual metaphor has been motivated on cognitive grounds, as explicated in Chapter II.  
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component LG call ‘exploratory’. As regards the first point, we believe that LG’s conclusion is 
right and provides a good demonstration that the meaning of a form may be different for 
different people even within the same speech community, especially when real-world limitations 
(such as blindness) are involved. As regards the second point, LG are led to posit ‘exploratory’ in 
the meaning because, when given an object and told to look at it, the subjects in the experiment 
would seem to closely examine the object as opposed to merely glancing at it – in the case of the 
sighted subjects – or merely tapping it – in the case of the blind subjects. Note that our meaning 
of ATTENTION may explain this behavioral response equally well. Furthermore, our hypothesis – 
unlike EXPLORATORY – has explained large-scale distributional patterns that follow specifically 
from the notion of ATTENTION. For instance, the fact that look favors a preceding but in 
comparison to a preceding and has to do with the thematic importance of subsequent information 
in the text, as suggested both by the override effect of the use of but as well as by the use of the 
meaning ATTENTION. Similarly, the fact that look favors at in comparison to on or in has to do 
with the narrowing of the visual field, as suggested both by the use of the meaning ZERO-
DIMENSIONAL LOCATION and again by the use of the meaning ATTENTION. It is difficult to see 
how EXPLORATORY could explain these and the other patterns noted in Chapters III and IV. 
It will now be shown that (a) LG’s componential analysis is filled with redundancy, 
positing in the meaning more than is necessary to account for the form’s distribution; (b) their 
reliance on subcategorization frames leads them to misattribution, positing in the meaning 
elements that likely come from surrounding contextual features; and (c) their initial framing of 
the data in terms of the traditional a priori syntactic categories – that is, the fact that the object of 
study is the acquisition of verbs – limits the dataset and assumes in advance of analysis that there 
is more than one linguistic unit look. 
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 First, then, seeing as the proposed meaning includes a component of ‘visual’ there is 
really no reason to posit in addition the component ‘perceptual’, because the notion of visual 
may by itself facilitate the inference of messages involving perception. LG have been led to 
‘perceptual’ to differentiate look from come and go – other verbs that are posited to have 
‘motion’ in their meaning, but ‘visual’ would have done the job equally well. Similarly, seeing as 
the meaning includes a component of ‘exploratory’ then there is no reason to posit in addition a 
component of ‘activity’, because the notion of exploratory by itself suggests messages involving 
activity. And again, if the meaning includes the components ‘visual’ and ‘exploratory’ then there 
is no reason to posit in addition to these the component ‘inspection by eye’, because the notions 
of visual and exploratory are together sufficient to lead speakers to the inference of messages 
involving inspection by eye. It is finally worth noting that neither of the meaning components 
‘exploratory’, ‘activity’ or ‘inspection by eye’ has lead LG to quantitative co-occurrence 
predictions of the type that the hypothesis of ATTENTION has been able to make, as has also been 
mentioned above.  
Turning to the issue of misattribution, recall that the reason for positing ‘motion’ as a 
component in the meaning of look is its co-occurrence with locative prepositions (e.g., look up). 
But the notion of motion may well be contributed by the use of the locative itself (e.g., up) as 
well as other contextual features. If it were treated as a CS hypothesis, it would have to be shown 
that MOTION consistently contributes to the inference of message partials that are suggested by 
the use of look regardless of whether or not look co-occurs with forms that are indicative of 
location or direction. It is difficult to see, however, what MOTION might contribute in cases such 
as, say, I like his new look or She’s good looking, where no locative is present and where the 
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intuition that one’s gaze moves along a path seems quite irrelevant to the communicated 
message.  
Finally, LG have biased their analysis by completely ignoring any occurrence of look 
where it is used with entity-suggesting morphology (e.g., the look). Indeed, they fail to even 
address the issue that some of the meaning components they propose – such as ‘activity’ and 
‘exploratory’ – are notions that straightforwardly contradict many of the quite common uses of 
look. The hypothesis proposed here has not restricted the dataset just to cases where look co-
occurs with verbal morphology and has consequently achieved a more comprehensive 
explanation of the distribution of look.  
Before we turn to the next section, we may briefly mention the work of Levin (1993) who 
similarly offers a componential analysis of verb meaning. Levin argues that the semantic 
components that make up a verb determine the verb’s syntactic behavior, particularly its 
expression of argument structure (1993:10-11). Like LG, Levin posits several meaning 
components in look to accommodate its different syntactic behaviors. She classifies look as (a) a 
‘peer verb’ (along with, e.g., gape) – a class of verbs characterized for taking a PP complement, 
typically at; (b) a ‘stimulus subject perception verb’ (along with, e.g., smell) – a class of verbs 
that take the stimulus as a subject and have an AdjP complement predicated of the stimulus (and 
a perceiver argument is optionally expressed in a PP); and (c) a ‘rummage verb’ (along with, 
e.g., listen) – a class of verbs that take two PP complements: the object being searched (typically 
with for), as well as the location (typically with in).  
We agree with LG and Levin that regular patterns of co-occurrence of a given form 
follow from and may be indicative of the sign’s (not verb) meaning. However, whereas Levin 
and LG can only point to correlations between the meaning components they propose and the 
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syntactic patterns the form occurs in, we have been able to go beyond the correlation and offer an 
actual explanation of why a form with a certain meaning regularly appears in the environments 
that it does. For instance, Levin does nothing more than state that look regularly co-occurs with 
at, whereas we have explained why this is so. Indeed, we have explained at great length in 
Chapters III and IV that look regularly co-occurs at greater than chance frequency with numerous 
other forms because its meaning, by hypothesis, contributes to the same aspect of the message as 
is contributed by the other form involved.  
Note, further, that Levin characterizes the facts of the distribution of look in terms of 
abstract syntactic categories, such as PP – categories that are a priori with respect to the analysis 
of look – rather than in terms of units that are closer to the observation, such as at. The move to 
greater abstraction would be justified if it achieved greater explanatory power; but, in fact, our 
analysis of look has offered far more nuanced explanations of the distribution of look. For 
example, we have explained why look favors at in comparison to on or in despite the fact that all 
three sequences are found to occur, or why look – in comparison to see – disfavors the meaning 
LESS CONTROL, again, though both sequences occur. Finally, note that both LG and Levin derive 
the components in the meaning of look solely from an examination of patterns of co-occurrence 
that they already knew about prior to setting out to hypothesize what the meaning of look might 
be. Our meaning hypothesis, by contrast, has led us to the discovery of new distributional 
patterns, ones that were not known prior to the hypothesis. 
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3   A construction grammar analysis 
Wierzbicka (1988) presents a construction grammar approach; she maintains that grammatical 
constructions are expressive devices that carry invariable meanings, and that the distribution of 
constructions is fully determined by their semantic values: “every grammatical construction is a 
vehicle of a certain semantic structure; and this is its raison d’être, and the criterion determining 
its range of use” (1988:3). Replacing the term grammatical construction with sign, Wierzbicka’s 
position appears quite aligned with our own. But there are at least two major differences. First, 
unlike our own approach, Wierzbicka’s goal is not to explain the distribution of forms but rather 
to offer a semantic description: “we always keep in mind our main goal: an integrated semantic 
description of natural language” (1988:3). Thus, meanings are not treated as hypotheses intended 
to explain distributions (both known and newly discovered), but rather the goal is to find the best 
description for distributional facts that are already known to the analyst in advance of the 
analysis. A corollary of this approach is that Wierzbicka fails to appeal to attested linguistic data 
as we have done, instead constructing decontextualized sentences and classifying some sentences 
as grammatical and others as ungrammatical. Wierzbicka’s position further differs from ours in 
that she holds that individual lexical forms do not have meanings in isolation and receive 
meaning only when they occur within constructions: “the notion of the meaning of a word in 
isolation is in any case a fiction […] one cannot really say what a verb […] means, one can only 
say what a phrase […] means” (1988:8). In other words, Wierzbicka adopts a version of the 
compositional view of meaning
40
, and maintains that the meaning of a grammatical construction 
                                                          
40
 Unlike formal compositional approaches, Wierzbicka is quite explicit that the attempts to develop a semantics 
based on the notions of reference and truth have failed to be descriptively adequate. Rather than involving a relation 
between language and the world, Wierzbicka holds that meaning in natural language has more to do with how 
humans interpret the world: meaning is subjective and anthropocentric, reflecting cultural concerns and culture 
specific modes of interaction (1988:2).  
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is primary while the meanings of the component parts of the construction are derived from, and 
receive their value only relative to, the meaning of the construction as a whole (1988:9)
41
.  
It may be noted that Wierzbicka is reluctant to agree that words have meaning in isolation 
because it appears to her that the meaning of an individual word changes from context to context. 
Of course, as explained at length in Chapter I, this only seems to be the case when meaning is 
identified with the communicated message. Wierzbicka does believe, however, that grammatical 
constructions have stable invariant meanings. But below we will see that her proposed meaning 
for have a look fails to explain many of the attested uses of this putative construction.  
 Wierzbicka’s analysis is of the putative construction have a V42, in which look may figure 
(have a look). To get at the meaning of the construction, Wierzbicka examines the differences 
between the uses of a verb generally and the uses of the same verb in the have a V construction 
particularly. The first difference Wierzbicka notes is aspectual: the periphrastic construction 
presents the action as limited in time (1988:297). Wierzbicka thus asserts that “one cannot say 
[…] ?I had a long look”. Had Wierzbicka examined attested data she would not have been able 
to make this statement. Indeed, there seems to be nothing incoherent about the example below.  
(1) I displaced a rock in Tennessee. Underneath, huddled at one edge of the exposed dirt, was 
a colony of ants. The slender ants moved slowly in the cool spring morning, and 
I had a long look at them before they vanished down their hole. (Natural History 
Magazine) 
Second, Wierzbicka notes that the action reported by the construction cannot have an 
external goal: it must be aimless, or aimed at some experience of the agent performing the action 
                                                          
41
 One wonders why language users would bother to derive the meanings of words in a construction if they already 
had the meaning of the construction; and why would an analyst do it? 
42
 Wierzbicka distinguishes between have a V and have a N, and for reasons not to be discussed here she classifies 
look in the former construction.  
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(1988:298). Again, attested examples do not seem to corroborate this requirement. In the 
example below the action reported by have a look certainly seems to have an external goal: 
finding a present for Uncle Steve. 
(2) We’re going to have a look for your Uncle Steve’s birthday present. (Today’s Parent) 
Third, Wierzbicka claims that the action must be seen as repeatable, something that can 
be done again and again. Actions which cannot be repeated cannot be described by the have a V 
construction (1988:299). But, it is difficult to explicate what precisely makes an action 
repeatable, rendering this hypothesis unfalsifiable. Wierzbicka explains that, for instance, one 
can have a bite because one can bite their sandwich again and again; yet, she continues, one 
cannot have an eat (this sequence marked as ungrammatical) because once one’s sandwich has 
been eaten it cannot be eaten again. But, by the same token, we may say that once a bite has been 
bitten, that bite cannot be bitten again; or, after having eaten a sandwich, one can go on to eat 
another sandwich, and then another one. Who is to say if an action can or cannot be seen as 
repeatable? At any rate, the repeatability of the action often does not seem to contribute to the 
interpretation of texts where have a look occurs. Consider again example (1), where the speaker 
had a long look at the ants until they vanished down their hole; there seems to be nothing in the 
communicated message that involves the repeatability of the action. 
On the basis of these three criteria – action limited in time, no external goal and 
repeatability – Wierzbicka postulates the following semantic invariant: “The have a V 
construction is agentive, experiencer-oriented, antidurative, and reiterative” (1988:300). But as 
our attested counterexamples demonstrate, this semantic invariant appears to be at odds with the 
facts.   
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 Now Wierzbicka continues to explain that her tentative meaning would wrongly predict 
that people should also say things like have a kneel-down, which she marks as ungrammatical. 
This data leads her to add another semantic component to her posited meaning to the effect that 
the have a V construction implies that the activity is enjoyable, pleasurable or potentially good 
for the agent (1988:301). Have a kneel-down is then ruled out because, Wierzbicka maintains, it 
is not seen as an enjoyable action. But then, Wierzbicka acknowledges, this additional 
component in the meaning seems to be at odds with the possibility of utterances such as It’s 
awful – just have a look at it! where the possibility of an enjoyable effect is certainly not implied. 
Such data motivates Wierzbicka to classify perception verbs as a special subtype of the have a V 
construction. This subtype has the additional meaning of an action “which could cause one to 
find out (to come to know) something about something” (1988:302). Still, this is argued to be a 
subtype of the general have a V construction because even here, Wierzbicka argues, the action 
implies a beneficial (even if not enjoyable) effect “since obtaining knowledge would be 
generally described as something good rather than bad” (1988:302). Note that here Wierzbicka 
posits a semantic description which depends on the analyst’s personal views on the value of 
knowledge. But even conceding that point, there seems to be cases where no beneficial effect to 
the agent is implied.  
(3) Hate to be a pain but could you maybe just have a quick look in these files to see if they 
are correct please? (http://modthesims.info/d/archive/index.php?t-505906.html) 
In this example, the speaker seems to imply quite the opposite of a “potential mental gain” 
(1988:306) to the agent (hate to be a pain but could you maybe just… please); indeed, the 
purpose of the action here is entirely for the benefit of the person making the request and not at 
all for the benefit of the person performing the action, thus again, also falsifying Wierzbicka’s 
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claim that the have a V construction cannot be used when the goal of performing the action is 
external to the agent.  
 Finally, Wierzbicka claims that the perception-verb subtype of the Have a V construction 
adds to the meaning of the verb the idea of a half-hearted, casual, and not totally serious effort: 
“the expression have a look at seems to suggest a lack of zeal and commitment” (1988:306). Yet 
again, attested examples seem to falsify this proposed semantic component.  
(4) We need to have a long, hard, serious look at airport departure tax—and I know the 
Chancellor would have a cardiac arrest but the sums stack up. 
(http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmniaf/53/5030110.htm) 
In sum, the main problem with Wierzbicka’s analysis is that she tries to identify the 
meaning of the construction exclusively on the basis of introspectively-derived data (i.e., 
constructed sentences judged for grammaticality) rather than objectively observable facts of 
actual language use. Once attested examples are examined, each and every one of the meaning 
components she proposes for have a look has been falsified. Notice, further, that Wierzbicka’s 
analysis cannot make predictions of the sort we have been making. For example, in Chapter I we 
demonstrated that look favors careful in comparison to first. There does not appear to be 
anything in Wierzbicka’s analysis that could lead to this prediction. In fact, her claim that the 
have a look construction has a meaning component involving a casual action would seem to 
predict that careful should actually not be favored. Similarly, in Chapter III we have shown that 
have a look favors this in comparison to the. Again Wierzbicka’s proposal would have no way of 
predicting or explaining this favoring. Lastly, Wierzbicka offers no explanation of the well-
known fact that have a look, much like look in isolation, favors at in comparison to on or in 
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despite all three sequences found to occur. This piece of data was not shown in Chapter III, and 
so we end this section with offering it here now.  
Table 1 COCA searches for at, on and in 
(for have a look) 
Favored Disfavored 
[have] a look at [have] a look on 
[have] a look in 
 
Table 2 Total COCA occurrences of at, on and in in the presence 
and absence of have a look 
 have a look present have a look absent 
 N % N % 
at  486 91 2265757 16 
on  24 5 3134810 23 
in  21 4 8363166 61 
Total 531 100 13763733 100 
The hypothesis of ATTENTION, VISUAL explains this data much as it explains the favoring by look 
for at when have is absent; positing have a look as a construction does not add here any 
explanatory strength.   
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4   A markedness analysis 
Tobin (1993) has a similar goal to that of the analysis proposed here, that is, to explain speakers’ 
expressive choices of look and of see. Tobin’s hypothesis is as follows. First, look and see share 
the meaning VISUAL; the two signs differ, however, due to a semantic parameter called RESULT, 
for which see is claimed to be marked and look is claimed to be neutral or, unmarked (1993:63-
5). Accordingly, see expresses a visual action, state or event that is specifically seen from the 
point of view of its RESULT, which involves the reception of visual sensory input (e.g., He saw 
the picture); look, by contrast, expresses a visual action state or event which may or may not 
involve a RESULT (e.g., He looked at the picture involving a result, versus He looked but saw 
nothing not involving a result).  
 By giving look the unmarked meaning, Tobin intends to explain why look is used much 
more diversely than see, e.g., in all of He looked at me, He looked blankly, He looked but didn’t 
see, He looks happy, his new look, etc. These utterances all communicate message partials 
involving VISUAL yet none, it is argued, is specifically seen from the point of view of RESULT, 
and some do not involve RESULT at all. On the other hand, by Tobin’s hypothesis, the notion of 
RESULT is always contributed by the use of see, even if the visual stimulus is only implicit. For 
example, the meaning RESULT explains the use of see in I see well with these glasses because the 
message involves the reception of visual sensory input in a particular manner. 
 While Tobin appeals to the unmarked status of the meaning of look to explain the more 
diverse distribution of this form, its unmarked status alone is incapable of explaining on what 
basis speakers choose look over see when ‘result’ is a feature of the message being 
communicated. For example, why do speakers sometimes say look at it and sometimes see it if 
both utterances may communicate a message partial involving the reception of visual sensory 
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input? To account for the distribution of look, therefore, Tobin also defines the unmarked status 
of look in positive terms, explaining that being unmarked for RESULT amounts to having the 
meaning PROCESS
43
. Thus, his hypothesized meaning for look may be rendered VISUAL PROCESS. 
By this hypothesis, the reason speakers would choose look as opposed to see in, say, look at it is 
that they want to contribute specifically to a message partial involving visual process. But, if 
look invariably contributes the semantic notion of PROCESS, as Tobin’s analysis clearly intends to 
demonstrate (see the micro-level analysis on pp. 65-70), then what does the hypothesis of its 
unmarked status add to the explanation? In other words, if the explanation anyway must always 
appeal to the notion of PROCESS, then why not make the simpler claim – the one that avoids the a 
priori postulation of a markedness category in the grammar – and just hypothesize VISUAL 
PROCESS as the meaning of look
44
? 
 Now VISUAL PROCESS seems a rather unconvincing explanation for why speakers choose 
look over see. For example, it is not quite clear that the notion of PROCESS plays a role in 
utterances such as You look beautiful. Tobin explains the use of look in such cases as follows: 
“these examples describe a process of how someone or something […] is developing and 
progressing as it is being observed, usually at the time of encoding” (1993:65, emphasis in 
original). But a different interpretation of these utterances may be that the message actually 
concerns the result, not process, of the visual event because it is precisely the reception of visual 
sensory input that enables one to make the judgment or attribution communicated through these 
                                                          
43
 Tobin initially states that when the unmarked form look is used then the visual action “may be viewed either from 
the point of view of a PROCESS and/or a RESULT” (1993:63-4; emphasis, N.S), implying that look does not 
necessarily contribute to a message feature of ‘process’. But then, if look can contribute to a message feature of 
‘result’ while not contributing to a message feature of ‘process’ then it is difficult to explain why speakers would 
ever choose look as opposed to see. And indeed, in the course of actual analyses, Tobin repeatedly appeals to the 
notion of ‘process’ in explaining why look occurs where it does. 
44
 It may be noted that such a hypothesis would not preclude the reception of visual sensory input from being a 
feature of the communicated message; only this feature would be an inference following from the meaning PROCESS 
as well as other contextual clues which may be present. 
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utterances. Tobin’s analysis relies on his own subjective interpretation of examples, without 
appealing to redundant information in texts where look occurs to support his hypothesis.  
Consider now why ATTENTION provides a better explanation than PROCESS for speakers’ 
choice of look. For one, PROCESS cannot explain why look is used in examples such as the 
following, repeated here from Chapter III.  
(5) She stood holding the calendar forward between the tips of her fingers, as if she were a 
photograph with the focus on the calendar and her own figure blurred in its background. 
[…] “Would you like to look at this calendar, Peter?” (The Fountainhead) 
In example (5) Peter certainly needs to visually register the calendar to answer to 
Dominique’s request. Tobin’s hypothesis would have a hard time explaining why look has been 
chosen here rather than see (e.g. why not Would you like to see this calendar, Peter?). But our 
hypothesis has a straightforward answer: look is chosen because Dominique wants Peter to 
attend to the calendar, as is made evident by redundant information in the text (e.g., focus on the 
calendar; this).  
Furthermore, the hypothesis of PROCESS cannot lead the analyst to discover – much less 
explain – the quantitative distributional facts that have been noted in this dissertation. First, with 
respect to the example above, unlike ATTENTION, PROCESS cannot explain why look favors co-
occurrence with this in comparison to the; this favoring has nothing to do with the notion of 
process but it straightforwardly follows from the hypothesis of ATTENTION. Likewise, PROCESS 
will not be able to explain why look favors a preceding but in comparison to a preceding and, or 
why it favors carefully in comparison to carelessly, or even why look favors at in comparison to 
on and in. Similarly, the hypotheses of PROCESS and RESULT for look and see, respectively, 
cannot explain why look – in comparison to see – favors this, or why look favors but, or why 
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look favors notice. Yet all these favorings and more have been explained in terms of the meaning 
hypotheses proposed here. 
In conclusion, unlike LG, Levin and Wierzbicka, our hypothesis has resulted from an 
unbiased and unrestricted dataset and has therefore made it possible to posit just a single look 
with one invariant meaning that, as has been demonstrated throughout this dissertation, can 
successfully explain all occurrences of this form in spoken and written texts. Also unlike LG, 
Levin and Wierzbicka, our analysis has allowed us to go beyond the facts of co-occurrence that 
were known to the analysts prior to their analyses and actually explain why these patterns of co-
occurrence are as they are. Indeed, our research is the only one that has led to the discovery of 
numerous patterns of co-occurrence that were not known prior to the meaning hypotheses 
proposed in this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Theoretical excursus: 
A critique of William Diver’s approach to the grammar-lexicon divide 
and a recapitulation of analytical assumptions and findings 
1   Introduction 
In his thinking about the place of meaning in linguistic theory, William Diver was always careful 
to begin linguistic analyses without framing the observations in terms of the a priori syntactic 
categories of sentence grammar. But the a priori classification of some linguistic forms as 
grammatical and of others as lexical nonetheless remained a feature of Diver’s thinking, much as 
it has for nearly all linguists. The distinction between grammar and lexicon captures an 
impressionistic difference that the meanings of some linguistic forms seem open to introspection 
(e.g., cat) whereas the meanings of others are not (e.g., the). Other seemingly observational 
differences are that grammatical forms, in comparison to lexical forms, tend to be smaller units; 
tend to occur more frequently in texts; and tend to occur as affixes, or satellites, to lexical forms. 
But above all, the reason why this a priori distinction was sustained in the thinking of Diver and 
has continued in others in CS is the fact that – unlike the admittance of the traditional 
grammatical categories (noun, verb, etc.) – the assumption of a grammar and a lexicon had 
seemed (if only implicitly) analytically harmless; indeed, the classification of a form as 
grammatical (as opposed to lexical) has never hindered a successful invariant meaning 
hypothesis. Yet despite this perceived harmlessness, the assumptions that have been associated 
with a grammar-lexicon classification – primarily, the assumption that invariant meanings are the 
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province of grammar alone – have come with a price. These assumptions, as we shall see in the 
next section, were all made a priori and, in light of the apparent strength of the hypotheses of the 
present study, prove rather misguided. The present work has endeavored to demonstrate that an 
invariant meaning hypothesis can succeed quite well in explaining speakers’ choice of a lexical 
form; all that was necessary was to let go of the a priori assumptions regarding the nature of the 
lexicon, and instead proceed to test lexical meaning hypotheses by the same exact analytical 
principles that have normally been applied to grammar. 
Section 2 elaborates the above discussion concerning the differential status of the 
categories of grammar and lexicon in CS. Then, Section 3 will conclude this dissertation with 
some recapitulations of the major findings and contributions of the present work. 
2   The linguistic status of the categories of grammar and lexicon 
Diver (2012: Section 4, 1995 [2012]: Section 3.2.1.4) maintains that grammar and lexicon 
constitute two different types of hypothesis; the essential difference among them involves “the 
way that the meanings in a list relate to each other”. Lexical meanings constitute an open-ended 
list where each meaning stands independent of the meaning of any other form; for example, the 
meaning of cat could be stated without recourse to the meaning of dog, or even of animal 
(though the meanings may well share some semantic content, as has been proposed here for look 
and see). Grammatical meanings, by contrast, cluster in closed lists – systems – where meanings 
stand in a relation of closed opposition to one another and thus mutually define one another
45
; for 
example, the statement of the meaning of that – LESS DEIXIS – depends for its interpretation and 
testing on its opposition to the meaning of this – MORE DEIXIS. In short, a sign is grammatical if 
                                                          
45
 The meanings in a system also typically exhaust the relevant semantic substance. 
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its meaning is systemic, and is lexical if its meaning is independent. I would like to propose here 
that this ought to be recognized as the sole basis for distinguishing between grammar and 
lexicon, because this is the only criterion that allows for the distinction between grammar and 
lexicon to emerge from an analytical procedure that itself is neutral to the distinction
46
.  
Other assumptions that have been associated with the categories of grammar and lexicon 
are all a priori and prove unwarranted in light of the results of the present research. These other 
assumptions (all summarized in The Grammar of Modern English – a Columbia School Primer, 
an unpublished manuscript by Alan Huffman) are: (a) that grammar and lexicon form a 
continuum; (b) that invariant meanings are the province of grammar whereas in the lexicon there 
is polysemy; (c) that due to their lack of systemic opposition, lexical meanings do not constrain 
the choice of one another as do grammatical meanings; and finally (d) that grammatical 
distinctions are imposed by the language whereas lexical distinctions are imposed by real world 
categorizations
47
. In each of the next subsections we examine these points in detail and see why 
they are at odds with other tenets of CS linguistics. 
  
                                                          
46
 In keeping with the CS methodological principle of beginning analysis with the smallest possible problem, the 
analyst ought to begin with just one potential signal and attempt to formulate a meaning that accounts for its 
distribution. If the analysis succeeds then we have an independent – that is, lexical – meaning hypothesis. But the 
analysis might fail, and the reason may be that the deployment of the putative sign, call it sign A, is influenced by 
the availability of signs B and C whose meanings offer speakers competing expressive alternatives. The 
consequence is that sign A is absent in places where its hypothesis would lead one to expect it. In this case, the 
analyst must explore the distributions of signs B and C and posit tentative meaning hypotheses that would explain 
why the distributions of each sign differ (in Chapter IV we have explored the constraining effect of see, seem and 
appear on the distribution of look). If the analysis succeeds then we still have only independent – lexical – meaning 
hypotheses. But, it may be that in the course of exploring the different distributions of signs A, B and C, the analyst 
finds that she cannot formulate a substantive meaning for A that makes clear how it differs from B or C. In that case, 
the only way the analyst can differentiate them is to define A as not – one way or another – being the other/s. When 
such meanings are posited a CS grammatical system has been created (Reid, personal communication). 
47
 Of course, there have been successful CS hypotheses – such as Crupi’s (2004) hypothesis of yet, but and still – of 
independent meanings that are nonetheless invariant, constrain the deployment of one another, and offer a 
linguistically-imposed categorization. One might think that these forms that Crupi studied fall somewhere in the 
middle on the grammar-lexicon continuum. But this is untenable, as will be explained.  
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2.1   The a priori assumption of a grammar-lexicon continuum 
The idea of a grammar-lexicon continuum has not (explicitly, at least) originated in the thinking 
of Diver; rather, it is a familiar idea that seems to have made its way to CS through the work of 
cognitive linguists (see Huffman 2012:17). Cognitivists, in turn, have come to posit a continuum 
in response to generative theory where grammar and lexicon are qualitatively seen as two 
completely different types of entities in the linguistic system: for the generativists, the term 
grammar applies to a set of innate principles that exist independent of the communicative 
function of language and that underlie one’s linguistic knowledge; the lexicon, by contrast, is 
seen as a kind of dictionary, a list of idiosyncrasies that must be learned through exposure, and 
which in turn allows speakers to put the innate grammatical knowledge into operation (see, e.g., 
Haegeman 1994:16). In direct contrast to the view of the generativists, cognitive linguists make 
the initial assumption that language is first and foremost an instrument of communication and 
consequently, that linguistic constructs – whether lexical or grammatical – are all inherently 
symbolic: “lexicon, morphology and syntax make up a continuum consisting solely of 
assemblies of symbolic structures” (Langacker 2004:21, original emphasis). This is then the form 
of the continuum. At the lexicon end there are particular concrete words or constructions, such as 
I, I don’t or I am. At the grammar end there are purely schematic constructions, that is, abstract 
patterns of symbolization, such as SVO, that emerge from the frequency of use of particular 
complex expressions (e.g., I ate the cookie, She saw mom, etc.). And lastly, in the middle of the 
continuum there are various different types of constructions that are partly schematic and partly 
concrete, such as the more X the more Y (e.g., the more you study the more you’ll know). 
 Note now that given the CS conception of grammar – which is quite different from the 
cognitivist conception delineated above – a grammar-lexicon continuum becomes, upon 
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inspection, simply untenable. First, unlike cognitive linguists, an appeal to the degree of how 
schematic or how concrete a linguistic unit is plays absolutely no role in CS in the identification 
of a linguistic unit as grammatical or lexical; indeed, the schemas posited by cognitive grammars 
typically involve a priori syntactic categories which, for the most part, CS analysts do without. 
Instead, as explicated above, in CS the term grammar has been applied to meanings that 
constitute a closed system, whereas the term lexicon has been applied to forms whose semantic 
value is independent. Now, whereas cognitive analyses can stand to have linguistic units that are 
partly schematic partly concrete, a CS analysis could never stand to have a linguistic unit that is 
partly systemic, partly independent; the meaning of a particular sign is either hypothesized to be 
a part of a system or it is not. Indeed, despite talking of a grammar-lexicon continuum, no CS 
analysis has ever proposed that a hypothesized sign actually stands in the middle.  
 Nonetheless, Huffman (2012:17) informally cites prepositions and adverbs as forms that 
may occupy the middle of the putative continuum. But in the analytical history of CS, whenever 
forms traditionally classified as prepositions or adverbs were studied, the result always involved 
either a systemic or an independent meaning hypothesis. For example, Reid (2004) offers a 
systemic meaning hypothesis of the forms at, on and in (even though he, too, talks of these forms 
in various places as if they were lexical, e.g., on p.105). But, because Reid’s hypothesis involves 
a closed system where the meanings in the system are mutually defined, these forms should be 
recognized as 100 percent grammatical; (it may sometimes be forgotten that their traditional 
classification as prepositions need have no bearing on their status). On the other hand, Crupi 
(2004) offers an analysis of the forms yet, but and still and posits an independent meaning 
hypothesis for each; hence, yet, but and still should be recognized as 100 percent lexical. 
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2.2   The a priori assumption of polysemy in the lexicon 
As discussed extensively in Chapter I, Diver’s principled distinction between the linguistically 
encoded meaning on the one hand and the subjective experience of message partials on the other 
is what makes the hypothesis of an invariant meaning feasible; yet it seems Diver only applied 
the meaning-message distinction to grammar while uncritically continuing to accept unrestricted 
polysemy in the lexicon, so much so as to resist applying the technical term meaning altogether 
to lexical units (see Diver 1995 [2012]: Section 3.3.2; Huffman 2012:17; Reid 2004:122). Reid 
(2004:105) notes that Diver was particularly apprehensive that an uncontrolled appeal to 
metaphor would allow a lexical analysis to escape falsification
48
. While our analysis has 
appealed to metaphor to explain some of the uses of look, the justification for and status of 
conceptual metaphor vis-à-vis our hypothesis were carefully controlled. Various pieces of 
empirical evidence independent of the use of look were brought forth in support of the 
conceptual link between vision and intellection. And, it is precisely the recognition that this 
conceptual link is a feature of cognition generally rather than of language particularly that has 
freed our analysis from the need to evoke polysemy in the linguistic code. Rather than 
identifying non-visual interpretations as an additional meaning of look, our analysis has treated 
the metaphor as merely another way that the hypothesized meaning can contribute to the 
communication of the ongoing message.  
Note, further, that the assumption that invariant meanings are the province of grammar 
alone is inconsistent with the CS view that a language is an inventory of signs. As explicated in 
Chapter I, the identification of a sign only follows a successful joint-hypothesis of a signal 
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 One wonders why this apprehension – which in general terms concerns the problem of polysemy – was not 
handled by the same analytical principles that have guided Diver’s thinking on grammar – where the risk of 
polysemy is no less.  
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corresponding to an invariant meaning. But, if there are forms in the language that are lexical and 
therefore lack – by definition – invariant meanings, how could these forms ever be identified by 
a CS analysis as signs? In other words, Diver’s views regarding polysemy in the lexicon defy the 
possibility of a lexical hypothesis (though, as mentioned above, Diver did talk of the lexicon as a 
hypothesis); at best, it can offer a description, much as would a dictionary. And finally, the 
notion of a grammar-lexicon continuum fails again, this time because a meaning hypothesis 
cannot be partly invariant, partly polysemous
49
; partly polysemous is polysemous, and 
polysemous senses cannot be sustained as a CS hypothesis (see arguments in Chapter II: Sections 
1 and 7, as well as discussion in Reid 2004: Section 9).  
2.3   The a priori assumption that only grammatical forms constrain one another 
There is no doubt that the meanings of a grammatical system constrain the deployment of one 
another, yet there is every reason to believe that the meanings of lexical units do so, too. Still, 
one argument Diver offered for this supposed differential status of grammar and lexicon involves 
a thought experiment speculating on what might happen if some form were to suddenly drop out 
of the language (see, e.g., Diver 1995 [2012]: Section 3.2.1.4). If it were a grammatical form that 
dropped out of usage then the consequence would necessarily be a reshuffling of the other 
meanings in the system, influencing of course their deployment by speakers. This is so because 
grammatical meanings are only understood via their value relative to other grammatical 
meanings in the same system; thus, any alteration in one part of the system shifts the value of the 
other members. By contrast, if a lexical form were to suddenly drop out of usage then this, Diver 
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 The possibility of a form being in the middle of the continuum for being fully systemic (like grammar) and yet 
polysemous (like lexicon) is also impossible to sustain as a CS hypothesis, because CS cannot admit of polysemy 
(see Reid 2004). The alternative – a form that is fully independent (like lexicon) and fully invariant (like grammar, 
according to Diver) – is precisely what we have proposed in this dissertation for look. But no one wants to argue that 
look is in the middle of the continuum.  
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maintains, need not have consequences for any other form in the language. Now this may seem 
true with respect to forms like cat or deer – Diver’s examples. But, as we have seen in the 
analyses of Chapter IV, speakers’ choice of the hypothesized sign look is certainly influenced by 
the availability of the signs see, seem and appear, whose meanings offer speakers competing 
expressive alternatives despite not forming a closed system. Indeed, look sometimes fails to 
occur in places where its hypothesized meaning might lead one to expect it to occur (e.g., in 
Objects in mirror are closer than they appear). The explanation for its occasional absence has 
been offered in terms of the constraining effect of the hypothesized meanings of see, seem and 
appear on the distribution of look. Returning now to Diver’s thought experiment, if somehow, 
say, appear were to drop out of the language, it may well be that the distribution (and eventually 
meaning) of look would change accordingly so as to cover some of the area where previously 
speakers were choosing appear; (for example, in the hypothetical absence of appear, Objects in 
mirror are closer than they look might turn out to be the best way to express the intended 
message). 
2.4   The a priori assumption that lexical meanings are based on real-world categorizations 
Given the fact that Diver most emphatically adopted Saussure’s assertion that “language is a 
principle of classification” (Diver 1974 [2012]:31), it is ironic that Huffman states that lexical 
meanings reflect real-world categorizations rather than being imposed by the language. Saussure 
is here making the point that a language may divide up a spectrum of conceptual possibilities any 
way it likes and that the conceptual distinctions languages make are, therefore, arbitrary. 
Interestingly, while Diver adopted this truism wholeheartedly to grammar, Saussure’s own 
examples come from the domain of lexicon. For instance, Saussure notes that English 
distinguishes river and stream on the basis of size whereas French distinguishes riviere and 
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fleuve on the basis of whether the water flows into the sea (see Culler 1976:33-4). Similarly, in 
our own analysis of look and see it would be difficult to maintain that the hypothesized 
difference between them – ATTENTION versus EXPERIENCING – amounts to a straightforward real-
world categorization. There are conceivably other ways that the semantic domain of vision could 
have been partitioned and it is quite probable that different languages draw somewhat different 
distinctions. For example, out of context, look would be translated to Hebrew as histakel while 
see would be translated as ra’a. But, to take just one type of seemingly an unusual case, in many 
imperative contexts where English speakers use look (such as, say, in Hey, come look at this 
bird!), Hebrew speakers actually use ra’a (Hey, bo tire’e et ha-zipor ha-zot). Of course a full-
fledged analysis would be required, but it does seem that the (as yet unknown) meanings of the 
visual forms in Hebrew do not match precisely the hypothesized meanings of look and see in 
English. It seems therefore that, despite the lexical status of the forms involved, each language 
nonetheless imposes its own distinctions on the semantic domain of vision (see also Otheguy 
1995:218). 
2.5   Conclusion 
The assumptions we have examined regarding the nature of the lexicon have served in the 
history of CS to bias the selection of forms of interest for analysis: from its inception, the choice 
of CS linguists has been to concentrate on grammatical forms since, as we have seen, the a priori 
assumptions made about lexicon and grammar have rendered lexical analysis impossible to 
execute. But the choice to concentrate on grammatical forms has also been justified as follows: 
“a premature stab at lexical analysis might risk misattributing to lexicon what properly belongs 
to grammar” (Huffman 2012:17). In our own case, for example, resting on the shoulders of 
successful CS hypotheses of grammatical formatives, we have appealed to the presence of entity- 
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and event-suggesting morphologies (such as the or -ed), thus freeing us from the need to attribute 
these message partials to the meaning of look. Indeed, Huffman proposes that understanding the 
contribution of grammar to communication would help to elucidate what the contribution of 
lexicon might be (2012:17). So now, after a great many successful grammatical hypotheses 
offered in the CS framework, the time has finally come to recognize that the potential risk of 
misattribution has significantly diminished, and that the contribution of lexicon can safely be 
explored. Our analysis has shown that the CS term meaning can apply to lexicon in precisely the 
same way as it has previously applied to grammar. The biases and assumptions CS analysts have 
long held about the lexicon have proved wrong for look, a word all agree is lexical. Indeed, in 
our analysis of look we have discovered that no reason to evoke polysemy actually arises, much 
as this has been discovered time and again for grammatical forms. All the rationales and testing 
techniques used by CS analysts in validating meaning hypotheses of grammatical systems have 
proven here equally applicable.  
3   Recapitulations 
This dissertation has posited a meaning hypothesis for look that has explained the distribution of 
that form in documented acts of speaking and writing; furthermore, the hypothesis has given rise 
to numerous genuine predictions (that is, predictions to hitherto unknown facts) of quantitative 
co-occurrence favorings that have been confirmed in a massive corpus of English texts produced 
by thousands of speakers. In addition to doing what all scientific predictions do, namely 
increasing our confidence in the hypothesis that produced them, the predictions made here 
provide us with new knowledge about the distribution of look, see and other forms that may 
provide useful for other scholars.  
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The qualitative analyses offered in this dissertation have explicated the fit of the 
hypothesized meaning – ATTENTION, VISUAL – with the various different types of messages or 
message partials suggested by the use of look. For example, the hypothesized meaning has 
explained why speakers choose look for the communication of message partials involving visual 
activity (e.g., looked carefully at the photo), message partials involving attribution (e.g., look 
beautiful), and message partials involving visual features (e.g., rely on my looks). In all of these 
cases, look is chosen because visual attention is a feature of the communicated message. The 
characteristics of the message that are relevant to the validation of the meaning hypotheses have 
not been the product of the analyst’s intuition or knowledge of English, but have been 
consistently demonstrated through redundant information available in the attested texts. In 
explaining the choice of look made by speakers on the basis of its meaning, we have also 
endeavored to explain why other closely related forms, such as see and appear, were not chosen 
in the contexts under study.  
As part of the analysis, we have seen that the meaning of look underdetermines the 
messages it can be used to communicate. Indeed, it is this gap between meaning and message 
that has enabled a single invariant meaning to explain by itself all occurrences of look without 
the need to invoke either polysemy or homonymy. We have thus had no need to posit a ‘look-
noun’ and a ‘look-verb’, recognizing that the message partials involving an act of visually 
attending as opposed to visual features are fully attributable to the surrounding morphology 
(such as -ed or the). More generally, we have attempted to show that the classification into 
lexical form classes is not equipped to explain, nor discover, the many peculiarities in the 
distribution of look that we have discovered and explained. The syntactic classification can at 
best explain why, say, look co-occurs with -ed (because it is a verb, it would be said), but it 
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cannot explain – as we have done – why, for instance, look co-occurs with this at a higher than 
chance frequency in comparison to the; or why – on a particular occasion – look is chosen as 
opposed to see; or why – on a particular occasion – look is chosen as opposed to appearance.   
In order to explain facts of this sort an appeal to the meaning of the form is required. In 
speculating about the meaning of look, previous studies have nonetheless let the traditional 
syntactic categories guide the semantic analysis. Thus, Gruber (1967), Landau and Gleitman 
(1985), Levin (1993) and others have all restricted their dataset only to verbal uses of look and, 
in order to explain how its distribution differs from see, have posited a feature of ‘activity’ in the 
meaning of look. But ‘activity’ contradicts uses such as found in the new look or looking good, 
where no activity seems to be at issue. These analysts have thus been led to positing more than 
one linguistic unit look (a verb and a noun, at least) – inevitably, because the analysis began from 
a biased dataset that completely left out many of the different uses of this form. The hypothesis 
proposed here, by contrast, has made no a priori assumptions about lexical form classes, and has 
treated every occurrence of look as equally the responsibility of the hypothesis. Looking at an 
unbiased and unrestricted dataset, a unified explanation for the full range of the distribution of 
look has become feasible and, as in the case of this dissertation, has enabled the generation of 
supporting verifiable predictions.   
Furthermore, much as we saw no need to posit ‘look-verb’ and ‘look-noun’, we also saw 
no need to posit constructions that exist as linguistic units over and above their component parts. 
Instead, the message partials that are often communicated through frequent sequences such as 
look for (search), look up to (admire), look after (take care of), etc. have been fully explained in 
terms of the contribution of the hypothesized meaning of look – together with the contribution of 
the forms it co-occurs with. Indeed, the hypothesized meaning ATTENTION, VISUAL has explained 
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why look is chosen even when look for is used for a communication that does not involve a 
message of searching, or when look up to is used for a communication that does not involve a 
message of admiration. The meanings of the putative constructions thus empirically fail as 
explanatory hypotheses for the distributions of these sequences because these sequences are 
sometimes used for the communication of message partials that are quite different from the ones 
proposed as the meanings of these constructions. 
We have further had no reason to posit two senses of look – one ‘visual’ and another 
‘intellectual’. Nonetheless, like the cognitivists, we have appealed to the conceptual metaphor 
mapping the domain of vision to the domain of intellection to explain uses of look such as found 
in look at how you’re thinking. But unlike the cognitivists, we have concluded that there is no 
need to build the metaphor into the linguistic code. It is precisely because the conceptual link is a 
feature of cognition generally rather than of language specifically that VISUAL alone is sufficient 
to explain both the visual and intellectual messages. Moreover, the hypothesis of separate visual 
and intellectual senses is impossible to falsify because there are many occurrences where the two 
putative senses are combined and blend into one another. If the analyst only considers a handful 
of examples, some like look at the photo and others like look at how you’re thinking, then it may 
well appear that the uses of look fall neatly into discrete conceptual categories, one involving 
only vision and another involving only intellection. But as more examples are analyzed, the 
conceptual space between the putative senses fills in, revealing a continuum that defies a 
principled partitioning. We have seen numerous examples where the communicated message 
simultaneously involves both vision and intellection, thus only lending further support to the 
conceptual metaphor being a general feature of cognition, and obviating the need of positing 
‘intellectual’ as a secondary sense. 
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The classification of look into lexical form classes, as well as the positing of 
constructions of which look is only a part, and the positing of visual and intellectual senses – all 
result from an underlying assumption (one that is set aside here) that the meanings of linguistic 
forms are available to introspection, and can be known to the analyst simply by virtue of the 
subjective experience of understanding communicative intents in utterances. In other words, 
many linguists are accustomed to identifying the meaning of a form with some aspect of the 
message communicated on a particular occasion of the form’s use. It thus may seem that a 
component in the meaning of look is ‘activity’ because the message communicated on some 
occasions of its use involves an element of activity; or it may seem that the meaning of look-for 
is ‘search’ because the message communicated on some occasions involves a message partial of 
searching. When the meaning of a form is thus identified with the conceptual fractions of 
message or message partials that the form is involved in, the analyst is inevitably led to positing 
multiple linguistic units per form because virtually all forms are used for the communication of 
many different types of messages or message partials.  
The success of the meaning hypothesis proposed here in explaining the distribution of 
look has crucially depended on William Diver’s fundamental distinction between, on the one 
hand, the invariant meaning – that which is a part of the linguistic code – and, on the other, the 
message or message partial – the interpretation of the code through a process of inference. Rather 
than encoding messages, meanings are here seen as merely sparse notional fragments that 
provide but hints, prompts from which many different types of message elements can be inferred. 
While the hypothesized semantic value of look is sparse, it has been shown to provide precisely 
the right amount of semantic substance that is necessary to explain all of its different uses, as 
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well as to explain why look is chosen where see, seem and appear may initially appear as 
plausible alternatives. 
Turning now to a recapitulation of some of the quantitative data. As noted, the 
hypothesized meaning has been empirically supported through large scale quantitative 
predictions testing for the regular co-occurrence of look with particular other forms that, by 
hypothesis, are chosen by speakers to produce partially overlapping message effects. For 
example, the hypothesized meaning we have abbreviated as ATTENTION, VISUAL has explained 
why look co-occurs with carefully at a higher than chance frequency in comparison to carelessly. 
Previous analyses, as mentioned above, have all classified look as an activity verb and have used 
this classification to explain why look – but not see – co-occurs with carefully. But carefully and 
carelessly are equally applicable modifications for activities and both modifications are found to 
co-occur with look. Our hypothesis is, as far as one can tell, the only one that could explain why 
it is that look favors carefully in particular (noting that this favoring is particular to look and does 
not extend to just any form that is used to denote an activity). Furthermore, the hypothesized 
meaning has explained why look co-occurs with at at a higher than chance frequency in 
comparison to on and in. Of course, everyone already knew that look at is most frequent but our 
hypothesis (together with Reid’s 2004 hypotheses of the meanings of at, on and in) has explained 
why this is so: it is (in a nutshell) because look and at – each due to its hypothesized meaning – 
both contribute to a message feature involving a narrowing of the visual field. 
In addition to these patterns of distribution that may have long been known, the 
hypothesized meaning has also led to the discovery of numerous peculiarities in the distribution 
of look that have been noted here, and explained, for the first time. For example, the hypothesis 
of ATTENTION has led to the discovery that look co-occurs with this at a higher than chance 
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frequency in comparison to the. Or again, our hypothesis has discovered and explained why look 
co-occurs with a preceding but at a higher than chance frequency in comparison to a preceding 
and. Moreover, the hypotheses of both look and see have also explained why look favors co-
occurrence with this more so than see, and again, why look favors co-occurrence with a 
preceding but more so than see.  
Furthermore, by positing meaning hypotheses for see, seem and appear we have 
explained why look is sometimes absent where its hypothesis might lead the analyst to expect it. 
For example, the hypothesized meaning of see – EXPERIENCING VISUALLY – has explained why 
see favors co-occurrence with a following a more so than look; the hypothesis of appear – 
INITIATION OF PERCEPTION – has explained why appear favors co-occurrence with a following 
but more so than look; and lastly, the hypothesis of seem – PERSPECTIVE DEPENDENCY – has 
explained why seem favors co-occurrence with at the time more so than look. These are all newly 
discovered distributional facts that have only just been revealed through our meaning 
hypotheses.  
It is worth mentioning that the hypothesized meanings of look and of see have also 
explained why see favors co-occurrence with the meaning LESS CONTROL (roughly, what the 
tradition calls a direct object) more so than look. Previous analyses have all classified look as an 
intransitive verb, and have used this classification to explain why look co-occurs with 
prepositions (e.g., Levin 1993). But look does sometimes co-occur with the meaning LESS 
CONTROL, as for instance in look me in the eye. While some may posit this particular sequence to 
be a special construction (e.g., Wierzbicka 1988), no one has ever considered looked him right 
across the table at the China Club (Chapter IV, example 11) a construction. Our analysis has 
shown that there is no need to posit a construction in either of these cases because the 
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hypothesized meaning of look, together with the established hypothesis of the meanings of the 
Degree of Control System, can explain both why look disfavors co-occurrence with LESS 
CONTROL as well as why the two meanings are nonetheless sometimes chosen together. 
While most of the predictions presented in this dissertation were made on the basis of 
ATTENTION, some predictions followed from VISUAL as well. For example, we have seen that 
look co-occurs with visual attributes (e.g., green) at a higher than chance frequency in 
comparison to seem (which lacks VISUAL in its meaning). Or again, the hypothesis of VISUAL has 
explained why look co-occurs with forms denoting visual entities (e.g., painting, tree) at a higher 
than chance frequency in comparison to forms denoting abstract entities (e.g., music, idea).  
One final note with respect to the quantitative predictions we have made. While previous 
CS analyses have tested their quantitative predictions on one or more texts each produced by a 
single person/author, this study has tested large-scale distributional predictions using COCA – a 
massive on-line corpus produced by thousands of speakers and writers. The use of COCA has 
allowed me to carry out many quantitative tests that would simply be impossible to do if done by 
“hand” using a couple or several books. Take, for instance, the predictions concerning the 
frequency of but look in comparison to and look, or of looks to me in comparison to seems to me; 
if done by hand, it would be practically impossible to gather enough tokens of either of those 
sequences to produce any significant results. This is true of virtually all the counts presented in 
this dissertation; none of them could have been done if all the tokens had to be found manually 
by reading through texts. The ability to search through the massive corpus on-line allows the 
analyst an unprecedented freedom, making it possible to test the frequency of virtually any 
sequence one wishes. While the quantitative predictions have been tested in this blind manner 
through large-scale searches, still, it must be stressed that each and every prediction presented in 
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this dissertation has resulted from a qualitative analysis of an attested example that was found by 
hand. This methodological procedure underscores the fact that the proposed meaning hypotheses 
are intended to explain a speaker’s choice of a particular sign on each occasion of its use. The 
confirmation of the predictions made in this dissertation have thus demonstrated that, through the 
use of a massive corpus, objective quantitative evidence can be brought to bear on the analysis 
proposed for a particular example, either supporting it or failing to support it.  
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